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The payment of bridewealth is a near-universal cultural practice among the Igbos of South-
East Nigeria. Bridewealth used to be a symbolic legitimator of marriage. However, its 
symbolism has been distorted by expensive items on marriage lists. In this context, bridewealth 
payment provides an excellent analytical tool for the structure-agency debate, which has, in 
varying degrees, engaged academic interest for centuries. Underlying this debate is the extent 
to which institutions determine human behaviour and its attendant power relations. While 
structure refers to the self-replicating, complex elements that sustain institutions, agency refers 
to the volitional, purpose-driven nature of human activities. In this debate, the structural-
functionalist-Marxist view, symbolic interactionism, and complementarity view are prominent. 
From these views, this dissertation develops a needs-based approach to structure-agency 
interaction, arguing that a focus on the primacy of structure or agency obscures their underlying 
motivations. It posits that the structure-agency interaction is both the process and product of 
logical assessments and dialogue, which are driven by socio-economic needs. In the context of 
this framework, it explored one central question: In what ways do power relations play out in 
the negotiation process of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria? Using literature review, 
non-participant observation of bridewealth negotiations, and in-depth interviews of 47 key 
informants, it reveals an interdependent, complex web linking the custodians of culture with 
agentic tools such as wealth, religion, and education. Despite cultural inhibitions in spousal 
selection and bridewealth negotiation, prospective spouses have a range of creative tools for 
reducing exorbitant items on marriage lists, thereby deconstructing high bridewealth. These 
agentic tools are driven by socio-economic elements such as desire to marry, economic 
coercion, cohabitation, threat of extramarital pregnancy, and religious values. The study 
concludes that bridewealth negotiation reflects socio-economic dynamics within hybrid 
cultural spaces in which potential couples and their parents may navigate the powerful 
constraints of tradition or sustain tradition through their inaction. These socio-economic 
dynamics are so powerful that they produce widespread disregard for legislation limiting 
bridewealth amounts. The study’s findings demonstrate the ineffectiveness of a top-down 
approach to law, the value of policy sensitivity to people’s lived realities, and the importance 
of in-depth consultation in the formulation of legislation.  
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Chapter One: Laying the groundwork 
 
1.1  Problem background  
In what ways do power relations play out in the negotiation process of bridewealth payment in 
South-East Nigeria? This question emerges from a longstanding academic interest in the 
interaction of institutions and their influence on human behaviour.1 In a general sense, unequal 
power relations raise challenges for state policy makers in two ways. First, they put a strain on 
people’s obligation to respect the rule of law, as provided in constitutional clauses on equality 
and other laws that purport to regulate behaviour.2 Second, they reflect the interaction of 
normative orders and their effects on programme implementation and outcomes. For example, 
disdain for legislation against high bridewealth may be caused by people’s preference for 
customary laws, or people’s belief that traditional leaders are the legitimate authorities in 
decision-making concerning customary law. Disdain for bridewealth legislation may also be 
based on people’s belief that it is not attuned to their customary law, cultural relations, or 
economic realities. Such belief reflects a need-based approach to bridewealth payment, which 
occurs in contexts of emotional, cultural, religious, economic, and normative interaction. 
Accordingly, the manner power relations play out in the context of bridewealth negotiation and 
payment is significant for the structure-agency interaction. In this study, the manifestation of 
power relations sheds light on the pervasive influence of cultural institutions on individuals’ 
agency, especially women, girls, and even young men.  
Traditional marriage laws and practices are often based on cultural institutions that 
affect the exercise of individuals’ agency, depending on the extent to which individuals resist 
through factors such as gender, age, religion, and sometimes, wealth. The dynamics of unequal 
power relations are sustained, invoked, and sometimes resisted by actors purporting to protect 
tradition on the one hand, and actors attempting to change tradition, on the other hand. This 
protection-versus-alteration dynamic creates tension between custodians of traditions, such as 
                                                 
 
1 D Elder-Vass The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency (2010) 1-6; S Hays 
‘Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture’ (1994) 12(1) Sociological Theory 57-72 at 57-59. 
 
2 See, for example, s. 42(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Republic of Nigeria, which provides for the right to 
equality. See also Limitation of Dowry Law, Eastern Region Law No. 23 of 1956, now Cap 76 Laws of Eastern 
Nigeria 1963, which regulates bridewealth. 
 




elders and traditional rulers, and change-seekers, such as couples and parents, who resist the 
powerful cultural constraints of traditional marriage in their desire for more convenient 
marriage procedures. In South-East Nigeria, this tension is very visible in the negotiation 
process of bridewealth payment, a process that occurs in complex cultural spaces that demand 
elucidation.  
The payment of bridewealth is a near-universal practice among the Igbos of South-East 
Nigeria, largely because of the cultural value placed on it.3 Bridewealth is a material or non-
material value given by the groom’s family to the bride’s family as a legitimating symbol of a 
customary law marriage.4 Its payment is accompanied by an elaborate ceremony involving 
activities that constitute and symbolise the formal commitment of a potential groom and his 
family to initiate a marriage tie and cement a lasting relationship with the family of the potential 
bride.5 In the past, the ceremonies and materials that accompanied or marked this commitment 
were suited to the needs of an agrarian society. Accordingly, bridewealth payment sometimes 
took the form of labour or service from the groom to the bride’s family for a stipulated period, 
which was termed bride service.6 This service was often accompanied by a small cash payment 
and drinks. As I show below, the requirement for bridewealth is a key aspect of the structure-
versus-agency interplay in Igbo traditional marriage.  
In Igboland, marriage requires some steps or procedures, which a man and woman must 
undergo before living as husband and wife. These procedures and their accompanying customs 
                                                 
 
3 CO Odimegwu & A Zerai ‘Understanding the Proximate Determinants of Fertility of a Nigerian Ethnic Group’ 
(1996) 52(3/4) Genus 67-87 at 71.  
 
4 G Ferraro & S Andreatta Cultural Anthropology: An Applied Perspective (2011) 222-225. Other requirements 
for the validity of traditional marriage include consent, spousal capacity, and celebration of the marriage. On the 
requirements of a customary marriage, see generally, Beckley vs Abiodun (1943) 17 NLR 59 where the court held 
that Ibo marriage was not contracted until the formal handover of the bride had taken place. See also Edet vs 
Essien (1932) 1 NLR 47; Adeyana vs Bamidele (1968) 1 ALL NLR 31,34; Agwasim & anor vs Ejivumerwerhaye 
& others (2001) 9 NWLR Pt 718 at 395; Igbokwe vs U.CH Board of management (1961) WNLR 173, 175; E 
Nwogugu Family Law in Nigeria (2014) 73; TO Elias Groundwork of Nigerian Law (1954) 283, 285.  
 
5 DJ Smith ‘Romance, Parenthood, and Gender in a Modern African Society’ (2001) 40(2) Ethnology 129-151 at 
135, 139. It must be noted that the concept of marriage has different meaning in different contexts. See LD Wardle 
‘What is marriage?’ (2006) 6(1) Whittier Journal of Child and Family Advocacy 53-103 at 53-55. In the context 
of South-East Nigeria and this study, marriage may be defined as a union of a man and a woman, or a man and 
more than one woman, which usually entails obligations owed by one person to the other. On the definition of 
marriage, see generally S Girgis, RP George, & RT Anderson ‘What is marriage?’ (2011) 34 (1) Harvard Journal 
of Law and Public Policy 245- 287 at 246-253. 
 
 
6 G Ferraro & S Andreatta op cit note 4 at 224. 
 




reveal the dynamics of unequal power relations within the interplay of structure and agency. 
After the couple have indicated an intention to marry, the first step preceding bridewealth 
payment is iku aka n’uzo (which literally means knocking at the door). Here, the groom-to-be 
and his family introduce themselves to the bride’s family and convey their intention. This is 
followed by a second visit, which is scheduled after both families (headed by the fathers of the 
couple) have undergone a background check of the other family to ascertain whether they have 
hereditary diseases such as epilepsy and mental problems, and whether they are osu (outcast) 
or diala (freeborn).7 Osu people are believed to be an untouchable caste in South-East Nigeria, 
and are viewed as persons dedicated to a god as its servants.8 They are not allowed to inter-
marry with other members of the community, who are referred to as the diala (freeborn).9 As 
a reflection of unequal power relations within the structure-versus-agency interplay, 
intermarriage among the Osu and diala is still widely forbidden. The reason is to avoid 
contamination of the diala or incurring the wrath of the gods, which could allegedly bring 
epidemic to a community.10 Even though the Osu and diala dichotomy does not reflect in 
bridewealth negotiation because it occurs prior to a marriage agreement, it demonstrates the 
constraining influence of structure on prospective spouses’ freedom to choose marriage 
partners.  
The second step in the marriage process, which reveals the interplay of structure and 
agency, is the inara list. It literally means ‘asking for the list of customary requirements,’ and 
usually follows when the marriage investigation is positive for both families. When the 
                                                 
 
7 LN Anameze Marriage Among Igbos: An Analytical Study of Past and Present Practices (1996) 54. 
 
8 SC Agunyai & J Etembo ‘Women August Meeting and the Quest against Discrimination of OSU in South-East, 
Nigeria’ (2017) 25(1) Ife Social Sciences Review 13-24 at 21; CT Nwaoga ‘Socio - Religious Implications of 
Child Adoption in Igboland South Eastern Nigeria’ (2013) 4(13) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 705-
710 at 708; TA  Osinubi ‘Abolition,  Law,  and  the  Osu  Marriage  Novel’ (2015) 2(1) Cambridge Journal of 
Postcolonial Literary Inquiry 53-71 at 58; E Nwaosuji ‘An Appraisal of Osu and Oru Caste Systems in Nnokwa 
Community Anambra State’ (2015) 9 Global Journal of Applied, Management and Social Sciences 103-110 at 
103; EC Onyeozili & ONI Ebbe ‘Social Control in Precolonial Igboland of Nigeria’ (2012) 6(1/2) African Journal 
of Criminology and Justice Studies 29-43 at 34; F Onwubuariri ‘Appraising the Osu Caste System in Igbo Land 
Within the Context of Complementary Reflection’ (2016) 2(4) Igwebuike: An African Journal of Arts and 
Humanities 58-100 at 61. 
 
9 See also DA Offiong ‘The Status of Slaves in Igbo and Ibibio of Nigeria’ (1985) 46(1) Phylon (1960-) 49-57 at 
51; AW Igwe & GO Akolokwu ‘The Scar that Has Resisted Erasal: The Discrimination of Osu of Igboland, 
Nigeria: Assessing the Human Rights Implications’ (2014) 4(1) American International Journal of Contemporary 
Research 277-285 at 276-280. 
  
10 SN Ezeanya ‘The Osu (Cult-Slave) System in Igbo Land’ (1967) 1(1) Journal of Religion in Africa 35-45 at 
38-39. 
 




investigation is negative for either or both families, the marriage may not take place despite the 
desires of the intending couple.11 Families who call off the marriage do so on the basis of 
pressure from custodians of culture, while families who persist with the marriage do so on the 
basis of agency, of which Christianity, education, and  acculturation are chief factors.12 Some 
parents who discover that their potential in-laws are Osu could resist pressure from elders, 
traditional leaders, and oracles to cancel the marriage, while others may succumb to calling off 
the marriage.13 Parents who resist pressure from tradition make a needs assessment, which is 
informed amongst others by their desire to ensure their children’s happiness, or their desire for 
the material benefits of the marriage union.14 Potential couples themselves may attempt to 
navigate cultural constraints through agentic tools such as education, religion, and economic 
coercion.15 In this case also, a needs-based approach is evident. 
The last step involving the interplay of structure and agency in the marriage process is 
the negotiation and payment of bridewealth. This final step is often accompanied by the 
celebration of the traditional marriage (igba nkwu). The final quantum of bridewealth is mostly 
influenced by customs and traditions, as well as the negotiating skills of both families.16 It is 
also influenced by the financial ability of the groom, as well as the depth of his emotions for 
the bride, all of which reflect needs-based choices. The groom and his family are given a list 
of customary requirements, which include livestock, bridewealth (aku nwanyi), foodstuff, and 
other material things.17 These items must be provided before a marriage can be said to have 
                                                 
 
11 DA Offiong op cit note 9 at 56. 
 
12  A detailed explanation is provided in Chapter five. See generally GI Nwaka ‘The Civil Rights Movement in 
Colonial Igboland’ (1985) 18(3) The International Journal of African Historical Studies 473-485 at 484; AA Mere 
‘Contemporary Changes in Igbo Family System’ (1976) 6(2) International Journal of Sociology of the Family 
155-161 at 160. 
 
13 E Obinna ‘Contesting identity: The Osu caste system among Igbo of Nigeria’ (2012) 10(1) African Identities 
111-121 at 112-115. 
 
14 E Uchendu ‘Woman-Woman Marriage in Igboland’ in AU Azodo & MN Eke (eds.) Gender and Sexuality in 
African Literature and Film (2010) 149.  
 
15 See also AC Diala ‘Successful Marginalised Group Inclusion in Customary Governance Structures and 
Processes: Case Study of The Osu People in Owerri South-East Nigeria’ in J Hedström & J Smith (eds.) 
Overcoming Political Exclusion: Strategies for Marginalized Groups to Successfully Engage in Political 
Decision-Making (2013) 35. 
 
16 DD Nsereko ‘The Nature and Function of Marriage Gifts in Customary African Marriages’ (1975) 23(4) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 682-704 at 686. 
 
17 These material things range from hand bags, travelling bags, shoes, clothing (wrappers and head scarfs). 
 




taken place. The consequences of not providing all or some of these items could be a boycott 
of the marriage ceremony or even non-recognition of the marriage by the community. These 
consequences sometimes depend on the extent to which the marriage requirements are 
complied with.  
After the materials have been presented and accepted by the groups mentioned above, 
the bridewealth is negotiated and paid for in cash, non-living material items, or livestock such 
as cows, goats, and sheep. The negotiation starts, orally in most cases, with a bundle of broom 
sticks, cowries or shells, which was used in the past to indicate how much is to be paid.18 
According to Waya and Okanume, the bundle of broom sticks has both ‘metaphoric and 
symbolic’ meaning.19 The broom sticks represent what the bride’s family believe her virtues 
and accomplishments are worth. Sometimes, the family assessment of a bride’s worth was 
informed by their own financial needs or their status in society. Nowadays, most communities 
use ropes and stones to signify the amount to be paid. The groom and his kinsmen receive the 
tied bundle, count it, remove a certain number of sticks from the bundle, and return it to the 
bride’s family. The returned quantity signifies how much they desire to pay. The needs 
assessment evident in the returned items is influenced by the amount of money a stick, stone, 
cowrie or rope represents for the families. With both families taking turns to add and subtract 
sticks, the negotiation continues until an agreed sum is reached and paid.20 Chapter five 
analyses the dynamics of unequal power relations and the agentic forces involved in this 
negotiation. For now, I turn to the literature on structure and agency to show their relevance to 
unequal power relations in bridewealth negotiations in South-East Nigeria. 
 
1.2  Theoretical framework 
This thesis stands at the intersection of law, sociology, and economics. Accordingly, it draws 
from these sister disciplines to explain its conceptual framework on bridewealth negotiation 
within the structure-versus-agency interplay.  
                                                 
 
18 DT Waya & AC Okanume ‘Evaluation of the Tiv and Igbo Marriage Systems’ (2017) 29 Journal of Culture, 
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The interaction of institutions has, in varying degrees, engaged academic interest for 
centuries.21 At the heart of this interest is the extent to which social structures and human 
agency determine behaviour and its attendant power relations.22 Here, the terms ‘institution’ 
and ‘structure’ denote formal and informal rules and processes, which constrain and/or shape 
agency – that is the way people act or live their lives.23 While structure refers to the self-
replicating, complex social forms that give stability to institutions such as government, 
communities, universities, and marriage, agency refers to the volitional and purpose-driven 
nature of human activities such as thoughts, action, monitoring, and reflexivity.24 The structure-
versus-agency debate centres on the constraining effect that social structure is believed to exert 
on human activities, and the associated ability of individuals to act independently of this 
constraint.25 Three broad views dominate this debate in the social sciences. They are the 
structural-functionalist-Marxist view, the symbolic interactionism view, and the 
complementarity view.  
The structural-functionalist-Marxist view of sociology regards social life as the product 
of a system of relationships. These relationships create embedded structures, which determine, 
in a sort of top-down approach, how individuals function in society.26 Here, the key word is 
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‘function’ – i.e., the operation of social structure is responsible for the manner individuals 
function or behave. In other words, this school of thought privileges structure as the prime 
determinant of behaviour, thereby confining humans to passive responders and mere 
‘occupants’ of social places.27 For example, prospective spouses would have little or no choice 
than to comply with all traditional requirements for bridewealth payment and marriage 
ceremony, irrespective of their opinions and even financial means. The structural-functionalist-
Marxist view thus downplays the agency of humans, both as creative agents and as 
determinants of social organisation. As evident in chapters five and six, this view is not 
supported by my field findings, which show that bridewealth negotiation displays considerable 
agency driven by people’s needs and informed choices. In this sense, the structural-
functionalist-Marxist resonates with legal positivism, which sees the state as unquestionably 
powerful, and sees state law as an effective tool for moulding behaviour irrespective of people’s 
preferences for other normative orderings.28   
Although the extremity of the positivist theory has been whittled down by Hart’s 
conception of law as the union of primary and secondary rules, legal positivism still neglects 
the influence of human beliefs, attitudes, religion, and socio-economic activities in shaping 
structure and the law.29 As shown in chapter five, legal positivism and the structural-
functionalist view of sociology derive scant support from field evidence on bridewealth 
payment in South-East Nigeria. However, their theoretical principles are significant for 
people’s disobedience or adherence to the obligation to provide all items in the marriage list, 
which is the customary list containing the formal requirements for a traditional marriage, 
including the bridewealth payment itself.30 These theoretical principles also manifest in cultural 
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constraints on couples’ presence during their bridewealth negotiation. In this sense, legal 
positivism and structural-functionalism help to explain the persistence of high bridewealth, 
which as evident in chapter five, is encouraged by frivolous items on the marriage list. 
Accordingly, the influence of legal positivism and structural-functionalism is doubtful because 
changes are occurring in the practice of bridewealth payment, which are not traceable to the 
influence of structure. 
Conversely, the symbolic interactionism or interpretive view of sociology believes in 
the ability of individuals to construct and reconstruct their world (social structure) in a manner 
that gives meaning to their existence.31 Accordingly, this view emphasises the need to account 
for human behaviour through the lens of individuals’ ongoing activities and opinions.32 In other 
words, social structure is formed through the ideas individuals hold about phenomena, their 
interpretations of the situations they encounter, and their interactive responses to these 
situations. However, symbolic interactionism fails to account sufficiently for the immense 
pressure that structure exerts on agency. In bridewealth payment, for example, it cannot explain 
the formidable resistance that prospective spouses encounter when they attempt to challenge 
marriage customs and traditions. Put differently, symbolic interactionism would present an 
unrealistic view of the dynamics of power relations in the bridewealth payment process, as well 
as the coercion, dialogue, and compromises that emerge from the interaction of structure with 
agency. As Archer explained, the restraining and enabling power of structure can only be 
exerted on logical human beings capable of responding in reasonable ways.33 Accordingly, the 
interaction of structure with agency involves not only structural influence on agency, but also 
agency’s reception, resistance, and compromises on structural demands. As I shall explain, this 
reception, resistance, and compromises follow a needs-based approach similar to the 
complementarity view of structure-agency interaction. 
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The complementarity view of sociology seeks a balance between the symbolic 
interactionism view and the structural-functionalist view of sociology, since it perceives 
structure and agency as products of mutual and interdependent interaction.34 The 
complementary theory resembles a recent academic view of the structure-versus-agency debate 
known as new or normative institutionalism. As the more widely used phrase, new 
institutionalism is gaining ground among scholars, especially economists and sociologists.35 
Championed by John Meyer, Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, it focuses on the ‘production 
and maintenance of norms, the interplay between formal and informal systems of constraints, 
and the effect of belief systems on economic action and institutional change.’36 New 
institutionalism is prompted by Granovetter’s proposition that economic action revolves 
around social relationships and informal norms. It is thus concerned with the social structures 
that surround individuals’ interests, influence norm development, and determine the role of 
norms in bringing about institutional change.37 In this sense, new institutionalism is akin to 
Hoggett’s reflexive behaviour, in which social actors continually modify their actions due to 
their interactions with formal norms.38 Other than Hoggett, several variations have been 
developed to justify and advance the complementarity theory of social behaviour. In what 
follows, I examine these variations in a manner that culminates in the model that suits my 
theoretical approach.  
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The first variation of the complementarity theory is the dialectical model. It was 
initiated by Benson and developed by Seo and Creed.39 In the simplest sense, a dialectic 
relationship between two things means mutual influence of one on the other. To perceive the 
relationship between structure and agency as a dialectical one is to assert that although social 
structure shapes individuals’ behaviour, individuals and groups also shape social structure. As 
Cole put it:  
After all, society is a social creation – the creation and maintenance of social order 
requires the cooperation of individuals connected through social relationships. So, while 
the lives of individuals are shaped by the existing social structure, they none the less 
[sic] have the ability– the agency– to make decisions and express them in behaviour.40  
 
In essence, the dialectical model holds that institutional change is ‘an outcome of the dynamic 
interactions between two institutional by-products: institutional contradictions and human 
praxis.’41  
In relation to power, Collinson demonstrated how the dialectical model can provide 
new and innovative ways of understanding shifting dynamics of leadership and control.42 He 
did this by acknowledging the inherent dynamics of unequal power relations. Collinson 
recognised that even though leaders and structures have significant control over individuals, 
their power may produce opposite outcomes. These outcomes may be intended or unintended 
through the activities of their followers, such as resistance and acquiescence. Thus, he viewed 
control and resistance as interdependent variables. Lesorogol’s study in Sambura, Kenya, also 
sheds light on the dialectical model.43 She acknowledged the dynamic nature of institutional 
change processes and the exogenous and endogenous factors that create conditions conducive 
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to change. She found that inequalities and conflicting interests among different social groups 
provide impetus for change, as well as ammunition to attack or defend common property. 
The second variation of the complementarity theory of social behaviour is the 
morphogenetic model. It was initiated by Buckley and advanced by Archer.44 The 
morphogenesis model was first used in a biological evolution context. Over time, there has 
been considerable effort to extend its application to the study of social behaviour and 
institutional change.45 The morphogenetic model suggests that structure – that is society and/or 
its institutions – can be transformed or altered by both the intended and unintended activities 
of human agency. It also suggests that structure has neither pre-set form nor operational 
features capable of resisting human agency.46 What this means is that although structural 
practices such as bridewealth payment may appear impregnable, human agency can erode their 
operation, alter their format, and in time, even abolish them.47  
By stressing the power of agency, therefore, the morphogenic approach highlights the 
importance of consultation in policy implementation. Local populations are unlikely to be 
impressed with policies that purport to regulate their lives without adequate sensitivity to the 
lived realities that inform and influence their social choices.48 As Moore’s semi-autonomous 
social field theory indicates, individuals will not hesitate to tailor their behaviour along the 
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lines of whatever works best for them, regardless of the demands of state law.49 For example, 
brides can reflect on the state of bridewealth payment in their community or tribe and (re)orient 
their approach. This reorientation, which could result in autonomous decisions, is usually based 
on a needs-assessment. In turn, the behavioural products of these assessments have power to 
reshape customs and tradition regarding the quantum, beneficiaries, and legitimacy of 
bridewealth.50 Porpora utilised examples such as  cotton, gin, computers, mobile phones, and 
the internet to explain the application of morphogenesis and its effects on social behaviour.51 
Moore’s study in Tanzania shows how small-scale individual actions can cumulatively erode 
strong institutions.52 Ensminger and Knight’s study of the attitude of young men regarding the 
quantum of bridewealth payment in Galole Orma of northeastern Kenya shows the 
transformations that have occurred in the modus and recipients of bridewealth payment.53 In 
the past, bridewealth used to be paid to the bride’s father, and by extension, the extended 
family. However, due to Islamic influences, economic motives, and changes in bargaining 
power, families are increasingly turning to indirect dowry – that is payment of bridewealth to 
the bride herself. This is a logical, needs-based approach, which seeks to maximise the benefits 
of the bridewealth payment to prevent its misuse by the bride’s family members. Such an 
approach involves bargaining or persuasion to convince traditional actors to make a shift from 
established practice. As Knight and Ensminger explained it, indirect dowry is enticing, ‘as it 
funnels resources to the conjugal couple and their descendants rather than to the father of the 
bride and his lateral kin.’54 Even though the indirect dowry is still provided by the groom, 
Knight and Ensminger depart from the new institutionalism and symbolic interactionism 
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theories through their emphasis on bargaining as the key vehicle for shifts from established 
traditional practices.   
The third advancement of the complementarity theory is the bargaining model, which 
is grounded in the rational choice theory.55 This theory offers a nuanced understanding of the 
structure-versus-agency debate by recognising social behaviour as the product of informed 
decisions based on cost-benefit analyses. Thus, it acknowledges the benefits or satisfaction 
people derive from making logical decisions based on the choices available to them.56 By 
stressing how people calculate the potential gains and losses of their decision-making, the 
bargaining model reveals asymmetries and conflicts in power relations.57 Here, agents are 
recognised decision makers who offer solutions to problems through bargaining. People 
usually arrive at bargaining decisions after carefully assessing their needs. Although some 
decisions may be taken in a moment of passion, people usually weigh the pros and cons of the 
choices available to them and could change impromptu decisions taken without proper needs 
assessment. For example, Ensminger and Knight’s study in Galole Orma, Kenya, reveals the 
choices that inform shifts in power relations and customary practices. They explained how 
conflicts over norms governing marriage were resolved through bargaining between 
prospective spouses and custodians of customs.58 Arguably, these bargaining processes 
followed a needs-based approach, and the logic of these needs played influential roles in 
inducing institutional change. By explaining these bargaining processes, Ensminger and Knight 
created an approach for explaining norm emergence and change and the mechanisms that cause 
normative change. They explained the three mechanisms responsible for the dynamic process 
of normative change as: coordination on focal points; competitive selection among contracts; 
and bargaining. Of these three mechanisms, asymmetries in bargaining power is the most 
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important source of normative change.59 Given that bridewealth has distributional effects, 
bargaining power is an instrument in its formation and transformation, since bridewealth 
payment serves the interest of those with the most bargaining power in society.60 In turn, the 
bargaining power of actors involved in bridewealth payment is influenced by their ideology, 
the rate of compliance to traditional norms, and the mode of enforcing these norms.  
The rational choice theory has been critiqued for arguing that people act based on cost-
benefit analysis, which seemingly ignores the emotional elements that influence behaviour. 
Nonetheless, I endorse it because it resonates with my field findings. However, in adopting it 
and rejecting its criticisms, I recognise that people do not only make decisions based on 
material gains; they are also influenced by factors such as ideological, spiritual, and traditional 
values. However, their ideological beliefs are influenced by their assessment of which choices 
work best for them and their community.61 The bargaining model of rational choice, in 
combination with morphogenesis, informs my needs-based approach to the structure-agency 
interplay. A needs-based approach regards the interaction of structure and agency as both the 
process and product of choices reached after logical assessments and dialogue, which are 
driven by socio-economic needs. By socio-economic needs, I mean the material, emotional, 
spiritual, and even legal needs of individuals. As I explain in chapter six, a needs-based 
approach reveals interdependence between structure and agency, which is evident in the 
complex web linking the custodians of culture with agentic tools such as wealth, religion, and 
education. It is suited to the interplay of structure and agency, wherein the negotiation process 
of bridewealth payment yielded rich information.  
The fourth advancement of the complementarity theory is Giddens’ structuration 
model, which sees structure as both the medium and outcome of individuals’ activities.62 Here, 
medium and outcome entail rules, resources, procedures, and sanctioning of modes of conduct, 
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which allow people to act in beneficial ways within appropriate contexts. I argue that these 
beneficial ways are outcomes of needs-based assessments. By perceiving structure and agency 
as a duality, Giddens argues that structure not only constrains but also enables. He sees agency 
as the ability to make and remake rules, bearing in mind the intended and unintended 
consequences.63 In other words, people construct and reconstruct structure through their 
change-inducing activities.64 His theory holds that irrespective of the extent of asymmetric 
power relations, structure and agency have a mutual, interdependent relationship.65 In this 
sense, it resembles the strategic-relational view of sociology,66 which perceives structure as the 
‘metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged.’67 Thus, the structure-versus-agency debate 
is about the product of their interaction rather than their individual components.68 Just like 
some of the other views discussed above, Gidden’s theory has received criticism for its focus 
on the duality of structure and agency, which could mask the power of social structures to 
influence human behaviour. Contrariwise, I believe the duality inherent in the structuration 
theory does not obscure power relations if the structure-agency interaction is viewed from a 
needs-based approach. Socio-economic needs are the drivers and determinants of the structure-
agency interaction. These needs compel individuals to make choices, defy tradition, or 
persuade/bargain with the custodians of tradition to usher in normative changes. Accordingly, 
a needs-based approach offers a convincing explanation for human behaviour, thereby making 
the structure-versus-agency debate unnecessary.  
                                                 
 
63 See generally, S Best A Beginner's Guide to Social Theory (2003) 184-190. 
 
64 M van Rooyen ‘Structure and Agency in News Translation: An application of Anthony Giddens’ Structuration 
Theory’ (2013) 31(4) Southern African Linguistics and Applied Language Studies 495-506 at 499-504. 
 
65 A Giddens New Rules of Sociological Methods: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies (1976) 60; A 
Giddens op cit note 23 at 24 and 199; A Giddens op cit note 62 at 93. 
 
66 B Jessop ‘Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach’ (2005) 56 New Formations: A Journal of 
Culture, Theory and Politics 40-53 at 48; B Jessop State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place (1990) 
191, 260-264, 275-290; C Hay Re-Stating Social and Political Change (1996) 147-155; B Jessop ‘Interpretive 
Sociology and the Dialectic of Structure and Agency’ (1996) 13(1) Theory, Culture and Society 119-128 at 124; 
B Jessop ‘Institutional Re (turns) and the Strategic-Relational Approach’ (2001) 33(7) Environment and Planning 
1213-1236 at 1226. 
 
67 C Hay Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (2002) 127; see also D Valler & A Wood, ‘Devolution and 
the Politics of Business Representation in Britain: A Strategic - Relational Approach’ (2004) 36 Environment and 
Planning 1835-854 at 1835-1836. 
 
68 A Gamble, et al ‘Editorial: New political economy’ (1996) 1(1) New Political Economy 5-11 at 5; A 
Chettiparamb ‘Steering Across Scales: Applying a Strategic-Relational Approach to a Study of Land Mobilisation 
for Road Widening in Kochi’ (2007) 19 Journal of International Development 413-427 at 415. 
 




Given that social roles are the major determinants of power dynamics in society,69 
feminist perspectives on unequal power relations is relevant to the negotiation process of 
bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria.  
 
1.2.1  What feminists say 
The literature on gender sheds light on how the dynamics of unequal power relations in 
bridewealth negotiation reflect the influence of structure and agency.70 Feminists seek to 
broaden understandings of the ways institutions confer and distribute power between women 
and men in social groups.71 They argue that gendered structures construct gendered interests, 
ideas, and identities.72 In other words, whether individuals are acting structurally (for example 
as law makers, rulers, or enforcers) or as agents, there is an element of gender bias in play, in 
that individuals manifest varying shades of maleness and femaleness. These gender 
manifestations affect the outcome of behaviour, rules, and power, irrespective of whether 
individuals are interpreting, breaking, or complying with norms.73  For example, Asiimwe 
argues that even though the payment of bridewealth has overwhelming support among the 
members of the community, its motivations, processes and outcomes are gendered and bent 
towards reinforcing masculinities and femininities that do not only create, but also reinforce 
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male dominance and female subordination.74 In this study, the fact that, unlike the bride, the 
groom is sometimes allowed to be present during the negotiation process of bridewealth 
payment is an expression of unequal power relations. Similarly, the fact that the bride is usually 
represented by her father, uncle, or brother, is an expression of unequal power relations.75 This 
cultural constraint reflects the influence of structure and agency on each other. This is because 
research participants informed me that in the past, grooms were not allowed to be present 
during bridewealth negotiation.76 Like brides, they were represented by their fathers or uncles 
if their father was unavailable. Nowadays, however, grooms can be present, even though 
usually passive. It is unclear the extent to which their presence is traceable to their own agency, 
given that some brides pressure the groom to observe the bridewealth negotiation and attempt 
to exert influence through their fathers. While the groom’s presence may be passive, he is often 
consulted by his family on the way forward since he usually funds the marriage expenses, 
unlike in the agrarian past when it was funded by the extended family. Thus, during the 
negotiations, grooms whisper in their fathers’ ears regarding decisions to add more money to 
demands or hold their ground on an offer. This consultation of grooms demonstrates the 
economic needs assessment involved in bridewealth negotiation. It also demonstrates grooms’ 
increasing voice in bridewealth negotiation, thereby showing how agency can bring about 
institutional change. Conversely, women’s non-participation in their bridewealth negotiation 
indicates unequal gender relations, which undermines their agency and underpins their feelings 
of weakness and subordination. In short, it proclaims the superiority of men over women, 
thereby reinforcing patriarchy.  
In Key concepts in feminist theory, Walby critically analyses the influence of patriarchy 
on women’s empowerment and victimisation.77 Amongst other questions, her work appears to 
seek an answer to this question: to what extent can women’s actions be seen to be constrained 
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by patriarchal structures?78 In the context of this study, her work is relevant for examining the 
extent to which the bride’s absence may be perceived as a constraint on her agency by 
patriarchal structures. Walby provides insights to this question in two parts.  
First, if women have agency, then they must be choosing their oppression, and if they 
do not choose it, then they are merely passive victims. While the latter denies and 
underestimates the agency of women, the former suggests that women create their oppression.79 
My understanding is that, often, women create and reinforce their oppression in the negotiation 
process of bridewealth payment when they unquestioningly accept norms, practices, or values 
that render them invisible, powerless or passive. By so doing, they reinforce their subservience, 
which in turn hinders them from fighting unfavourable social structures. In mitigation, one 
could argue that many of the conditions that influence women’s agency are too institutionalised 
for them to change them.80 These conditions need to be interrogated, hence the need for a 
review of women’s agency in the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial South-East Nigeria to 
understand the changes that have occurred, the reason for the changes, and causes of 
persistence.81  
In offering solutions to unequal power relations, feminists suggest the need to account 
for the problem through participation and interaction, which implies the interdependence of 
structure and agency.82 For example, Bystydzienski chooses the term empowerment, which 
denotes a process by which oppressed persons take control of their lives by participating with 
others in discussions of issues that affect them directly.83 This kind of participation contributes 
to social change and distribution of social power.  
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The literature on bridewealth payment reveals some form of continuity in people’s 
perceptions of masculinity and femininity. As stated earlier, in the past, bridewealth was an 
important symbol of marriage, a pledge that the bride will be treated well, and a recognition of 
her productiveness and worth to her community.84 It was paid in societies characterised by 
closely-knit family units.85 Sociologists have referred to these societies as ‘multiplex’ and ‘kin-
dominated.’86 Their close-knit nature was a product of their agricultural settings. In these 
settings, families worked as united entities to produce family property such as livestock, 
economic crops, and farming tools.87 The head of the family was the primary ‘breadwinner,’ 
and the one in charge of work parties and the overall income of the family.88  He oversaw 
wealth production and distribution for the general welfare of members of the family. The result 
is that bridewealth payment was strongly influenced by the joint production of family income.89 
Given that bridewealth was often raised by the family, it was usually negotiated by the family 
head. This custom is no longer compatible with the individual nature of income production in 
contemporary Igbo society.  
In The land has changed,90 Korieh described the revolutionary changes that colonial 
rule brought to the agrarian settings of South-East Nigeria. He explained how extended families 
became mostly replaced with nuclear families characterised by individual production of 
wealth.91 Today, many prospective spouses are the breadwinners of their families, especially 
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the groom. Accordingly, they provide the resources for bridewealth payment with little or no 
help from their extended family.92 Scholars have suggested that the shift of bridewealth 
payment from the family to the groom reinforced masculinity. This is because the bride’s 
family believes that high bridewealth demonstrates the groom’s ability to take care of their 
daughter.93 The Igbo adage nwata kwo aka o soro ndi okenye rie nri (a child that washes his 
hands deserves to eat with the elders) demonstrates this perception. However, although 
individualised payment of bridewealth signals commitment to care for the bride, it does not 
really suggest that the commitment will continue after marriage. 
As stated above, this study utilises a needs-based view of the structure-agency debate 
as its theoretical framework for examining the dynamics of unequal power relations in 
bridewealth negotiation in South-East Nigeria.  
 
1.3  Why the study area? 
This study focuses on South-East Nigeria, a geo-political region comprised of Enugu, 
Anambra, Imo, Abia, and Ebonyi states.94 I selected it for two reasons.  
One, it has generally homogenous socio-cultural features such as dialects, religion, and 
customs, which help in generalising some of my research findings. 
Two, as most scholars have noted, the highest amount of bridewealth is paid in South-
East Nigeria, unlike other ethnic groups where the payment is almost negligible.95 The reasons 
for the persistence and demand of high payment ranges from the high value placed on women, 
to the value placed on bridewealth payment as an age long tradition that needs to be maintained 
and sustained – that is, a culture to be proud of.96 Exorbitant rates of bridewealth payment led 
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to the adoption of the Limitation of Dowry Law by the then Eastern Nigerian government in 
1956.97  
In 1954, the then Eastern regional government of Nigeria set up a four-person 
committee to investigate the social effects of the payment of bridewealth and to make 
appropriate recommendations. After investigating, the committee concluded that bridewealth 
was unnecessarily high and recommended for the payment to be statutorily limited to £30.98 
The committee also recommended penalties for exceeding the stipulated amount. They further 
recommended that incidental expenses should be defined as expenses related to marriage gifts 
and should be limited to £5.99  
  Following the committee’s report, the former eastern Nigerian government introduced 
the Limitation of Dowry Law. The law made it an offence punishable on conviction with six 
months’ imprisonment for anyone to receive or pay more than is stipulated by the legislation.100 
Section 5 (b) of the Limitation of Dowry Law further states that ‘no court shall make any decree 
or order if the claim involved in such suit or proceeding or if the passing of the decree or order 
or if such execution would be in any way contrary to any provision of this Law’. This provision 
in other words empowers the court to reject any claim of bridewealth that exceeds the sum 
stipulated in the Limitation of Dowry Law. However, the legislation is wisely silent on the 
validity of marriage where the bridewealth breaches the law.101  
Following complaints about the Dowry Law and consultations in 1979 to address these 
complaints, a bill titled ‘the Limitation of Bride Price Law’ was introduced to repeal the 
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Limitation of Dowry Law, but was never passed.102 The law stated that the maximum amount 
to be paid as bridewealth, excluding marriage gifts, is 500 Naira ($1.37 or £1.17) whilst the 
inclusion of marriage gifts reduces the payment to 200 Naira plus 300 Naira as incidental.103 
Even though this law was not passed, one notable change to it lay in its title: from ‘Dowry’ to 
‘Bride Price’.  
However, the Dowry law is a glaring failure, given that people flagrantly flout it by 
continuing to charge high sums as bridewealth.104  
Its failure demonstrates the limitations of state law, as well as conflict between state 
law and culture.105 In most of these conflicts, culture prevails. This may be illustrated with an 
anecdote reported by Ogbu:106  
[A] man who insisted on paying no more than the official bridewealth of thirty pounds 
was asked by the relatives of his bride-to-be whether he came to marry according to 
government regulation or according to local customs. Before he could answer, he was 
told that if he wanted to marry according to government regulation, he should go to 
Enugu and marry a daughter of one of the cabinet ministers. Having no real choice in 
the matter, the man had to pay more than twice the official bridewealth. He was then 
given his bride and a receipt, but the latter bore only the amount of the official 
bridewealth. When the marriage later failed, the man could only recover the official 
bridewealth as he could present no written evidence to the native court judges that he 
paid a higher bridewealth. In any case, it would have been against the law to do so. 
 
Regarding the efficacy of legislating against high bridewealth, Nwaka has observed that 
‘legislation, however well-intentioned, is often ineffective against attitudes and prejudices 
which cannot be easily reduced to specific grievances amenable to legal or administrative 
remedy.’107 His observation illustrates dissonance between the idea of the human as a subject 
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of structure typified by legal norms and people’s ability to defy legal norms that do not conform 
to their customs and traditions.108 
 
1.4  Why study bridewealth negotiation process? 
Bridewealth is an undeniably important cultural institution. Its negotiation process reflects 
power dynamics, their distributive consequences, and the needs assessment that precede and 
accompany people’s exercise of agency. By revealing how women and men bargain for 
privileges and power,109 bridewealth negotiation shows unique needs dynamics capable of 
enriching understandings of the structure-agency interplay. As Pettigrew rightly noted, 
investigating processes is the best way to ‘capture the dynamic quality of human conduct in 
organisational settings’.110 The organisational setting of South-East Nigeria is strongly 
patriarchal. Here, individuals’ choices of marriage partners – when to marry, where to marry, 
and who to marry, are heavily constrained by cultural factors. These factors include the clan, 
tribe, and the social status of the prospective parties – that is whether they are descendants of 
slaves or freeborn.111 As I pointed out in the literature review, there is dissonance between the 
origins of many customs surrounding bridewealth payment and the contemporary funding of 
bridewealth payment. The power of agency over structure is questioned in decisions regarding 
the quantum of bridewealth payment, who benefits from bridewealth payment, and the 
rationale for its distribution.112 Just like structural constraints on choice of marriage partners, 
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decisions over bridewealth distribution are determined by culture, even though the quantum of 
bridewealth is influenced by socio-economic factors such as education, high standard of living, 
and urbanisation.113  
Furthermore, during bridewealth negotiation, individuals who often did not make any 
substantial financial contribution to the upbringing of the bride, emerge to determine the 
manner of the distribution of bridewealth. It is during this period that the engaged couple 
discover that, although they bring the money needed to celebrate their marriage, they may not 
have much input in how the money is spent. They may not be able to determine who will benefit 
from the spending, and why those persons should benefit from it. In this sense, the cultural 
institutions that determine and maintain the quantum of bridewealth payment often conflict 
with individuals’ desire to influence the payment of bridewealth. The confluence of culture and 
the socio-economic elements of needs-based agency create an intriguing research puzzle. In 
this confluence of, or hybrid social relationship, potential couples are constrained in their 
ability to actively participate in bridewealth determination, quantum, and distribution on the 
one hand. This is problematic, since they fund the bridewealth. It is especially problematic for 
the bride, whose passive role in bridewealth negotiation seriously questions her agency as an 
adult capable of rational, independent actions.114 As the Igbo saying goes, nwanyi amaghi mgbe 
erere ya (a woman does not know when she is sold). On the other hand, couples’ compliance 
with the cultural restrictions surrounding bridewealth payment sustains it as a social structure. 
Couples’ cultural restraints, coupled with the involuntary absence of the bride, demonstrates 
unequal power relations and reinforces patriarchal continuities.  
This research is significant for policy implementation in Nigeria, especially in the 
context of law’s complex role in development.115 As disdain for the Dowry Law shows, people 
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are unlikely to be impressed with policies that seek to regulate their lives without adequate 
sensitivity to the socio-economic needs that influence their social choices.116 The failure of the 
Dowry Law reflects policy insensitivity to the importance of bridewealth payment, especially 
the beliefs and conditions that sustain it. It also calls for a rethinking of the socio-economic 
needs that inform behaviour on bridewealth payment. As Ian Greener put it, ‘the underlying 
assumptions that policy makers hold about agency are crucial for the effectiveness of policy.’117 
Therefore, by investigating the structure-versus-agency interplay in bridewealth negotiation, 
this study promises to broaden policy understandings of women’s subordination, gender roles, 
patriarchal continuities, and conflict of laws. It will reveal how individuals such as potential 
couples and women are negotiating cultural spaces, privileges, and rights, using different 
strategies and tools.118 In sum, an empirical examination of the interplay of structure and 
agency in the context of bridewealth payment is significant to policy and scholarly 
understandings of unequal power relations.  
 
1.5  Objectives  
In the light of the research puzzle, I seek to use a needs-based view of the structure-agency 
interaction to broaden understandings of how power relations play out in the negotiation 
process of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria. Furthermore, I aim to shed light on the 
ways individuals manipulate or control the cultural institution of bridewealth payment. In so 
doing, I will uncover cultural constructions of structure within socio-economic needs and 
embedded notions of acceptable social conduct and restraints. 
 
1.6  Research question 
My investigation was conducted with the question I posed at the beginning of this dissertation:  
In what ways do power relations play out in the negotiation process of bridewealth payment 
in South-East Nigeria?  
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To answer this question comprehensively, and in line with the above objectives, I utilised 
the following probes:  
(a) Which factors are responsible for the persistence of high bridewealth payment? 
 
(b) What role does informal law play in the negotiation process of bridewealth payment?  
 
(c) In what ways do individuals use agency to manipulate bridewealth negotiation?  
 
(d) What significance does the structure-agency interaction hold for policy formulation and 
implementation in Nigeria?    
 
Given that social norms are the foundation of social life,119 the answers that emerge from these 
questions will benefit policy making and implementation in Nigeria.120 What follows outlines 
the methodology of study, which is described in detail in chapter two. 
 
1.7 Methodological outline 
I used a qualitative method to understand the dynamics of unequal power relations and how 
these dynamics play out in the negotiation process of bridewealth payment in South-East 
Nigeria.121 I triangulated literature review, direct, non-participant observation of bridewealth 
negotiations, and in-depth interviews of 47 key informants between March and May 2016.122  
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1.8 Chapter organisation 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, as follows: 
 
Chapter Two: Methodological approach and interpretation  
This chapter shows how the research method employed in this thesis worked to provide 
understanding of the research objectives and question. It specifically examines the research 
design, sample size, and limitations of the research method.  
 
Chapter Three:  The Concept of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria 
This chapter proffers an understanding of the concept of bridewealth, paying careful attention 
to its meaning and significance. It places emphasise on the distortion of bridewealth payment 
and reasons for this distortion. 
 
Chapter Four:  Structure, agency, and women’s voices in the Nigerian legal system 
This chapter offers a feminist account of structure and agency in Nigeria’s precolonial, colonial 
and post- colonial legal system. Specifically, it looks at the history of the Nigerian legal system 
in order to show how the reception of English law affected women’s agency in the context of 
bridewealth payment. 
 
Chapter Five:  Negotiation process of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria 
This chapter reveals the complex web of social relationships within which individuals 
manipulate or influence the cultural institutions of bridewealth payment. Using data from key 
informant interviews and personal observations, it reveals the active actors in the negotiation 
process of bridewealth payment, their roles, and the influence of agency on these roles.  
 
Chapter Six:  Significance of structure and agency interplay 
This chapter reviews the data obtained from interviews. It evaluates this data and shows how 
the understanding of the interplay of structure and agency debate in the context of negotiation 
process of bridewealth in Nigeria enhances policy implementation in Nigeria.  
 
Chapter Seven:  Conclusion  




This chapter concludes the thesis by providing a synthesis of each chapter, situating the theories 
with data, and points the way for future research.




Chapter Two: Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The methods discussed in this chapter seek to understand the ways in which the dynamics of 
unequal power relations play out in the negotiation process of bridewealth payment in South-
East Nigeria. These dynamics offer a useful lens for comprehending the interaction of structure 
and agency, as well as the significance of this interaction for policy makers, potential couples, 
their parents, and traditional leaders.  
The first significance is the strain that unequal power relations place on people’s 
obligation to respect state law, as it is articulated in constitutional clauses on equality and laws 
that purport to regulate behaviour.1  
The second significance is the strain that unequal power relations places on the 
interaction of normative orders, and the effects of this interaction on programme effectiveness.  
From the literature surveyed in the introductory chapter, no major work has investigated 
the dynamics of unequal power relations using the negotiation process of bridewealth payment 
and needs-based view of the structure-agency interaction. In filling this gap in the literature, 
this chapter starts by explaining the research design, method of data collection, and the choices 
made to ensure data reliability and validation. It then explains the area of study, types of 
research participants, questions used to elicit data from participants, and limitations 
encountered in the investigation.  
 
2.2 Research sites  
The study area is the south-eastern region of Nigeria, a geopolitical zone with an estimated 
population of twenty million. It comprises of five states – Imo, Abia, Anambra, Enugu, and 
Ebonyi states.2 I visited all of them except Ebonyi State, which is the farthest and would have 
been too financially demanding for me to visit. However, I interviewed research participants 
resident in other states who are indigenes of Ebonyi or married to indigenes of Ebonyi.  
                                                 
 
1 See, for example, s. 42(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Republic of Nigeria, which provides for the right to 
equality. See also Limitation of Dowry Law Eastern Region Law No. 23 of 1956, now Cap 76 Laws of Eastern 
Nigeria 1963, which purports to regulate bridewealth.  
 
2 See the first schedule in the 1999 Constitution of the Republic of Nigeria. All South-East states were carved out 
of Imo State. 
 




I chose South-East Nigeria because the highest levels of bridewealth payments in 
Nigeria are made in this area. Also, the states that make up this region share similar language 
dialects and demographic features, which make it easy to generalise some of the research 
findings in the area.3 The states most notorious for high bridewealth are Imo and Abia.4 Most 
of the research participants were selected from these two states, which are fiercely resistant to 
changes in bridewealth payment.5  
Research participants were purposively selected. The purposive sample selection 
method involves identification of research participants who can provide sufficient information 
on the phenomena sought by the research.6 In this study, it involved the selection of research 
participants based on the aims of the research question.7 It also involved the selection of 
participants in a manner that sought a balance between their locations, education, age, 
occupation, and social status. As mentioned earlier, most of the highest levels of bridewealth 
payments occurs in Imo and Abia states. Consequently, I selected most of the research 
participants from these areas.  
In addition, the research participants were drawn from urban, peri-urban and rural areas: 
55 per cent from urban areas (n=24), 32 per cent from rural areas (n=15), and 13 per cent from 
semi-urban areas (n=8). The reason for the urban bias is because most people have migrated, 
and are migrating to urban areas for education, jobs, and better livelihoods.8 The requirements 
                                                 
 
3 See HC Ogbu ‘The Homogeneity of Igbo Culture’ (2013) 4(6) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 393-
400 at 393. 
 
4 UC Isiugo-Abanihe ‘Bridewealth, Marriage and Fertility in the East-Central States of Nigeria’ (1995) 51(3/4) 
Genus 151-178 at 154.  
 
5 DJ Smith ‘Romance, Parenthood, and Gender in a Modern African Society’ (2001) 40(2) Ethnology 129-151 at 
135; CO Odimegwu & A Zerai ‘Understanding the Proximate Determinants of Fertility of a Nigerian Ethnic 
Group’ (1996) 52(3/4) Genus 67-87 at 71; P Iroegbu ‘Marrying Wealth, Marrying Money: Repositioning Igbo 
Women and Men’ in B Saunders & MC Foblets (eds.) Changing Genders in Intercultural Perspectives (2002) 
103; LA Obiora ‘Reconsidering African Customary Law’ (1993) 17(3) Legal Studies Forum 217-252 at 230. 
 
6 MQ Patton Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (2015) 230-238; SB Merriam Qualitative Research 
in Practice: Examples for Discussion and Analysis (2002) 12. 
 
7 A Bryman Social Research Methods (2016) 408-410; LA Palinkas, et al ‘Purposeful Sampling for Qualitative 
Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method Implementation Research’ (2015) 42(5) Administration and 
Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research 533-544 at 533; SJ Gentles, et al ‘Sampling in 
Qualitative Research: Insights from an Overview of the Methods Literature’ (2015) 20(11) The Qualitative Report 
1772-1789 at 1778. 
 
8 See also B Chukwuezi ‘Through Thick and Thin: Igbo Rural-Urban Circularity, Identity and Investment’ (2001) 
19(1) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 55-66 at 58. 
 




for determining what qualifies as urban, peri-urban, and rural areas are mostly based on the 
level of infrastructural growth (built environment and facilities), population density, and 
official classification.9 Nineteen of the research participants are from Imo State, eleven are 
from Abia State, seven are from Enugu State, five are from Ebonyi State, and six are from 
Anambra State. One participant is from Oyo State in South-West Nigeria, although he resides 
in Imo State, and married a woman from there. He provided an insider-outsider perspective.  
 
2.3 Research design  
To shed further light on the research question and problem, the methods I employed in this 
study aimed to investigate three key issues. The first is how individuals such as the potential 
couples and their parents are navigating the constraints of cultural institutions. The second is 
the role of formal and informal law in bridewealth payment. The third is the factors responsible 
for high bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria. Accordingly, I employed a qualitative 
research method.  
I chose a qualitative research method because it is the most practical method for 
obtaining a nuanced understanding of complex phenomena such as the dynamics of power 
relations in the negotiation process of bridewealth payment and decision-making based on lived 
realities. Qualitative methods provided me with in-depth accounts of peoples’ experience of 
bridewealth payment, especially their interpretation of events in their own voice and within 
their own cultural setting.10 Though complex phenomena can be quantified in some cases, the 
description of the complexity of cultural interaction, bargaining, and decision-making is best 
extracted using a qualitative research method. Creswell argues that qualitative research 
methods are best suited for exploring and understanding social problems.11  
The qualitative research methodology I used here involves face-to-face key informant 
interviewing, literature review, unobtrusive observation of traditional marriage ceremonies, 
and thematic data analysis. These methods revealed the challenges faced by individuals during 
                                                 
 
9 An example is the classification in the Imo State Ministry of Lands, Survey and Urban Planning; Enugu State 
Ministry of Lands, Survey and Town Planning. See generally, A Onibokun & A Faniran Urban Research in 
Nigeria (1995) 5-17.  
 
10 SH Matthews ‘Crafting Qualitative Research Articles on Marriages and Families’ (2005) 67(4) Journal of 
Marriage and Family 799-808 at 800; E Babbie The Practice of Social Research (2010) 296-7. 
 
11 JW Creswell Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (2009) 4. 
 




the negotiation process of bridewealth payment through research participants’ personal views 
and experiences.12 As I proceed to explain, a combination of interviews, literature review, and 
un-obstructive observation ensured that their individual limitations were remedied by their 
collective strengths.13 
 
2.3.1 Review of materials 
A literature review provided an understanding of the concepts of structure and agency, unequal 
power relations and bridewealth payment. It exposed gaps in the literature on bridewealth and 
helped me to identify suitable research methods. Given the gaps I identified in the literature, I 
used materials on bridewealth from elsewhere where necessary. These materials include 
Kitamura and Ohta’s study of the Turkana tribe of northern Kenya, Yarbrough’s study of the 
puzzling persistence of bridewealth in Kwazulu Natal, Yan’s study in north China, Burman 
and Van der Werff’’s study on contemporary bridewealth practices in South Africa.14 
In-depth interviews were the primary data-gathering method for this study. I conducted 
pilot studies with four participants to aid in the development and refinement of my research 
questionnaire.15 I used face-to-face interactions and semi-structured, open-ended questions for 
my interviews. This system comprised of lists of questions and probes with the same thematic 
areas to be explored with all participants. A semi-structured interview is useful for exploratory 
research.16 It allowed me to work easily and flexibly with my research objectives, probe 
                                                 
 
12 Ibid at 4; see also M Hennink, et al Qualitative Research Methods (2011) 9 and 205; A Giorgi Phenomenology 
and Psychological Research (1985) 72. 
 
13 TD Jick ‘Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action’ (1979) 24(4) Administrative 
Science Quarterly 602-661 at 608-610. 
 
14 K Kitamura ‘Communication for “Negotiation” among the Turkana’ (1997) 18(3/4) African Study Monographs 
(1997) 241-256 at 243; I Ohta ‘Marriage and Bridewealth Negotiations among the Turkana in Northwestern 
Kenya’ (2007) 37 African Study Monographs 3-26; S Burman & N Van der Werff ‘Rethinking Customary Law 
on Bridewealth’ (1993) 19(2) Social Dynamics 111-127; Y Yan ‘The Individual and Transformation of 
Bridewealth in Rural North China’ (2005) 11(4) Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 637-658; M 
Yarbrough ‘Very Long Engagements: Legal Consciousness and the Persistent Authority of Bridewealth in a South 
African Community’ (2014) New York Law School Review 1-69. 
 
15 S Kvale Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (1996) 148-150. 
 
16 E van Teijlingen & K Forrest ‘The Range of Qualitative Research Methods in Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health Care’ (2004) 30(3) Journal of Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care 171-173 at 
171; See TE Jayaratne & AJ Stewart ‘Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Social Sciences’ in MM Fonow 
& JA Cook (eds.) Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research (1991) 85-87; S Brinkmann 
‘Interview’ in T Teo (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Critical Psychology (2014) 1008. 
 




research participants’ responses, ask spontaneous questions, and obtain spontaneous and 
uninhibited answers from the research participants.  These methods are well suited for getting 
individual perceptions of cultural issues and suggestions for policy reform. It further helped 
me to unpack informed choices made by people based on their socio-economic needs. Data 
from interviews offered a contrast to data from literature review by revealing current attitudes 
towards bridewealth payment. It also helped me to obtain materials not available in the 
literature. I conducted the fieldwork during school holidays and festive periods. As such, the 
disposition and accessibility of research participants favoured face-to-face interviews. They 
were relaxed, with informal and conversational style of questioning. They were also more 
amenable to grant interviews in their business locations (n=18) and in their houses (n=29) than 
in other locations. My flexible approach in interview locations took into consideration the fact 
that some women may have feelings of uneasiness in discussing their experiences and 
perceptions of bridewealth in the presence of their husbands. Hence, I interviewed married 
couples separately. Interviews provided me with nuanced understanding of the origins of 
bridewealth payment, people’s cultural beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes towards the 
institution of marriage within which bridewealth payment occurs. It further shed light on the 
role of law and the perceptions of non-state policy makers such as village chiefs, and leaders 
of men and women associations. It also illumined people’s adaptation of cultural norms to 
socio-economic changes such as education, individual income, and religion, which I found to 
be significant bargaining tools in bridewealth negotiation. The findings I obtained from 
interviews are therefore contextual findings rather than sweeping generalisations.17  
 
2.3.2 Personal observations 
One of the goals of qualitative research is to discover patterns of behaviour that emerge after 
close observation and to ‘discover what can be learned about some phenomenon of interest, 
particularly social phenomena where people are the participants (or as traditionally referred to 
as subjects)’.18 As a research method, observation entails watching research participants in their 
                                                 
 
17 EW Eisner & MD Day Handbook of Research and Policy in Art Education (2008) 461. 
 
18 PS Maykut & R Morehouse Beginning Qualitative Research: A Philosophic and Practical Guide (1994) 21, 
43-44. 
 




natural environment to see if their behaviour matches the things they say about phenomena.19 
Un-obstructive observations helped me to witness bridewealth negotiations as they unfolded, 
check nonverbal expressions of negotiators, and monitor the silent communication narratives 
of some research participants. To understand the world, in this case the negotiation process of 
bridewealth payment, I needed to ‘become part of it.’20 Observations also entail watching how 
individuals are influenced by their environment. As Mulhall noted, ‘interviews with individuals 
provide the pieces of the jigsaw and these pieces are then fitted into the “picture on the box” 
which is gained through observation.’21 Observation is well suited for understanding how the 
dynamics of unequal power relations play out in bridewealth negotiations. It gave me better 
understanding of the customs and traditions surrounding bridewealth payment, the active and 
non-active players in bridewealth negotiation, and the behaviour of potential spouses, their 
parents, and other members of the family during the negotiation process.22 It further helped me 
to complement and contrast the data I obtained from interviews.  
I observed negotiations of bridewealth leading up to marriage ceremonies in two 
communities in Imo State in April 2016. Since my observation was not obstructive, I gathered 
data with an audio device and manually recorded my observations as field notes. The three 
main limitations I encountered relate to my role as an observer. The first is the effect of my 
presence on research participants. The second is cultural limitations on my presence in 
bridewealth negotiations conducted by men. The third is my limited ability to record my 
observations while absorbed in the marriage proceedings. However, I was able to make up for 
these limitations through interviews of participants, whose perceptions helped me to 
corroborate my personal observations of bridewealth negotiation. 
 
                                                 
 
19 A Tashakkori & C Teddlie Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (2003) 312-314; J 
Burke & LA Turner ‘Data Collection Strategies in Mixed Methods Research’ in A Tashakkori & C Teddlie (eds.) 
Handbook on Mixed Methods in the Behavioural and Social Sciences (2003) 312. 
 
20 MQ Patton op cit note 6 at 259. 
 
21 A Mulhall ‘In the Field: Notes on Observation in Qualitative Research’ (2003) 41(3) Journal of Advanced 
Nursing 306–313 at 308. 
 
22 See generally chapter five for more details of the members present during the negotiation process.  
 




2.4 Sample selection and description of research participants 
I need to point out that one or more individuals in my research participants belonged to more 
than one of the groups I explain below. Accordingly, it is difficult to give a total number of 
research participants in each individual group. For example, the traditional leaders were asked 
questions based on their capacity as parents and traditional leaders, as married couples and 
parents, and as parents and elders. Research participants were selected from the five mentioned 
states based on their age, occupation, state of origin, marital status, educational qualifications, 
and gender.23 I did not choose religion as a criterion because an overwhelming majority of 
South-East Nigerians are Christians.24 I chose research participants based on their key roles 
and influence in the community with regards to the negotiation process of bridewealth, their 
potential knowledge of the negotiation process of bridewealth, and their willingness to offer 
information.  The key research participants in this regard are traditional/village rulers, elders, 
and chiefs, married couples, parents of potential spouses, potential spouses themselves, and 
leaders of men and women associations. As such they are all knowledgeable and possessed the 
capacity to answer questions on bridewealth negotiation and payment. What follows is a 
description of the research participants and the questions I posed to them. This description is 
presented in no order, beginning with leaders of groups and associations.  
 
2.4.1  Leaders of men and women’s associations 
The women’s association referred to here is called otu umunwanyi alulu, which literally means 
an association of married women.25 This association has its equivalent men’s association. Just 
like that of the women, the men’s association is composed of married men in a lineage or 
community, titled men, and age grade groups.26 I interviewed four of these associations because 
they determine the items for their group on the marriage list and exercise disciplinary powers 
when there is failure to adhere to, or provide all the items on the list. They explained the criteria 
                                                 
 
23 See table 1 appendix J for an overview and participants’ demography. 
 
24 All my research participants are Christians. 
 
25 This association is different from other women’s associations in Igboland, as explained in chapter three of this 
thesis. DC Ohadike ‘Igbo Culture and Tradition’ in C Achebe, Things fall apart (1958) xxviii. 
 
26 See GI Jones ‘Ecology and Social Structure among the North- Eastern Ibo’ (1961) 31(2) Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute 117-134 at 128-133; B Umeogu ‘Igbo African Legal and Justice System: A 
Philosophical Analysis’ (2012) 2(2) Open Journal of Philosophy 116-122 at 117 and 121. 
 




for determining the items on the list, which helped me to account for factors responsible for 
high bridewealth payment. The ages of these leaders ranged from 43-55 years. Most of them 
are low income earners and have been educated up to high school. They were selected from 
both urban and rural areas. Sometimes, the ability of leaders of associations to regulate cultural 
norms is determined by traditional rulers, who are explained next. 
 
2.4.2  Traditional leaders 
Traditional leaders are widely regarded as the custodians of customs and traditions in 
Igboland.27 I interviewed two of them and their wives also. One of the traditional leaders is a 
graduate with a Nigerian Certificate in Education (NCE) and a principal of a high school at the 
time of interview. His wife is also a graduate and a teacher. The other traditional leader is a 
businessman, but also a university graduate. Along with their wives, they are all within the 
ages of 65-79 years.  Among other things, they provided me with an overview of the origin and 
significance of bridewealth payment in their community, the factors responsible for high 
bridewealth payment, and their role in enforcing the Limitation of Dowry Law. 
 
2.4.3 Elders and chiefs 
This group is slightly different from traditional rulers. While a traditional ruler oversees an 
entire community, chiefs and elders have power within their families and kinship groups. 
However, some of them are members of the traditional rulers’ cabinet.28 Elders and chiefs (n=6) 
are mostly elderly, titled individuals in the community who are also members of the Umunna. 
They wield considerable power in the negotiation process of bridewealth, especially over the 
contents of the marriage list.29 Their ages range from 62-70 years. They are low to high income 
earners, most of whom have a minimum of high school education. Their occupation ranges 
from farmers to businessmen. They enabled me to understand the significance of bridewealth 
payment, changes in its meaning, reasons for these changes, the criteria for fixing the items on 
                                                 
 
27 B Umeogu op cit note 25 at 119; CO Akakuru, et al ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Traditional Leadership Styles 
in Igboland, South-Eastern Nigeria’ (2014) 19(3) Journal of Humanities and Social Science 48-52 at 50. 
 
28 CO Akakuru, et al op cit note 27 at 48. 
 
29 The chiefs are Chief Okenwa Ejeagui from Anambra state; Chief Innocent Eziaghala from Imo state; Chief 
Anselm Anyaoha from Imo state; Chief Linus Uhuo from Ebonyi state; Chief IO Joshua from Abia state and Chief 
Olakuso from Oyo state, Western Nigeria who is married to a woman from Imo state.   
 




the marriage list, and the beneficiaries of these items. Above all, they explained the cultural 
consequences for not complying with the marriage list. These consequences are for the 
intending spouses on the one hand, and their parents, on the other hand.  
 
2.4.4  Potential and married couples 
 Potential spouses (n=9) and married spouses (n=14) gave an account of their experiences 
during the negotiation process of their bridewealth. They also offered their opinions on best 
bridewealth practices. I interviewed couples separately to obtain their individual views and to 
avoid leaving out vital information due to pressure from the presence of their partner. For 
potential spouses still undergoing the negotiation process of bridewealth payment, or who had 
just concluded the process, I asked questions such as their opinion about their lack of 
representation in the distribution of marriage gifts and key role players in shaping attitudes 
about bridewealth payment. Their ages range from 25-45 years; their educational qualifications 
range from standard six to master’s degree holders, and their income and occupation range 
from low to high income earners, and from unemployed to public servants and entrepreneurs. 
 
2.4.5  Parents of couples  
Parents of couples (n=13) usually collect the marriage list from the groups mentioned above 
and give it to the groom and his family. They benefit from the items on the list, as determined 
by men and women associations. Here, parents of couples include both receivers and givers of 
bridewealth. Since the payment of bridewealth is given by the groom’s family, I asked majority 
of them questions in their capacity as receivers. In their capacity as givers, I asked them 
questions related to their children’s exercise of agency. They further answered questions 
relating to the ways individuals are navigating the cultural constraints surrounding bridewealth 
payment.  
 
2.5  Access to participants 
I contacted research participants through family, religious, and professional links. My parents 
and father-in-law are religious leaders and respected individuals in three of the five South-East 
states. As such, they helped me in identifying some key participants, such as traditional leaders 
and leaders of associations. However, they played no further role beyond persuading a few 
research participants to meet me and decide whether to grant me interviews.  




I employed the snowball technique to gain access to some research participants such as 
newly-wedded couples. Snowballing consisted of interviewed participants recommending 
other participants such as friends, acquaintances, and group leaders to offer information.30   
 
2.6  Data analysis 
To assist with data collection, I used an audio recording device. It enabled me to preserve 
confidentiality and reproduce participants’ views faithfully. It also assisted me in reflecting on 
the emotions that accompanied the provision of information by participants.31  
 Thematic data analysis helped me to identify, report, and analyse patterns of similarities 
and contrasts in the data collected from interviews and materials in the literature.32 This was 
achieved through thematic coding involving detailed description and interpretation of data.33 
The themes derived from interviews will be highlighted later in this chapter.  Thematic data 
analysis helped me to answer questions, such as the tools used by people to navigate the 
influence of cultural institutions, the role of law in the negotiation process of bridewealth 
payment, and active role players in the distorted significance of bridewealth payment.  
I personally transcribed all the audios of interviews. Many of the interviews (42) were 
in Igbo language. After the transcription of interviews, I coded and analysed data with the aid 
of NVIVO 11 software.34 As part of data analysis, I compared field notes I made from my 
observations of marriage ceremonies with data in interview transcripts.  
 
2.6.1 Coding process 
                                                 
 
30 MS Lewis-Beck, et al The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (2004) 1044; C Noy 
‘Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in Qualitative Research’ (2008) 11(4) 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 327-344 at 330. 
 
31 For more detail on audio tape recording see KA May ‘Interview Techniques in Qualitative Research: Concerns 
and Challenges’ in JM Morse (ed.) Qualitative Nursing Research: A Contemporary Dialogue (1989) 198. 
 
32 M Vaismoradi, et al ‘Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis: Implications for Conducting A Qualitative 
Descriptive Study’ (2013) 15(3) Nursing and Health Sciences 398-405 at 400; J Aronson ‘A Pragmatic View of 
Thematic Analysis’ (1995) 2(1) The Qualitative Report 1-3 at 2-3. 
 
33 M Vaismoradi et al op cit note 32 at 399 
 
34 NVivo 11 is a qualitative data analysis software package produced by QSR International. It is useful for in-
depth analysis of data through its thematic, graphical, and cross-referencing tools. 
 




In the coding, similar patterns of answers and behaviour were stored in nodes and thematically 
analysed. Thematic coding assists in efficient compilation of similarities and differences in the 
information gathered. The themes that emerged in the coding process are discussed in chapter 




Interview Transcript Coding  
Interviewer: What is the effect of not providing all the 
items on the marriage list? 
 
Remy: It will be seen in the eyes of the community that 
the marriage rites were not completed, and it will 
deprive the bride’s father the opportunity to 
participate in the sharing of anything that pertains to 
traditional marriage in another family. 
Social recognition of marriage 
Deprivation from communal benefit 
Interviewer: Do you know about the Limitation of 
Dowry Law of 1956 and its effectiveness? 
 
Joseph: No, even if there is a law like that it is not 
effective in my place. The successes and challenges of 
traditional marriage rites rest on the prospective 
spouses, parents of the couples, families of both 
couples etc. Their work is to make the law but it is still 
the families that will implement it. The government did 
not train the daughter for them and should not stop 
them from benefiting from whatever comes out of it by 
reason of marriage. They stay up there to make their 
laws but can’t come down to implement them. It is 
Ignorance of the law 
Lack of enforcement 
Conflict of laws  
Top down policy approach 
                                                 
 
35 For the themes developed for the interviews of traditional rulers and reasons see CO Akakuru et al op cit note 
27 at 50; EO Awa The Transformation of Rural Society: A Study of Rural Development in the Eastern States of 
Nigeria 1970-76 (1992) 47. 
 




implementation that is the problem and it rests on the 
parents, families to obey or not. 
 
2.7 Ethical considerations  
Ethical clearance for this research was obtained from the Research Ethics Office of the Faculty 
of Law at the University of Cape Town in 2016.36 I did not require any formal permission from 
the area of study, since the nature of my research does not demand it. To ensure the 
confidentiality of research participants, I used measures such as pseudonyms and redaction of 
information, which I adjudged as sensitive to participants’ needs. I also conducted some 
interviews anonymously – that is without requiring the interviewer to provide his or her name. 
Where necessary, I removed from the thesis personal identifiers of research participants such 
as names, age, addresses, and where requested, occupations. Most often, this required a 
judgment call in consultation with my supervisors. For participants who are not literate, I used 
oral explanations to ensure that they entered the research on fairly even levels of understanding 
with literate participants.  I stored a control list of research participants in Dropbox, a password-
protected cloud storage facility. Before concluding this chapter, I will explain some challenges 
I encountered in my field work, which may constitute limitations of the study. 
 
2.8 Speed bumps and lessons learnt 
Other than resource constraints, the challenges I encountered in the research relate to my 
research design and cultural constraints. As shown in 2.7.3 below, some of these challenges 
demonstrate the interplay of structure and agency in social life. They also demonstrate people’s 
ability to make informed decisions based on their needs. 
 
2.8.1 Too big or too small? 
My first challenge was the sample size of my research. Although I would have loved to 
interview a larger number, I interviewed only 47 key individuals. Sample size is usually a 
limitation in qualitative research because of the cost and difficulty of interviewing all the 
                                                 
 
36 Ref: L34-2015. See appendix A. 
 




research participants needed for the research.37 For an ethnographic study, Morse suggests 
approximately 30 - 50 participants; for a grounded theory research, he suggested 30 - 50 
interviews, while Creswell recommended 20-30.38 According to Patton, sample size can be 
determined by the resources available, as well as the time allocation for the research and the 
aims of the research.39 Sample size may be determined by data saturation – that is when 
participants seem to have no new information to offer.40 For this study, answers to the questions 
I asked were continuously repeated in a way that indicated I was not likely to obtain new 
perceptions or divergences from the views expressed about bridewealth negotiation. In short, 
the number of participants I interviewed were enough to provide detailed explanations of 
bridewealth negotiation in South-East Nigeria. After I had interviewed about 40 individuals, 
the information I obtained began to appear repetitive. To obtain certainty, I interviewed a few 
more, and obtained the same results. Accordingly, it is doubtful if interviewing more 
participants would have added new perspectives to my findings.41  
 
2.8.2  One good turn deserves another 
Most of the research participants were willing to relate their experiences of bridewealth 
payment and offer their opinions on it. However, a few individuals refused to grant me 
interviews because I did not offer them any monetary compensation. Two of them argued that 
since I was going to benefit from their views and their knowledge, I needed to pay them for 
their time. They did not seem to be interested in my explanations that informed consent also 
                                                 
 
37 SH Oppong ‘The Problem of Sampling in Qualitative Research’ (2013) 2(2) Asian Journal of Management 
Sciences and Education 202-210 at 203-205; M Sandelowski ‘Sample Size in Qualitative Research’ (1995) 18(2) 
Research in Nursing and Health 179-183 at 179-181. 
 
38 JM Morse ‘Designing Funded Qualitative Research’ in NK Denizin & YS Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (1994) 225; JW Creswell & CN Poth Qualitative Inquiry and Research design: Choosing 
Among Five Approaches (2017) 159.  
 
39 MQ Patton op cit note 6 at 242-244. 
  
40 RT Trotter ‘Qualitative Research Sample Design and Sample Size: Resolving and Unresolved Issues and 
Inferential Imperatives’ (2012) 55(5) Preventive Medicine 398-400 at 399; HR Bernard Research Methods in 
Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (2011) 7, 436. 
 
41 G Guest, et al ‘How Many Interviews Are Enough? An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability’ (2006) 
18(1) Field Methods 59–82 and 65-78; PI Fusch & LR Ness ‘Are We There Yet? Data Saturation in Qualitative 
Research’ (2015) 20(9) The Qualitative Report 1408-1416 at 1409-1412; M O’Reilly & N Parker ‘Unsatisfactory 
Saturation’: A Critical Exploration of the Notion of Saturated Sample Sizes in Qualitative Research’ (2012) 13(2) 
Qualitative Research 190–197 at 192. 
 




means consent free from any influences and inducements. As Shenton noted, each participant 
approached should be given an opportunity to refuse to participate and give reasons for non-
participation to ‘ensure that the data collection sessions involve only those who are genuinely 
willing to take part and prepared to offer data freely.’42 I did not interview these monetary-
minded individuals, nor did I pressure them to be interviewed. 
 
2.8.3 The timid ones 
The third challenge I encountered was the unwillingness of some research participants to 
participate for fear of social rebuke or fear of having their views misquoted. In sum, they did 
not want anything that could cause problems in their marriages. Ordinarily, a subject like the 
negotiation process of bridewealth payment should not present confidentiality issues. The fact 
that a few women expressed concerns for confidentiality is evidence of the strong influence of 
cultural institutions over women’s agency. They requested protection and removal of 
identifiers that could link them to the research. In some cases, I went to considerable lengths 
to assure them that information they provide would be used responsibly, while their identity 
would be protected with pseudonyms, redactions, and removal of personal identifiers from my 
dissertation. I usually interviewed spouses in this category separately and assured them that I 
would send them my research for their approval if needed. A few of them settled for anonymity.  
 
2.8.4 Generalisability of findings 
My fourth challenge is related to sample size because it concerns the generalisability of my 
findings, which is a major criticism of qualitative research method.43 The results of a qualitative 
research method are not as generalisable as the results of a quantitative research.44 The reason 
is that data from qualitative research mainly speaks to the experience of participants in the 
context of their environment.45 On the other hand, generalisability is the main yardstick for 
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estimating the validity of quantitative research study.46 Eisner specifically states that data that 
can be generalised is data derived from ideas, skills and images.47 My sample selection, 
although smaller than I desired, was carefully selected, and the information I obtained is 
detailed enough to solve my research puzzle. Most of the experiences related in this study 
challenged the present format of bridewealth payment as a cultural institution.   
 
2.8.5 Language barrier 
The last challenge I encountered concerns language. This challenge is surprising, given that I 
considered myself very conversant with the Igbo language. A central dialect of Igbo is widely 
spoken and understood in the study area.48 Since I am from the study area and speak English 
and Igbo language fluently, I did not anticipate language problems. However, there are 
different dialects in the study area.49 Many of my research participants desired to speak to me 
in Igbo language, with some insisting that, since my research is a cultural issue, it should be 
conducted in the local language. They also noted that they feel more comfortable answering 
their questions in their local language.  In some cases, I asked questions in English, only for 
the participants to demand that I translate them into Igbo. I was surprised by the challenging 
nature of cross-language interviewing!50 Moreover, the interview guide was drafted in English, 
thereby raising the tendency of inconsistent translations.  
However, my pilot studies helped me to prepare for conceptual and literal translation 
challenges involved in cross-language questioning in English and Igbo. Also, I used back-to-
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back translations.51 This method requires at least two bilingual individuals from South-East 
Nigeria to translate the transcripts from English to Igbo language and then from Igbo to 
English.52 Back-to-back translations improved the reliability and validity of the data.  
The above challenges illustrate the context surrounding my data and findings on how 
unequal power relations play out in the bridewealth negotiation process. The next chapter will 
shed light on the origin and significance of bridewealth in past and contemporary Igbo society. 
This will set the stage for the dynamics of power relations in bridewealth negotiation within 
the interplay of cultural institutions and forces of agency.
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Chapter Three: The concept of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Bridewealth, a cultural phenomenon that attaches privileges, rights, and legitimacy to a 
customary law marriage, raises issues over individuals’ agency with respect to customs and 
traditions. To provide a context for these issues, this chapter explores the literature on the 
concept of bridewealth in South-East Nigeria. This exploration pays careful attention to the 
origin, meaning and significance of bridewealth payment. In so doing, I argue that changes in 
the significance of bridewealth reflect both cultural and economic motives. These motives are 
shared by custodians of culture such as chiefs, elders, and age grade leaders on the one hand, 
and families who see bridewealth as an economic relief, on the other hand. The interplay of 
these motives creates complex power relations that blur the extent to which individuals use 
their agency to force through changes in bridewealth payment. 
The chapter begins with a historical overview of the study population and proceeds to 
the academic literature on the concept of bridewealth. As mentioned earlier, it is believed that 
high amounts of bridewealth are paid in South-East Nigeria. Drawing from scholarly opinions, 
it analyses bridewealth as a cultural practice and as legitimator of a customary marriage. It 
emphasises the distortion of bridewealth payment, maps the stages of its distortion, and 
identifies the factors responsible for its distortion.  
 
3.2  About South-East Nigeria  
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and one of the most populous in the world. It is 
made up of over 300 ethnic groups that speak hundreds of languages.1 For administrative 
purposes, there are 36 states, which fall under six geopolitical zones. These zones are created 
based on states with homogenous cultures, ethnic groups and common history, and to an extent, 
location. The zones are: North Eastern Zone (NE), North-Central Zone (NC), the Middle-Belt 
Zone (MB), South-East Zone (SE), South-West Zone (SW), and South-South Zone (SS). The 
South-East zone comprises of five states – Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi and Imo state. The 
people that make up the South-East zone are the Igbos. They speak the Igbo language, which 
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is one of the major languages in Nigeria.  However, there are trivial differences in tongues and 
dialects amongst the states that make up this zone.2 
To understand the resilience of Igbo cultural institutions, the suitability of bridewealth 
payment to the needs of the Igbos, and the impact of state law on bridewealth payment, it is 
important to explain the background of contemporary Igbo society. Before colonisation, the 
Igbos practiced a decentralised system of government, which is made up of families grouped 
into villages (obodo), family heads or clan leaders (umunna), and lineages.3 The village groups 
included, but were not limited to the umuada (association of first daughters in the village), 
different age grades (otu ogbo), chiefs (Nze n’ozo), and Ezeala (priestly chiefs). A detailed 
description of the contemporary structure of these groups and their roles in bridewealth 
negotiation will be discussed in chapter four. Igbo village groups were semi-independent 
political entities, likewise the villages, which exercised autonomy over matters that concerned 
them.4 This independence explains the popular saying ‘Igbo enwe eze,’ which means in its 
simplest form (Igbos have no king). The Igbo people use the aphorism to display their 
autonomy; it doesn’t necessarily mean that they had no kings, as it is not general in all parts of 
Igboland.5 However, in most commercial cities with coastlines such as Onitsha and Nri, 
monarchies existed before the British arrived in Nigeria.6 Other parts of Igboland such as Oru-
Igbo, Oguta and Arochukwu had kings, chiefs or advanced chieftaincy institutions before the 
colonial encounter.7 The issue of chieftaincy only arose during colonisation through the 
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introduction of warrant chiefs by the British.8 The British saw Igboland as a ‘stateless society’ 
and unsuccessfully administered them through warrant chiefs under the indirect rule system of 
governance. Due to the manner warrant chiefs were imposed in Igboland, the indirect rule 
system bred a culture of administrative impunity, which created a disconnection between the 
state and people subject to customary law.9 This disconnection still manifests in disdain for 
state interventions in cultural issues like bridewealth payment, and helps to explain why the 
state has not attempted to regulate customary marriages since the failure of the Dowry Law. 
The Igbo people are patrilocal,10 patrilineal,11 and patriarchal – that is a social system 
of male dominance. The exception is a few towns such as Ohafia, Abam, and Bende, which are 
matrilineal.12 Until recently, marriage was mostly endogamous – that is within the lineage, 
ethnic or social group.13 Endogamy occurs within an extended family system, which comprises 
of grandparents, grandchildren, nephews, nieces, cousins and aunts. The expansive nature of 
the family explains the numerous individuals who benefit from the marriage list.14 It also sheds 
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light on the cultural limitations on agency regarding bridewealth. Before explaining the concept 
of bridewealth, it is necessary to explain the nature of marriage and the family in traditional 
Igbo society. 
 
3.3 Communal nature of marriage  
Kinship ties are important in traditional life.15 In them lie the cradle of family tenets, continuity, 
and development.16 The family is the first platform where the cultural heritage of society is 
transferred and imparted to younger members.17 In South-East Nigeria, families create bonds 
between each other through marriage, which may be monogamous or polygamous.18 As the 
foundation of social life,19 marriage is considered an obligation for everyone, except priests of 
the Roman Catholic Church. As Iroegbu puts it, ‘failure to marry was failure to be Igbo’.20 In 
fact, marriage portrays a person as a responsible, reliable, and matured individual.21 The social 
pressure to marry reflects on individuals’ ability to negate some of the requirements of 
marriage. Also, it enables families to exert influence on marriage negotiations. Indeed, since 
ancient times, traditional marriage has been regarded as ‘an alliance between two families, 
rather than a contract between two individuals’.22 The two families coming together in marriage 
hold each other in high esteem.23 The reason could be seen from the popular saying that ‘ogo 
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bu chi onye’ (your in-law is your god) and the saying that a person has three homes: with his 
paternal relatives (umunna), with his maternal relatives (ikwunne) and with his in-laws (ndi 
ogo). Unsurprisingly, any breakdown of marriage in Igboland affects not only  the couple and 
their children but also the family and even community at large.24 Thus, in a quest to enforce 
cultural values, the family wields a strong influence in marriages.25 This influence explains 
why virtually the entire community is involved in the customary marriage processes.26 The 
importance attached to marriage reflects on the cultural legitimacy attached to bridewealth 
payment.27 This is the context for the below conceptual explanation of bridewealth as the 
legitimator of customary marriage in South-East Nigeria.28 
 
3.4  Bridewealth as a conceptual nightmare 
As defined in chapter one, bridewealth, called aku nwanyi or ego isi nwanyi in many Igbo 
dialects, is payment or gifts made by the groom to the family of the bride in contemplation of, 
or as a requirement of a traditional marriage. However, this definition fails to settle 
disagreements over its true meaning. As I show in 3.4.1 below, the distortion of bridewealth 
owes much to the terms used to describe it. For example, legislation uses the term ‘dowry,’ 
which shows the terminological confusion or ignorance of lawmakers regarding bridewealth. 
The Limitation of Dowry Law defines it as ‘…any gift or payment in money, natural produce, 
brass rods, cowries or in any other kind of property whatsoever, to a parent or guardian of a 
female person on account of marriage of that person which is intended or has taken place.’29 
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Even though this law purportedly regulates dowry, it is worth noting that dowry differs from 
bridewealth. Whereas bridewealth is given to the bride’s family by the groom’s family in view 
of marriage, in Igboland, dowry is, arguably, given to the bride by her family as marriage gifts. 
It is called ‘‘ihe eji du nwanyi uno,’ which means properties brought by the woman to her 
husband’s family as she begins a new phase of life in a new home.30 Recently, it mostly 
includes properties given to the bride by her distant relatives and friends. In most cases, parents 
see it as their daughter’s inheritance, and go out of their way to provide her with the household 
items she needs to start her new home.31  
As the most important element of a customary marriage in South-East Nigeria, 
bridewealth payment is almost universal. However, its mode, form, and quantum vary from 
community to community.32 There is no fixed amount, and every community determines its 
modalities. Studies have shown that even the amount fixed by communities sometimes vary 
from clan to clan, according to the level of education of the bride and the status of the parties’ 
families.33 In what follows, I will examine the controversies and debates surrounding 
bridewealth payment.  The views of scholars on this subject will be discussed under several 
headings in accordance with their schools of thought.  
 
3.4.1  Bridewealth as commercial transaction 
Some scholars argue that bridewealth payment has a transactional feature; as such it should be 
given a commercial terminology.34 They argued for it to be termed ‘bride-price’. When literally 
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translated into Igbo language, bride price means ego-isi nwanyi (ego = money, isi = head, 
nwanyi = woman). Taken literarily, ego isi nwanyi means money paid on a woman’s head. 
Although bridewealth is called ego isi nwanyi in most communities, the meaning attached to it 
does not signify a commercial transaction. Arguably, however, demand of high bridewealth 
justifies accusations of its labelling as bride price.  
 
3.4.2  Bridewealth as contract  
Some scholars view bridewealth payment as a form of legal contract for marriage.35 In other 
words, they believe it has features of a contract, such as offer, acceptance, consideration, and 
mutuality of obligation. Some features of mutual obligations include indemnity, which may be 
interpreted as compensation to the family or clan for losing the bride and guarantee that she 
will be treated well by her husband’s family. If interpreted as a specific performance of 
contract, the woman’s movement to her husband’s house implies that her legal status is inferior 
to the man.36 This contractual view of bridewealth obscures women’s agency as rational beings 
capable of independent behaviour. It also fails to highlight the complementary nature of the 
marriage relationship. As Radcliff-Brown summarised it, a customary ‘marriage involves some 
modification or partial rupture of the relations between the bride and her immediate kin …’ 
and gives the husband and his kin certain rights in relation to his wife and the children she 
bears.37  
However, many writers recognise that bridewealth is so unique that it should not be 
fitted into Western legal parameters. For example, Dalton suggests that the primitive means of 
exchange used by pre-colonial Africans during marriage has moral and other implications 
different from the commercial connotation of Western currency.38 He therefore suggested the 
use of the term bridewealth rather than bride price. Similarly, Uchendu, an ethnographer from 
South-East Nigeria, prefers the term bridewealth because Igbo women are not chattels 
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purchased by their husbands.39 Onokah suggests the term ‘marriage symbol,’ arguing that bride 
price depicts an untrue reality of women’s agency as rational, independent adults.40 In his wide 
ranging study of the functions of bridewealth, Ogbu concluded that bridewealth is the 
legitimising symbol of marriage rather than a commercial transaction.41 To avoid being caught 
in the middle of the controversy of whether bride price or bridewealth is the appropriate term, 
Singer prefers the term ‘marriage payments’.42 As seen below, Singer’s suggestion 
approximates communal usage of aku nwanyi, which literally means bridewealth.  
 
3.4.3  Indigenous meaning  
Some scholars have suggested that bridewealth should be given its functional meaning only, 
since its definition cannot be divorced from the cultural meaning attached to it in the 
communities in which it is practiced.43 In other words, bridewealth should be interpreted 
strictly in line with whatever roles it performs. As Evans-Pritchard rightly stated: 
There are very good reasons for cutting the term [bride price] out of ethnological 
literature since at best it emphasizes only one of the functions of this wealth, an 
economic one, to the exclusion of other important social functions … Hence, we find 
people believing that wives are bought and sold in Africa in much the same manner as 
commodities are bought and sold in European markets… [I] propose instead the 
term…bride-wealth. Wealth is a comprehensive term which neither in economic 
literature nor in every-day speech has any close association with the ideas of “price” or 
“purchase’’.44  
  
In my view, bridewealth is preferable to bride price, since the latter term gives the impression 
that women are bought. Such impression reinforces misconceptions of patriarchy and 
subordination of women, which are not supported by my field findings. Moreover, bridewealth 
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is merely an aspect of multiple payments and gifts exchanged in a ceremony aimed at 
celebrating the worth and value of women. In what follows, I will provide reasons why 
bridewealth is the most appropriate term for this cultural celebration. 
 
3.5  Cultural significance of bridewealth payment  
There are cultural meanings attached to the payments and gifts exchanged between the groom 
and the bride’s families during a traditional marriage. To understand the interplay of structure 
and agency in this exchange, a recap of the nature of Igbo precolonial society is needed.  
Precolonial Igbos lived in close-knit families.45 They were mostly farmers, craftsmen, 
and traders who depended on the produce from the land for their survival.46 Accordingly, land 
was, and still is a major asset in Igbo land; it was communally owned.47 The key means of 
acquiring it was by pledge (usually as a security for a loan), lease (usually for the farming 
season), inheritance and kola tenancy.48 Kola tenancy entails a situation where a person 
(grantee) who needs land for farming goes to another  (grantor) with forms of gift such as palm 
wine, and kola nuts.49 In other words, he paid with kola nut and palm wine, but the grantor still 
has a reversionary interest in the land. Igbos practiced mainly subsistence and commercial 
agriculture.50 Every member of the family participated in the input and benefitted from the 
output both in cash and in property.51  The family contributed to the wellbeing of its members 
in all aspects of life, especially marriage.52 In this context of mutual care and dependence, it 
                                                 
 
45 DA Ihenacho African Christianity Rises: A Case Study of the Catholicism of the Igbo (2004) 26. 
 
46  CJ Korieh ‘“We Have Always Been Farmers”: Society and Economy at the Close of the Nineteenth Century’ 
in CJ Korieh (ed.) The Land has Changed (2010) 27-29; VC Uchendu op cit note 3 at 22; CJ Korieh ‘Yam is 
King! But Cassava is the Mother of all Crops: Farming, Culture, and Identity in Igbo Agrarian Economy (2007) 
31 Dialectical Anthropology 221-232 at 221-222. 
 
47 EE Obioha ‘Change in Tenure Pattern and Customary Land Practices among Igbo Community in Southeastern 
Nigeria’ (2008) 10(1) Anthropologist 45-53 at 45; VC Uchendu op cited note 3 at 22. 
 
48 GI Jones ‘Ibo Land Tenure’ (1949) 19(4) Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 309-323 at 321-
322. 
 
49 Udensi vs Moghoh (1976) 7 SC 1, 15-17. 
 
50 They produced food crops rather than cash crops. 
 
51 FU Ohaegbulam op cit note 14 at 91. 
  
52 They serve as a social security for each other. 
 




was difficult for bridewealth to have a commercial meaning. It is even more difficult for its 
negotiation to be anything other than complementary. Several reasons affirm this argument.   
First, it was the duty of the father, as the head of the family, to choose marriage partners 
for his children.53 One reason, amongst others, is to ensure that daughters married into families 
with wealth and reputable character, and sons obeyed the rules governing marriage in certain 
social groups. Second, the groom’s family were required to check the health background of the 
bride’s family and vice versa.54 Third, bridewealth was raised, negotiated, and paid by the 
father and other kinsmen on behalf of the groom. Indeed, traditional Igbo society regards a 
father as the one procuring a wife for his son, and she is usually welcomed as an addition to 
the family with rights and privileges akin to a child born in the family. These realities make it 
difficult for the original meaning of bridewealth to have a commercial connotation.   
Furthermore, the items that constituted bridewealth payment in agrarian society ranged 
from clothing, drinks, and farm produce to livestock. These items suited basic needs of 
sustenance. Cash, which used to be cowries, was rarely used.55 Among other reasons, the use 
of labour or services, and livestock such as cattle, cows and cocks as means of payment 
signified the worth of the bride, especially recognition of her fecundity.56 The intending groom 
was required to perform some services such as fetching or splitting firewood, repairing the 
house, and cultivating the farm of the prospective in-laws.57 From my field findings and 
literature on the subject, the nature and significance of bridewealth may be categorised under 
the following: 
 
                                                 
 
53 DJ Smith op cit note 13 at 134. 
 
54 P Kyalo ‘A Reflection on the African Traditional Values of Marriage and Sexuality’ (2012) 1(2) International 
Journal of Academic Research in Progressive Education and Development 211-219 at 213; AA Mere op cit note 
14 at 157; K Okonjo ‘Aspects of Continuity and Change in Mate-Selection among the Igbo West of the River 
Niger’ (1992) 23(3) Journal of Comparative Family Studies 339-360 at 346-350. 
 
55 WI Ofonagoro ‘From Traditional to British Currency in Southern Nigeria: Analysis of a Currency Revolution, 
1880-1948’ (1979) 39(3) The Journal of Economic History 623-654 at 635; DD Nsereko ‘The Nature and Function 
of Marriage Gifts in Customary African Marriages’ (1975) 23(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 682-
704 at 685. 
 
56 CO Odimegwu & A Zerai ‘Understanding the Proximate Determinants of Fertility of a Nigerian Ethnic Group’ 
(1996) 52(3/4) Genus 67-87 at 82. 
 
57 CO Odimegwu & A Zerai op cit note 56 at 82; SNC Obi Modern Family Law of Southern Nigeria (1966) 176; 
L Bossen ‘Toward a Theory of Marriage: The Economic Anthropology of Marriage Transactions’ (1988) 27(2) 
Ethnology 127-144 at 127, 135. 
 






3.5.1  Legitimation of marriage  
Bridewealth is the most essential part of customary law marriage. Without it, a marriage is not 
recognised by the community.58 This is because once paid partially or in full, bridewealth 
confers customary legal rights and obligations on the couple.59 The payment is so important 
that it is required to be completed unless it is waived by the bride’s family.60 In other words, if 
the husband dies without completing his own part of the agreement, his children are bound to 
pay the remnant to be socially recognised and fully accepted as his offspring. However, 
statutory marriages have come to the rescue of couples, as they no longer require the payment 
of bridewealth for the validity of their marriage.61 The non-requirement of bridewealth for the 
validity of a statutory marriage is intriguing for the influence of state law on the agency of 
couples married under both customary law and statutory law.62 This intrigue manifests in two 
ways. In the context of the structure-versus-agency interplay, couples who first contract a 
statutory marriage can use it as a bargaining tool to negotiate a favourable bridewealth 
payment. On the other hand, they could face discrimination for not complying with traditional 
requirements for marriage, of which bridewealth is integral. This discrimination 
notwithstanding the constitutional provisions on non-discrimination on grounds that include 
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culture.63 Thus, the social legitimacy conferred by bridewealth counterbalances the ability of 
couples to negotiate with custodians of culture such as elders and traditional leaders. 
  
 
3.5.2  Compensation or symbolism? 
As stated earlier, precolonial Igbos thrived on communality; everybody was involved in family 
businesses, which were almost exclusively agricultural activities. Women were actively 
involved in these activities.64 In this context, the importance and significance of women’s 
services was recognised in the quantum of their bridewealth. Bridewealth thus served as 
compensation to a bride’s family for the loss of her services.65  Studies have shown that 
bridewealth enabled the bride’s family to marry a wife for a son in the family, who will replace 
the void left by the bride.66 However, there is no scholarly unanimity on whether bridewealth 
really serves a compensatory function, given that money and gifts cannot compensate for the 
loss of labour or service.67 Although bridewealth may serve a compensatory function, it has 
more cultural values than mere monetary compensation. In line with this reasoning, Teboh 
argued that the ‘amount of bridewealth is inconsequential. What matters is its symbolic 
significance. Generally, the expenditure of the bride’s family surpasses the amount of the 
bridewealth’.68 My interactions with research participants leave no doubt that bridewealth has 
a symbolic significance. However, this symbolism is being threatened by the high amounts 
demanded as bridewealth.  
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3.5.3  A unifying tool 
When all the requirements for the recognition of a customary marriage have been fulfilled, the 
prospective spouse acquires the right to resort to their kinsmen or in-laws in time of need.69 
This right confirms the argument that bridewealth is not wife purchase. Similarly, it is more 
than a compensation for the loss of a bride’s services. If bridewealth means wife purchase or 
compensation for lost services, a wife might not be able to seek financial or emotional help 
from her family. It is more likely the case that bridewealth serves as a unifying symbol for the 
joining of two families. It strengthens kinship ties, mandates the marrying families to take 
responsibility for the children of the marriage, and work to ensure the success of the marriage 
relationship. As Uchendu noted, marriage is ‘an alliance between two families, rather than a 
contract between two individuals’.70 Indeed, this alliance is deemed to continue even after the 
death of one of the spouses.71  
 
3.6 Forms of bridewealth 
As explained in chapter one, bridewealth involves cash and material gifts given in 
contemplation of marriage. Its format and functions are dependent on the customs prevalent in 
the concerned community.  Oftentimes, bridewealth forms part of the items in the marriage list, 
which are exchanged by the families of the groom and bride. These items constitute marriage 
gifts. The phrase ‘marriage gifts’ is a misnomer because ‘gift’ connotes willingness or 
voluntariness. Since the items in the marriage list are mandatory, it seems odd to use ‘marriage 
gifts’ to describe them. However, I prefer to use the phrase ‘marriage gifts’ because it captures 
the distortion and role reversal that occurred between bridewealth and marriage gifts. In the 
agrarian past when bridewealth consisted of labour service or livestock, marriage gifts were 
gifts in the true sense of voluntariness.72  In this sense, only bridewealth was compulsory, while 
marriage gifts were left to the discretion of the groom’s family, who brought them in 
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accordance with their wealth and appreciation of the bride. Today, the reverse is the case. 
Marriage gifts have become compulsory, while bridewealth has taken a backseat. This role 
reversal has created controversy over the ambit of marriage gifts.  
While some scholars believe that marriage gifts do not form part of bridewealth, others 
insist that the two are inseparable.  I refer to the former view as the duality school, and refer to 
the latter view as the unified school. The scholars in the unified school believe bridewealth 
payment encompasses every payment in cash or material which the groom or his family gives 
to the bride’s family.73   
The scholars in the duality school posit that marriage gifts are not part of bridewealth 
payment.74 The dualists base their argument on the premise that during divorce, only 
bridewealth (ego isi nwanyi) is refunded. Since marriage gifts are not returnable, it means that 
they do not form part of bridewealth.75 Moreover, as stated earlier, it is not only the groom that 
presents marriage gifts, the bride’s family also gives gifts to the groom’s family. They further 
argue that while failure to pay bridewealth invalidates the marriage, failure to provide all items 
on the marriage list merely withdraws social recognition of the marriage in the eyes of members 
of the community.76   
In my view, the dualist argument is watered down by the fact that bridewealth is listed 
on the marriage list, thereby making it part and parcel of marriage gifts. Furthermore, the mere 
fact that community members may withdraw social recognition if the marriage list is not 
complied with makes bridewealth an integral part of the marriage gifts. Thus, as a convenient 
term for describing the negotiation process of bridewealth in this dissertation, I adopt the 
unified view, which holds that marriage gifts and bridewealth are the same. Where I wish to 
draw a distinction between bridewealth and marriage gifts, I use the term ego isi nwanyi to 
denote bridewealth. I should point out that high bridewealth in Igboland, especially in Abia 
and Imo states, usually arises in the context of expensive marriage gifts demanded by brides’ 
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families. However, expensive marriage gifts are of recent origin. In what follows, I chart how 
expensive marriage gifts distorted the significance of bridewealth payment. I argue that 
bridewealth distortion is a significant component of unequal power relations, within which the 
structural versus agency interplay is revealed.  
 
3.7 Fall of bridewealth symbolism 
As I have shown, bridewealth symbolises the joining of two families in marriage. In the past, 
its symbolic role was reflected in labour service for the bride’s family by the groom and in 
exchange of livestock. Eventually, bridewealth began to be represented with monetary 
payments, thereby reflecting changes in its significance and function. These changes were 
informed by both cultural and economic motives, which are shared by custodians of culture 
such as chiefs, elders, and age grade leaders on the one hand, and families who see bridewealth 
as an economic relief, on the other hand. The dynamic nature of bridewealth’s continuity and 
change blur the interplay between structure and agency.  
As Ejidike noted, bridewealth payment demonstrates the continuities and changes that 
have accompanied the development of social life in Igboland.77 While the continuity of 
bridewealth relates to its historical adherence, its changes reflects its encounter with external 
forces.  The distortion of bridewealth’s symbolic nature in Igboland has a direct connection to 
changes in the agrarian basis of social life.78 These changes affected every aspect of Igbo 
traditional life, ranging from religion to the land tenure system, family patterns, marriage 
requirements, and cultural worldviews. Most of these changes are traceable to encounters with 
colonists and Christian missionaries, which transformed both the belief system and cultural 
practices of the Igbo people.79 Scholars have explained the impact of the colonial encounter on 
the cultural life of Africans. For example, Chanock argued that the manner in which chiefs and 
elders asserted ‘control over women and over family property’ was agreeable to the colonists’ 
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own coercive ‘prescriptions for African societies.’80 To demonstrate how colonial rule 
contributed to the creation of new power relations and distortion of bridewealth’s significance, 
I shall chart the stages of socio-economic transformation in Igboland. This transformation helps 
to shed light on the factors that constrain or compel individuals to use their agency in 
bridewealth payment. 
 
3.7.1  It’s all about the economy  
Following the inception of colonial rule in Nigeria, the political, legal and socio-economic 
system of the Igbos changed. These changes brought inflation, unemployment, and fiscal 
restructuring.81 Of note is the introduction of industrialisation, cash economy and influence of 
globalisation.82 These changes affected the agrarian basis of society in a radical manner. Ester 
Boserup and other scholars provide keen insight into the economic effects of these changes.83   
Precolonial Igbo society thrived on subsistence agriculture, in which women were at 
the forefront.84 The divisions of labour with regards to farming reveal the complementary 
nature of power relations. While men were responsible for the clearing and felling of trees, 
women were responsible for cultivating crops, processing, selling, preserving, and cooking 
food. The surplus of crops was sold by women, and the incomes generated from the sale were 
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used for the welfare of the family.85 As Friedl rightly observed, women, through their economic 
activities, exerted political control that guaranteed them a conspicuous position in resource 
distribution.86 However, the profit-motivated policies of colonial rule eroded women’s 
economic power. This occurred in three key ways. 
The first is the encouragement of large-scale agriculture involving the production of 
cash crops such as cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel and rubber.87 The second is the indoctrination 
that accompanied the introduction of improved farming techniques. Men were taught how to 
use modern equipment, thereby shifting economic power and widening the skills gap.88 The 
previously agrarian economy became industrialised. The fact that only men learned how to 
operate modern equipment gave them privileged status over women. It also enabled them to 
cultivate cash crops and generate higher income. These changes discouraged some people from 
participating in agriculture, displaced them from their economic power base, and tilted the 
economic bargaining scale.89 For example, bridewealth began to be the responsibility of the 
groom, rather than his family. Also, some families began to compensate for their diminishing 
earnings by demanding high bridewealth. In all these changes, land played an important role.  
In order to meet the demands of the new economic system, more land was needed for 
agricultural growth.90 Colonial authorities built factories and modernised many cities in order 
to achieve their aim of exploiting the natural resources of Africans.91 These new projects led 
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to most people selling their land to private individuals, leading to shifts in economic power.92  
Individual ownership of land, which was almost absent in the traditional land laws of the Igbos 
in the precolonial era, also emerged.93 This created intriguing power relations on two levels.  
Firstly, land ownership was concentrated in the hands of few individuals who possessed 
the financial wealth to buy land.94 Thus, the poor were compelled to sell to meet socio-
economic demands, such as urbanisation and educating their children.95 Secondly, women, who 
in the past were denied the right to own land, began to acquire wealth through independent 
income. They were able to invest in landed property, which enhanced their social status and 
their agency.96 This improvement in women’s agency is significant for bridewealth payment, 
since in the past, women only had access to land in their capacity as wives, daughters and 
sisters.97 In other words, before contact with colonial administration, there was an unequal 
placing of male and female children with regards to inheritance.98 As people’s socio-economic 
situation began to change, so did their expenses on training children change. Accordingly, their 
bargaining instincts in bridewealth negotiation also changed.99 The changes in socio-economic 
conditions included rural-urban migration, which also contributed to bridewealth distortion.  
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3.7.2  Enter urban migration 
Igbo people are known to be hard workers and entrepreneurs.100  They migrate to wherever 
there is promise of benefit and success. With the shift in the economy, there was a need to shift 
resource bases from villages to towns and cities. Moreover, labourers were needed during the 
building of roads, railways, and factories, which prompted increased migration.101 Places such 
as Aba, Lagos, Calabar, and Onitsha, which is close to the River Niger, developed as industrial 
centres. They attracted migrants with the presence of markets, administrative officials, 
industries, and the influx of foreign traders.102 Furthermore, coal mining, the discovery of oil, 
and the decline of agriculture led people to seek employment in cities in order to feed 
themselves and their families.103 This movement of people contributed to the distortion of 
family structures.104 The extended family pattern and communal way of life disappeared, 
leading to individualistic ways of life.105 Many individuals and their families established 
permanent homes in urban areas, often far away from their traditional homes. As Isiugo-
Abanihe rightly affirmed, the ‘social change that accompanies economic development brings 
with it a re-formulation of family organisation’.106 The impact of migration is such that, whilst 
people held tenaciously to cultural practices, they became exposed to Western lifestyles, and 
thus adapted their cultural practices to adjust them to complex modern realities and economic 
exigencies. The result is the commercialisation of bridewealth payment.107 In this 
commercialisation, education played an unwitting role.  
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3.7.3  Education as paradox 
The introduction of education in Igboland was revolutionary.108 As transformation and 
development soared in society, education became of immense significance for communication, 
knowledge, ascension to political and leadership roles, sustenance, and survival.  It is worthy 
to note that at the onset of colonial rule, Western education was dispensed alongside 
Christianity, which struggled for supremacy with indigenous religion. In this sense, acquiring 
western education was considered a waste of time for most people in Igboland.109 This was 
because of its exorbitant cost and people’s distrust of its effects on the traditional system. The 
traditional education practiced in the precolonial era by the Igbo people solved the needs of the 
society in that it dealt with individual responsibility to the society, work orientation, and other 
societal values.110 People’s distrust of Western education was heightened by their fear that its 
values were not attuned to their traditional values.111 According to Ubah, a ‘day well spent is a 
day spent on the farm, in the grazing field’.112 However, converts to Christianity were eager to 
accept Western education, since it made them stand out amongst their neighbours.113 When 
eventually the need for Western education gained momentum, only boys were initially sent to 
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school because of the patriarchal nature of Igbo society.114 Thus, male children acquired new 
understandings of privilege and social power.115 Significantly, they cemented their perceptions 
of women’s inferior role in society, and acquired distorted views of bridewealth from European 
teachers and their local successors.116 When eventually girls were allowed to attend school, the 
curriculum had to be structured to fit their new social status. The pressure to accommodate 
girls in schools arose from Christian influences. Specifically, missionaries pressured parents to 
allow their children to be educated irrespective of their sex.117 Girls were taught how to be 
good Christian house wives and mothers. The structuring of education in Igboland had mixed 
results.  
As Uchendu noted, it increased economic and gender inequality, created social 
stratification, distorted customs, and disrupted social harmony.118 The positive effect for female 
children is that they became more aware of their rights.119 The negative effect is that it became 
economically unfavourable for many people to send their female children to school. 
Accordingly, those able to do so attempt to recoup their expenses from high bridewealth.120 
Isiugo-Abanihe notes that education has overtaken the emphasis laid on social background, 
personal qualities, beauty, and accomplishments as the qualities required of a bride during the 
negotiation of bridewealth.121 This mixed result shows the duality of structure as both an 
enabler and a constrainer. On the one hand, education enabled females to be mentally better 
equipped, gain meaningful employment, and exercise agency in their cultural setting. On the 
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other hand, it constrained them in terms of their parents’ demand for high bridewealth. This 
constraint was especially strong on many educated females who hold strongly to cultural 
practices. Where they wish to marry early, their parents’ demand for high bridewealth puts 
immense pressure on suitors.122 High bridewealth also objectifies such women when suitors 
haggle for affordable bridewealth.123 In sum, the educational qualification of the bride 
primarily determines the quantum of her bridewealth. There are classifications for her subject 
of study, with certain professions such as medicine, nursing, engineering, and law attracting 
higher bridewealth because they are valued over other professions.124  
 
3.7.4  Bridewealth and gender relations 
Today, bridewealth is so distorted that it has become almost entirely monetised.125 It has also 
become an extortionary venture rather than the unifying symbol it used to be. This extortionary 
character affects the intending spouses’ agency, even in their matrimonial home.126 Here, I am 
concerned with how changes in the significance of bridewealth affect agency in the context of 
cultural and economic motives. The same traditional structures, which proclaim the self-esteem 
and dignity of women, also undermine their agency and decision-making power over the 
beneficiaries of their bridewealth.127 Affirming this argument, Isiugo-Abanihe stated thus: 
‘among the Igbos, for whom bride wealth payments are high, a woman comes under the 
authority of her husband and takes instructions from him as the head of the family by virtue of 
this payment’.128 In the context of bridewealth negotiation, the question is whether the interplay 
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of cultural and economic motives support Isiugo-Abanihe’s assertion. From my field findings, 
women’s economic status influences their agency during bridewealth negotiation. As I 
demonstrate in chapters five and six, women wield this agency through their parents and 
prospective spouses. Since Igbo people value enterprise, women enjoy a respectable social 
status because of their significant financial contributions to their families.  
  
3.8     Conclusion  
This chapter establishes bridewealth payment as the keystone of customary law marriages in 
South-East Nigeria. It identified two schools of thought regarding the components of 
bridewealth payment. While the unified view holds that bridewealth payment encompasses 
every payment in cash or material that the groom or his family gives to the bride’s family, the 
dualist view posits that marriage gifts are not part of bridewealth because they are not refunded 
during divorce. This chapter adopted the unified view because it plays a major role in the 
distortion of bridewealth’s original significance. This is because over time, excessive 
requirements in marriage lists influenced people’s perceptions of the meaning of bridewealth. 
These perceptions became so distorted that families demand high sums of money despite 
legislation that prohibits it. This open flouting of legislation has significance for the interaction 
of cultural institutions with the formal legal system. 
The chapter described women’s appreciable social spaces in the precolonial agricultural 
settings in which bridewealth emerged. These social spaces thrived in a village republican 
system in which the extended family and age groups played key supportive roles in the 
institution of marriage. In this setting, bridewealth had a symbolic value and served as a 
legitimation of marriage, appreciation of the bride’s fecundity, and compensation for the loss 
of her services to her family and lineage. However, Nigeria’s colonial encounter contributed 
significantly to the distortion of bridewealth in Igbo society. Some of the main factors that 
account for bridewealth’s distortion include education, acculturation, urbanisation, 
monetisation of bridewealth, and economic wants. Two aspects of this encounter are 
noteworthy for power relations within the structure- versus-agency interplay. 
The first is the radical alteration of the agrarian basis of society. This alteration resulted 
in the near eradication of the communal basis of wealth production. Individuals began to 
                                                 
 
 




acquire wealth independently, as they no longer farmed together under the extended family 
system of pre-colonial social organisation. Individual wealth acquisition changed the practice 
in which the groom’s family raised his bridewealth. It became the sole responsibility of the 
groom, who, depending on his wealth, could offer even more than the amount required by his 
in-laws.  
The second set of consequences is urbanisation, the cost of acquiring a Western 
education, and the loss of livelihoods that resulted from disruptions to the land tenure system. 
Families saw bridewealth as an avenue to recoup expenses on the education of their daughters 
and compensate for their own poor economic situation. Perceptions of the distorted version of 
bridewealth payment now include: a financial incentive for raising a girl-child,129 a wife 
purchase,130 and a form of future financial security.131 There is a belief by some parents that 
their son-in law might resent the idea of his wife shouldering her family’s financial 
responsibilities after marriage. Accordingly, they demand high bridewealth to compensate for 
limitations to her financial responsibilities.  
In conclusion, the interplay of structure and agency in contemporary manifestations of 
bridewealth reflect both cultural and economic motives. These motives demonstrate the duality 
of structure, since they are shared by both custodians of culture and families who see 
bridewealth as economic relief. The interplay of cultural and economic motives creates 
complex power relations that blur the structure-agency divide.  Given the unclear nature of the 
structure-versus-agency interplay in bridewealth payment, the next chapter investigates the 
political and legal structure of Nigeria’s legal system to uncover how the interaction of cultural 
and legal institutions impact on women’s agency.
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4.1 Introduction  
In the preceding chapter, I examined the concept of bridewealth payment, its significance, and 
the factors responsible for its distortion. I found that socio-economic changes, notably 
education, acculturation, and urbanisation, which contributed to the commercialisation of 
bridewealth, significantly influence current perceptions of bridewealth’s function. These socio-
economic changes, which were brought about by colonial rule in Nigeria, affected people’s 
religious, philosophical, and legal world view.  
 In this chapter, I offer an account of precolonial power relations in Nigeria, with 
emphasis on South-East Nigeria. This account is significant because bridewealth negotiation 
is inseparable from the wider society within which the marriage process occurs. In turn, the 
social settings in which agency is exercised are sometimes determined by socio-economic 
conditions beyond the control of the concerned persons. Accordingly, this chapter reveals how 
socio-economic changes affected bridewealth payment and altered the socio-cultural power 
relations that constitute structure in South-East Nigeria. Since bridewealth profoundly affects 
women’s agency, the chapter will place emphasis on women. It will shed light on how the legal 
framework instituted by colonial rule shapes women’s ability to manipulate the cultural 
institutions surrounding bridewealth payment. It will draw from literature on pre-colonial and 
colonial social relations to show how these social relations have evolved over time from their 
agrarian foundations. To better highlight the relationship between structure and agency in 
chapter five, it will also identify state attempts to use law to regulate bridewealth payment. 
Here, law is regarded as structure – ie, a tool of social control – rather than a facilitator of 
human interaction or agency.  
The analysis in this chapter encompasses people’s interactions in rural and urban 
settlements. The reason is that urbanisation is a significant feature of the colonial encounter, 
which greatly influences individuals’ exercise of agency.1 The chapter begins with a historical 
overview of Nigeria. 
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4.2 Brief historical overview of Nigeria  
This section provides an overview of Nigeria’s history and legal development before and after 
colonialism, with emphasis on marriage relations within the socio-political structure of South-
East Nigeria.  
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. Even though its present political 
structure was established by British colonisers in the early twentieth century, the political 
organisation of its people dates back several centuries.2 To the south, Nigeria is bounded by 
the Gulf of Benin and the Gulf of Biafra, which are on   the bights of Guinea in the Atlantic 
Ocean. To the north, it is bounded by Niger, east by Cameroon, and to the west by Benin.3 The 
main channel of trade and communication in pre-colonial times was the river, Niger.  
Nigeria has a wealth of mineral resources such as coal, iron, and petroleum reserves, 
which are the current mainstay of its economy. However, agriculture was the core basis of the 
economy before the discovery of petroleum. Indeed, Nigeria still prides itself in the variety of 
its agricultural produce. Its food crops range from yam, plantains, cocoyam, and cassava, to 
cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel, and groundnuts. These goods were produced for local 
consumption, as well as for export, with each geographical area specialising in specific foods. 
For example, the Igbos of South-East Nigeria were known for producing palm oil; the Yoruba 
in the South-West are known for production of cocoa, and the Hausas of northern Nigeria are 
known for the production of groundnuts. These three ethnic groups – Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba 
– are the largest and most well-known ethnic groups out of an estimated 350 others.4  
Prior to the consolidation of the Northern and Southern territories of Nigeria in 1914, 
the diverse communities of Nigeria were autonomous.5 Areas such as Oyo, Benin, and Sokoto 
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had fairly centralised systems of governance and held strong regional powers for an extended 
period of time.6 Smaller communities had fragmented systems of governance within structures 
such as councils, chiefs, and age groups.7 This is the case with the study area. 
   
4.3 Political structure of South-East Nigeria 
Just as many other tribes in Nigeria, the Igbo people have a rich history.8 Scholars have argued 
that before the inception of colonialism, the Igbos lacked homogeneity.9 In the words of Karl 
Deutsch, to qualify as a homogenous people, a group must be ‘linked by complementarity of 
habits and facilities of communication’.10 The Igbo people have similar customs and similar 
languages.11  However, they lack centralised political organisation and a genuine sense of unity 
amongst their different village groups.12 These village groups were named with reference to 
their acknowledged ancestral founders or after a momentous event, or in commemoration of a 
significant feature of their locality.13 Each village group had its own political unit, which 
consisted of age grades, title holders or elders, Umuada (married, divorced or single first 
daughters of the lineage), women associations, oracles, and diviners. These units, some of 
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which still exist, were arranged in patrilineages – that is descent from father to son or descent 
through blood ties.14 All of them played significant roles in bridewealth negotiation process. In 
what follows, I provide a description of Igbo political structures to highlight the dynamics of 
power, with careful attention on how the functions of each group enables or constrains agency. 
 
4.3.1 The Umunna 
This is a kindred group, which consists of males and females linked by the same ancestral 
descent. As a group involved in determining items on the marriage list, it consisted of adult 
members of the lineage, who were dominantly male and aged. As recorded by some scholars, 
there were limited numbers of women in this group in the past, making male power very 
significant.15 This group is different from traditional rulers. While a traditional ruler oversees 
the entire community, elders have power within their families and kinship groups.16 However, 
some elders are also members of the traditional rulers’ cabinet.17 They discuss issues and find 
solutions to matters affecting their lineage.18 The oldest amongst them was the leader called 
the Okpara, who acted on behalf of, and with the consent of other members of the group. In 
the context of bridewealth negotiation, they wielded the most influence by making sure that all 
traditional rites that accrue to them is met.19 As explained by Uchendu, the patriarchal nature 
of the society, which places ownership of a child on the father, accounts for this influence.20 
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4.3.2  Age grade associations 
This group, literally called otu ogbo in Igbo language, denotes men and women who are within 
the same age bracket.21 Their main function is to implement the decisions of Umunna or the 
assembly of elders. Such functions include collecting fines, clearing paths or bushes, fostering 
peace and stability, crime prevention, law enforcement, and welfare development.22 
Membership and participation in this group gives women an opportunity to assert their view 
and make complaints. In the context of marriage and bridewealth payment, age grades act in 
accordance with the complaint they receive on an issue. The extent of their power is subject to 
the decision of the elders, since many unsatisfied complainants resort to the elders.23 
 
4.3.3  The oracle 
Oracle means deities and spirits. They discharge judicial and divinatory functions, even today. 
They were feared and respected because of the divine powers they were believed to have 
exerted. For example, the Aro oracle was believed to have strengthened its people, protected 
them, allowed them to prosper, and killed whoever opposed them.24 Oracles are considered as 
impartial umpires, and their names portray the needs of the community.25 Villages and 
individuals consulted oracles in important matters such as settling disputes, health matters, and 
investigation of marriage partners.26 However, with the spread of Christianity, people no longer 
widely seek from oracles the suitability of their children’s marriage partners. Notably, oracles 
were both females and males. Indeed, the Earth goddess, (known as Ala, Ani, Ana, Ale, and 
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Ali in varying Igbo dialects) is the foremost deity in Igboland, since it connoted morality, 
fertility, and creativity.27 There were many female priestesses, which is an indication of 
women’s prominent role in precolonial society.  
 
4.3.4  Women’s associations 
Other than female age grades, women’s associations consist of the Umuada and the nwunyedi, 
meaning wives of the lineage.28 Although not as powerful as the Umuada, the nwunyedi – that 
is associations of married women in the kindred – are active in issues ‘involving lineage wives 
and their unmarried daughters, and matters regarding adultery and other breaches of 
marriage…’29 They have the power to settle cases that affect them as wives and mothers of the 
kindred.30 Where they fail to administer justice, the issue is referred to the Umuada.31  
The Umuada play a very active and influential role in social life, especially in marriage 
affairs.32 Their power is summarised by Akachi in this way:  
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In practically all Igbo communities, women in their natal villages – addressed as 
“Umuada” or “umumgboto” – wielded legal, decisional rights comparable to those of a 
modern supreme court. The “Umuada” were last arbiters; they equally had right to 
intervene, even uninvited, when they believed that there had been a miscarriage of 
justice.33  
 
Similarly, Chuku stated: 
The Otu Umuada was a vital force in their natal lineage.  They not only served as a 
police force over lineage wives, but also were peace mediators within their natal lineages 
and between their natal and marital lineages. They served as the supreme court of appeal 
on female matters as well as the watchdog of the men's political arm of government.34  
 
The Umuada play a complementary role to that of the Umunna, showing a duality in the 
political power relations of the Igbo people.35 While recognising that the roles of the Umuada 
is complementary, Njaka observed that they are ‘potentially the most powerful organ in the 
state.’36 He added that ‘despite this power, however, the Umuada (patrilineal daughters) are 
said to be like mothers – always lenient and not as fierce as it sounds.’37 Scholars in the 1970s, 
80s and now have shown how fierce this group can be, thus contradicting Njaka’s earlier 
statement.38 I would have agreed with his statement if he hadn’t put the word ‘always’.   
 
Another prominent female unit in Igbo social life is the omu. An omu is a female 
monarch charged with the responsibility of caring for the women in her community.39 This 
position was more pronounced in areas that practiced a ‘constitutional village monarchy’ 
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system such as the riverine Ibo, coastal Ibibio, and the Ijo.40 The omu oversaw the affairs of 
women and was their spokesperson in important meetings.41   
Given the above political structures, were women in precolonial Igbo society voiceless? 
The below exploration of social relations in the context of marriage shed light on women’s 
ability to manipulate cultural institutions using their agency. 
 
4.4  Social relations and women’s agency in precolonial Nigeria  
There is scant literature on the life of Igbo women in precolonial times, a situation traceable to 
the inadequate representation of women in historical studies.42 The little information that can 
be gathered are mainly from oral accounts, which is the main feature of African history.43 
However, oral accounts are tainted by the problem of individual biases and group prejudices. 
In any case, ethnographic accounts of Igbo women during the colonial period offer clues to the 
social status and agency of women in precolonial Igbo societies. These accounts, which have 
been debated by several scholars, arose from the subordinate position of women in 
contemporary society. Three schools of thought prevail.  
Some scholars believe that women had a subordinate position in precolonial Igbo 
society, while others argue otherwise.44 Yet others argue that even if women had power or 
influence, they only functioned within the private space rather than in the public domain.  Those 
who argue that women had a subordinate position have portrayed women as inferior to men 
and with little or no influence in society. This category of scholars is mainly Westerners with 
little or no experience or acquaintance with the lived experiences of the subjects of their study. 
For example, Basden and Talbot each painted a negative picture of gender relations in 
precolonial society.45 They portrayed women as not just inferior to men but also slaves to their 
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husbands. For instance, Basden stated that women’s lives consist of a ‘continual round of 
marketing and preparation of food.’46 It was not until the 1929 Women’s War, also referred to 
as the Aba Women’s Riot, that scholarly opinion and perceptions of women began to change.47 
The incident occurred because of women’s disgust at the systematic erosion of their precolonial 
economic and political power by British officials.48 
Scholars who argue in favour of women’s significant social status emphasised the lost 
identity and position of women in precolonial Igbo.49 For example,  Leith-Ross argues that 
Igbo women were not the ‘chattel type and correspond little to the widely-held idea of a 
downtrodden slave’.50 Their argument corresponds to the views of Nnaemeka, Chuku and 
Ezeigbo on the ability of women to exercise their agency in both the public and private 
spheres.51 These works laid the foundation for the autonomy notion, which rejects the idea that 
women occupied inferior social positions in precolonial Igbo society.52  
For example, Chuku argued that Igbo women were independent and ambitious, and 
played a leading role in development.53  In the socio-economic sphere, the works of Ester 
Boserup are significant.54 Boserup gave an insight into the significant role of women in 
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economic development, with emphasis on agriculture/farming. Similarly, Agbasiere argued 
that on the economic level, ‘the woman, not the man, is the main producer and main provider 
of foodstuffs for the household’.55  In her work, Dual sex political system in operation, Okonjo 
argued that women enjoyed a non-hierarchical status in the political system of precolonial 
Igboland. In a similar way, Egejuru rightly asserted that family roles were not classified as 
major and minor, or as superior and inferior.56 Every member of the family both young and old 
had a role to play in the development of the family.57 Other scholars have also rebutted some 
of the misleading information regarding women’s status in the precolonial Igbo political 
system.58 Their studies show that the social relationship between men and women in marriage 
and in the political, social and economic aspects of life in precolonial society were 
interdependent and complementary.59  In sum, these scholars reveal that precolonial Igbo 
society placed great value on the role women play in social life.60  
Despite the above literature on the precolonial status of Igbo women, some scholars 
still argue that the structural power that women wielded was only functional in the private 
domain and not the public domain.61 Others have argued that their role transcended the private 
domain.62 The term private or domestic domain, as elaborated by Sanday, entails roles 
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performed within the family unit, whereas the public domain relates to control beyond the 
localised family unit, i.e. economic and political authority.63 The debate here relates to the 
extent to which women exercised authority in the two spheres, as well as the extent to which 
their agency was respected.64 
From the literature, it is obvious that women exercised considerable agency in 
precolonial society.65 They used their status as mothers, sisters, daughters and wives in the 
groups mentioned above to manipulate socio-cultural structures and also partake in decision-
making in matters that affected them, such as marriage rites and marital abuse.66 Commenting 
on the status of women and how they exercise their agency, Uchendu wrote that the ‘African 
woman regarded as a chattel of her husband, who has made a bridewealth payment on her 
account, is not an Igbo woman, who enjoys a high socio-economic and legal status. She can 
leave her husband at will … and summon to him to a tribunal where she will get a fair 
hearing.’67 It is notable that Uchendu’s ethnographic surveys occurred after colonial rule had 
become firmly established in Nigeria. His observation lends credence to how the socio-
economic changes brought by colonial rule distorted bridewealth payment. What follows 
reveals the impact of colonial rule on Igbo women’s agency in Nigeria.  
 
4.5 Colonial impact on women’s agency  
As mentioned earlier, the Igbo people lacked a common identity before the inception of 
colonial rule.68 Along with the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970, colonial rule created a new 
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society in Igboland by forcefully lumping disparate Igbo communities into the single political 
unit known as southern Nigeria.69 Indeed, the coming of European colonialists had a 
revolutionary impact on the legal, economic, cultural, political and social aspects of life in 
Nigeria. As Mba rightly asserted, ‘colonialism is not just a system of administration but a whole 
(new) way of living, thinking, and believing.’70  Much has been written on the colonial history 
of Igboland.71  Accordingly, this section will only focus on its impact on agency relating to 
women’s power to influence and make decisions, especially in marriage. This impact will be 
explored at the intersections of politics, religion, and law.  
 
4.5.1 Impact of legal and political changes on women’s agency 
The role, place, and significance of law as a tool of authority and power cannot be over 
emphasised.72 As Mamdani rightly observed, colonial administrators were faced with the 
puzzle of how a ‘foreign minority’ can rule an ‘indigenous majority’.73 There were two 
alternatives: to rule directly or indirectly. The former could function effectively in societies 
where there were centralised forms of authority, while the later was only feasible in societies 
such as South-East Nigeria where power was decentralised. Indirect rule offered the advantage 
of allowing the indigenous laws of the colonised peoples to function alongside the law of the 
colonisers. This is the origin of the Nigerian legal system and the phenomenon of co-existing 
state and non-state law, also known as legal pluralism.74  
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In the precolonial era, leaders in Igboland were chosen based on their leadership skills, 
age, philanthropic nature, and charisma.75 However, the coming of colonial rule changed 
everything. Indirect rule became the mode of administration in South-East Nigeria. Here, 
English law, which is the law of the British colonisers, was imposed on Igboland. The British 
felt that they were bringing in the rule of law, a civilised way of life, and justice to a primitive 
people.76 Nigerian indigenous laws were applied only to the extent that they were not repugnant 
to natural justice, equity, and good conscience, and consistent with written law.77 Although 
bridewealth was not proscribed as repugnant, the colonial government eventually sought to 
limit its payment in 1956. Colonial rule created courts where its laws were administered, with 
the judicial authority resting almost exclusively on British officials.78  The understaffing of 
these courts and their false impression of the governance structure in Igboland contributed to 
the appointment of ‘assessors’, ‘native rulers’, ‘court clerks’ and ‘warrant chiefs’ as mentioned 
in Chapter three.79 These individuals were chosen based on their perceived authority in the 
society and their willingness to implement the colonial agenda.80 The warrant chiefs were given 
certificates of recognition to rule their respective areas, while the assessors appeared during 
trials for the purpose of advising British judges on applicable customs.81 This era of rapid social 
changes saw the appointment of warrant chiefs and formation of native courts to deal with 
disputes arising from alterations in the agrarian social settings of Igboland.82 Many of the 
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warrant chiefs were appointed by colonial officials based on their wealth, ability to understand 
English, and influence with colonial officials.83 Although these chiefs were males, the colonial 
officials did appoint one woman, Chief Ahebi Ugbabe, in recognition of her prominent social 
status.84 Her appointment validates scholarly claims that precolonial Igbo women wielded 
considerable agency through their economic, religious, and political power, which they lost to 
the colonial experience.85  
For example, colonial officials failed to recognise the agency of women in social life. 
Women were not part of native courts officials (only one woman was reported to be part of the 
native court). Since colonial officials came from a ‘Victorian society’ in which the social place 
of the woman was within the family unit only, they encouraged patriarchy in Igbo society.86 
Consequently, women experienced colonial rule as an instrument of social control, oppression 
and marginalisation.87 The precolonial social system that allowed them considerable agency 
turned into an arena for suppressing their voices.88 Despite not recognising women’s prominent 
social status, colonial officials imposed tax on women, which led to women-led violent 
conflicts in many parts of Igboland.89 The Aba war of 1929 demonstrates how women felt 
about their invisibility and marginalisation from the public sphere, a marginalisation which was 
accentuated by the corrupt behaviour of warrant chiefs.90 An excellent example is Korieh’s 
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description of a woman’s complaint to the Commission of Inquiry that investigated the 
Women’s War in 1930: ‘Our grievances are that the land has changed and we are all dying. It 
is a long time since the chiefs and the people who know book [Western-educated people] have 
been oppressing us.’91 In sum, the distortion of the political setting of the Igbos degraded the 
status of women. Legally, they were regarded as minors who could operate only under the 
rights of their fathers, brothers, and husbands.92 The indirect system of governance was alien 
to the Igbo people because they were not used to being ruled by a central authority.93 
Importantly, the cases handled in the native courts were administered with English legal 
procedures.94 Literature shows that most of the interpretation of customs given by the assessors 
was a distorted version of the practice of the people.95  The new legal ordering contributed to 
a number of changes that impacted on women’s agency and relegated them to the lower rung 
of the social ladder.96  
These changes are evident in the laws and policies relating to marriage (such as 
inheritance, succession, and bridewealth payment laws), institutions of authority, and women’s 
socio-economic autonomy.97 The first of these laws is the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, 
which was in force in Britain before the colonial cessation of Lagos. This Act allowed a man 
to divorce his wife on the ground of adultery. However, a woman had to prove other elements 
such as desertion, extreme cruelty, and incest to secure divorce, given that a husband’s adultery 
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was insufficient to prove divorce. The second is the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1990, which 
stipulates that marriage can only be dissolved if the petitioner can prove that the marriage has 
broken down irretrievably.98 The word ‘irretrievable’ was left undefined.  The Supreme Court 
in the case of Shokunbi v Shokunbi stated: ‘It is the actual state of the marriage that the court 
has to inquire into, as to know, whether or not, it is still viable, rather than concern itself with 
the question of guilt or innocence or either party which point is irrelevant’.99 While it is easy 
to get a divorce in customary law, with just a meeting of the two families and refund of the 
bridewealth, it is not the same with civil marriages.100  
Igbo women’s restricted ability to obtain divorce, coupled with the negative 
consequences of divorce, significantly undermines women’s cultural agency.101 This restriction 
is reinforced by the Christian missionaries, who through their teachings, introduced the idea of 
a lifelong marriage in which the wife will be the helpmate of the husband.102 Thus, for most 
Christian denomination, adultery is the only ground for divorce, thereby influencing laws that 
regulated marriage relations. Many Igbo converts contracted marriages in the Western 
churches. These marriages were undertaken based on doctrines that emphasised the submissive 
roles of women in marriages. Arguably, these doctrines reduced women’s agency in 
bridewealth negotiation, labelled brides as property to be possessed, and rendered them 
voiceless partakers in the marriage negotiation process.103  
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It may be argued that marriage laws and Christian teachings enhanced women’s legal 
status in marriage. However, women’s agency in marriage issues, which includes bridewealth 
negotiation and the ability to leave an abusive marriage, was whittled down.104 The submissive 
doctrines of Christianity, the complexity of statutory marriage procedures, and the stigma of 
divorce combined to constrain women’s agency in the marriage process. As Okeke noted, these 
combined factors weakened women’s bargaining power in the marriage process, in that they 
reinforced patriarchal structures, Christian doctrines, and championed complex new laws, 
thereby muffling women’s voices in marriage matters.105 What follows is an examination of 
the various attempts by the post-colonial government to close the gender inequality gap and 
regulate high bridewealth and how this affected women’s cultural agency. 
 
4.6 Cultural agency and the colonial legal legacy  
Women’s visibility and recognition became relatively pronounced during and after the 
Women’s War of 1929.106 As pointed out, the incident was sparked by women’s attempt to 
resist colonial policies in Igboland. The war was outstanding because women pioneered and 
orchestrated it. Nonetheless, the aftermath did not end the alienation of women from positions 
of power. Even though the colonial administration changed their assumptions on the status of 
women, they took few remedial measures.107 However, the war demonstrated the extent to 
which women could wield their agency.108  
While, on the one hand, colonial rule gave women freedom of choice in marriage and 
options for divorce, on the other hand, it suppressed women’s voices and set the tone for a male 
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dominated post-colonial Nigeria.109 However, the increased scholarly attention to women 
contributed to the rise and recognition of the role of women in Nigeria.110 It also highlighted 
how the interaction of customary law, English law, religious law (Islamic law), and statutory 
law affects women. The application of customary law in colonial courts and the codification of 
customs distorted perceptions of women’s agency.111 As such, what became the acceptable 
customary law is what Merry described as ‘a bricolage of traditions which had continutites 
with the past as well as changes in form’ that had nothing to do with women’s precolonial 
agency. 112 Although the status of women has improved since independence, the problem of 
gender and economic inequality has persisted.113 Nigeria continued with the common law legal 
system inherited from Britain, while allowing other sources of law as mentioned above.  The 
Constitution, which is the grundnorm, strives to uphold the advancement of the human rights 
of all citizens, whereas the customary law, which usually regulates the personal lives of 
individuals, continues to restrict women’s agency.114 These restrictions manifest in widowhood 
practices, discriminatory disinheritance of women, and women’s insignificant input in 
bridewealth negotiation. These restrictions give women inferior social status, despite their 
crucial roles as mothers and wives.115 So, what is the role of the legal framework in the 
enhancement of women’s agency? 
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Regrettably, Nigeria’s ratification of many international human rights instruments has 
not solved the problem of gender inequality. This problem persists because the interaction of 
law and culture in a plural legal setting and its implications for women’s agency are often 
poorly understood and considered during the adoption of gender laws. The politics of culture, 
its legitimisation of gender ordering, and its unclear interaction with state laws, have rendered 
it almost impossible for human rights laws and policies to work effectively in the balancing of 
the goals of gender equality and cultural identity.116 The interaction of law and culture presents 
a paradox for enhancing women’s agency. On the side of the of the law, the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which Nigeria signed on 31 August 1982 and ratified on 22 
June 1983, provides that an individual has the duty of preserving and strenghtening positive 
African cultural values in his relations with others,117 that the satisfaction of cultural rights is a 
guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights,118 and the freedom of cultural 
development is ensured.119 Article 18 of the African Charter also provides for the protection of 
the rights of women. However, even though the Constitution advances the idea of non-
discrimination, it lacks specific provisions for ensuring gender parity, thereby creating a 
vacuum for the restriction of women’s agency.120 For example, in 2016, the Nigerian Senate 
dismissed ‘a gender and equality law that pledged to eliminate discrimination in politics, 
education and employment, protect women’s land rights and tackle violence against 
women.’121 As representatives of the electorate, this rejection reflects the gendered nature of 
Nigerian society, a situation that negates the influence of state laws and policies.122 In this 
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context, challenging human rights violations by cultural actors has raised controversies. Some 
scholars have argued that violations of human rights amount to abuse rather than violation.123 
The reason is that the term violation should only be attributed to misconduct by state actors, to 
avoid giving recognition to non-state actors.124  In terms of marriage, the Marriage Act provides 
that where any of the parties to a marriage is below the age of 21 years, consent must be 
obtained from the father rather than the mother, except if the father is dead or of unsound 
mind.125 The intersection between law and culture in this pluralistic setting is thus blurred and 
dysfunctional in practice. As shown below, this is evident in state efforts to ensure that 
bridewealth payment is not excessive. 
 
4.6.1  State interventions in women’s agency 
In considering the efforts of the Nigerian state to enhance individuals’ agency with legislation, 
attention will be paid particularly to womens’s agency with regards to marriage (inheritance 
and succession) and bridewealth payment. Here, I consider law as structure – that is an 
instrument of social control rather than an expression of human interaction. Viewing law as 
structure exposes its (in)effectiveness and legitimacy based on the levels of its acceptance and 
disregard. Law exists to punish offenders, to prohibit conduct, and thereby compel compliance 
from agency.126 When it succeeds in these aims, structure is sustained. However, when it fails, 
questions must be raised over its ability to control agency. An example is the Limitation of 
Dowry Law of 1956, which seeks to regulate excessive sums demanded by parents as their 
daughter’s bridewealth.127 This legislation restricted the amounts individuals could pay as 
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bridewealth or for items that accompany bridewealth.128 The implementation and effectiveness 
of this legislation is so poor that it calls into question the legitimacy of the law.  
While examining why people obey state law, scholars have noted that laws cannot be 
complied with based on threat of sanction or punishment alone.129 This is especially the case 
for laws competing with norms such as bridewealth payment, which gives people cultural 
relevance and legitimacy. The legitimacy of laws depends on its obedience and its influence 
on the behaviour of people for whom it was/is enacted.130 The obligation to obey law therefore 
increases when people are allowed to express their views and participate in shaping decisions 
around an issue.131 It also depends on people’s ideological belief, economic conditions, and 
interpretation of the role of law in their social relations.132 Accordingly, laws aimed at 
enhancing women’s agency must recognise and take into consideration the historical factors 
that robbed them of their status.133 An example is the landmark April 2014 Supreme Court 
decision, which abolished the custom that denied women the right of inheritance.134 While this 
judgement was a relief for women in the sphere of gender equality, its ability to influence 
agency is questionable, especially regarding the unwillingness of most women to resort to 
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court.135 This unwillingness may be because of the fear of losing family relations and the stigma 
attached to making such a complaint.136 Thus, the 2014 Supreme Court decision shows the 
dynamics and the disconnection between the provisions of the law and what is obtainable in 
practice. Another such example is the rejection of the Gender Parity and Prohibition of 
Violence against Women Bill, a bill which sought to integrate and implement certain provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women, the Protocol of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the rights of 
women in Africa. The rejection of this Bill reflects the partriachal nature of Nigerian society. 
Observers have linked this rejection to the low number of women in the Nigerian Parliament, 
as well as entrenched cutural and religious beliefs, despite the gender equality principle in the 
1999 Constitution. Thus, compliance with law requires a dynamic rather than formalistic 
approach, and requires the involvement of all stakeholders in the drafting process of legislation. 
 
4.7 Conclusion  
Although there is insufficient literature on the subject, this chapter has shown that women 
exercised considerable agency with respect to marriage in the precolonial and early colonial 
era. There are several reasons for this finding. The first is because marriage is the foundation 
of social life in Igboland. Women’s agency in marriage affairs was well-respected and 
cherished because of their crucial role in the art of creation.137  
The second is because of the close-knit nature of precolonial Igbo society.138 A notable 
feature of this society is its dual sex political system,139 in which gender relations were more 
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complementary than hierarchical.140 Positions, power, respect, and authority were earned on 
the basis of individuals’ service to the community, moral integrity, wealth, age, eloquence, and 
charisma.141 Colonial rule changed all these by making women nearly invisible in public life. 
Although women now have increased access to education and employment, this has not 
translated into radical changes in their exercise of agency. Their ability to manipulate the 
cultural institutions surrounding bridewealth payment remains limited by the radical socio-
economic changes brought by colonial rule. In the next chapter, I reveal how power relations 
play out in the negotiation of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria and the extent to 
which socio-economic needs drive these power relations.
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Chapter Five: Negotiation process of bridewealth payment in South-East 
Nigeria 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the ways power relations play out in the negotiation process of 
bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria. As an important cultural tradition, bridewealth 
offers a nuanced understanding of power relations within the structure and agency interplay. 
The cultural institutions that surround the negotiation process of bridewealth may be regarded 
as structure, which sometimes conflict with agency – that is individuals’ ability to influence 
bridewealth payment. On the one hand, cultural institutions are primarily customs, the 
custodians of which are elders, headmen, and traditional rulers. On the other hand, the 
individuals who use agency to influence the quantum of bridewealth are both subjects and 
custodians of culture. They are primarily the intending couple, their parents, and their relatives. 
As shown in the two preceding chapters, the socio-economic changes brought by colonial rule 
transformed bridewealth payment. Significantly, these changes brought increased access to 
education and individual employment. However, despite these developments, the ability of 
prospective spouses to manipulate or influence the cultural institutions surrounding 
bridewealth payment is unclear. This chapter reveals the complex web of social relationships 
within which this manipulation and influence plays out. Using data from key informant 
interviews and personal observations, it reveals the active actors in the negotiation process of 
bridewealth payment, their roles, and the influence of agency on these roles. It further reveals 
the bargaining tools employed by these actors, the constraints on these tools, and the most 
influential elements in these constraints. It concludes by identifying power brokers in the 
negotiation and payment of bridewealth in South-East Nigeria. 
 The data in this chapter are presented mostly through the voice of research participants. 
I do this with extensive quotations from key participants. Theoretically, two assumptions 
guided the fieldwork from which these data are obtained. The first is the assumption that 
structure dominates agency because of the importance attached to the cultural institution of 
bridewealth. This assumption was based mostly on the scholarly works, which are reviewed in 
Chapter one. These works show the strong attachment Igbos have for their cultural heritage.1 
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It was also based on my experiences of bridewealth practice as an Igbo woman. The second is 
the assumption that economic coercion plays a powerful role in people’s abilities to influence 
cultural institutions. This assumption arose because of socio-economic changes and factors that 
are believed to affect most cultural practices. As shown later, these assumptions were not 
validated fully by the data. To better understand the negotiation process of bridewealth, it is 
important to expand on the distinction between bridewealth and marriage gifts outlined in 
chapters one and three. 
 
5.2 Bridewealth versus marriage gifts: A view from the field 
As I explained in Chapter three, marriage gifts are items exchanged between families intending 
to contract a marriage.2 These gifts are outlined in a list of marriage requirements, which may 
be written or unwritten. As I also explained, controversy surrounds the relationship of these 
gifts with bridewealth payment (ego isi nwanyi). While the duality theory school of thought 
believes that marriage gifts do not form part of bridewealth payment, the unified theory insist 
that the two are inseparable.3 The data from the field supports the latter view. Almost all my 
research participants expressed a unified view of bridewealth and marriage gifts.4 For example, 
when asked to describe the negotiation process of bridewealth in his community, a research 
participant stated thus:5  
During their second visit, they [the groom and his family] will come for the traditional 
list of items for the bride wealth payment. He will go with the list and study it to know 
if he can perform all the requirements. This list has different categories for the kinsmen, 
the married women, the father and the mother. All the items on the list for the father 
must all be completed nothing will be removed, it includes a big goat. When all these 
items have been provided, the man can now go with his wife. There is also bride wealth 
payment in the list; this is decided by the father. … This bride wealth is important 
because if he doesn’t pay them, all the items he brought are just a waste. 
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Affirming this statement, another informant stated:6 
Each kindred have its own list of items required for the bride wealth payment. …. In the 
past, a man is not required to provide all the marriage items at once; this is because the 
girl is assumed not to be sold. Nowadays, with civilization things have changed and you 
may be required to provide all of them at once. The amount to be paid as bridewealth 
(isi ego) as laid down by our king for a lady that acquired her first school leaving 
certificate to university level is 1500 naira plus some drinks and other items in the 
marriage list. 
 
Furthermore, they also noted that the changes in bridewealth payment are associated with 
commercialisation of bridewealth, as well as people’s demand of expensive items in marriage 
lists. These changes did not affect marriage gifts in isolation because they also affected the 
bridewealth payment itself.7 The below cartoon illustrates the unified theory and people’s 
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In the above cartoon, a prospective father-in-law asks the prospective groom why he has not 
responded to the marriage list given to him as part of the bridewealth requirements for his 
daughter, Ngozi. The groom, bemused by the excessive demands on the list, humorously asks 
if the list is just for marriage alone or comes with other benefits such as a traditional title. This 
joke illustrates how bridewealth has become submerged within marriage lists. Indeed, most of 
my research participants consider bridewealth as part of the marriage list, instead of the other 
way around.  In four of the lists of marriage requirements I saw, bridewealth (aku nwanyi) is 
listed.8 However, it is usually left blank, since it is regarded as a private matter between the 
groom and his prospective father-in-law. However, due to the astronomical increase in the list 
of marriage requirements, most fathers-in law waive bridewealth or accept a token sum as 
bridewealth. This trend is partly to lessen the financial burden on their sons-in law, and partly 
to avoid the impression that they are selling their daughters. A research informant explained it 
this way:9  
In the past, the father in- law takes the whole money but now with Christianity and other 
civilisation, they don’t take all the money. They take a little and return the remaining to 
their in-law and urge them to take care of their daughter. The reason why we don’t take 
the whole money is because the woman is not a property to be bought and sold. In the 
past, when people take the whole money it is very difficult for the girl to return to her 
family and for the father of the bride to repay the money if he is not buoyant enough. 
This leads to intimate abuse as the husband always brags about how much he paid. Now 
with the little money the father takes out, he can always pay back.  
 
However, my findings reveal that excessive demands in the marriage list is the main reason 
why parents accept token sums as bridewealth. As I showed in Chapters one and three, 
bridewealth was not paid in cash in the agrarian past. With the exorbitant nature of items on 
the marriage list, parents feel the groom’s financial burden would be worsened if they insist on 
high bridewealth. Also, parents know that only the bridewealth must be returned in the event 
of divorce. Accordingly, they accept a token bridewealth to make it easy to return in the event 
of divorce. A research participant explained it this way:10 
The man [groom] is instructed [when he collects the list] to make sure that 50, 20 and 
10-naira denominations are in the money he will bring [during the negotiation and 
payment of bridewealth]. The parents of the bride will take only 10, 50, and 20 naira out 
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of the money and give the rest to the man. The reason is to instil fear in you [the groom] 
not to maltreat their daughter because they can always return the money they took. 
 
Furthermore, the acceptance of token bridewealth is arguably a reinvention of bridewealth’s 
symbolism. An informant affirmed this assertion:11 ‘The bridewealth depends on the agreement 
of the two families. People use broom sticks to show how much is to be paid. These days’ 
people don’t even take all the money being paid. They take a little and return some to show 
that the girl is not for sale.’ From the data therefore, bridewealth is now submerged in marriage 
gifts. In what follows, I present a detailed account of the bridewealth negotiation process.  
 
5.3 The negotiation process of bridewealth payment 
The negotiation process of bridewealth payment involves an intricate bargaining interaction 
between the groom and bride’s families over several days or even months. This bargaining 
culminates in bridewealth payment.12 In rare cases, this process may be completed on the same 
day. Noticeably, the process is distinctively similar in the five states in which I collated data.  
Accordingly, I will categorise the process into two phases. These are the spousal search and 
introduction phase, and the negotiation and payment of bridewealth phase. 
 
5.3.1  Spousal search and introduction  
Before colonial rule introduced radical socio-economic changes into South-East Nigeria, 
parents usually chose wives for their sons.13 However, Western education, statutory marriage 
laws, and Christianity, all of which emphasise individual rather than group interests, have 
lessened the influence of families in spousal choices. Women and men now choose their 
partners based on love, an increasingly important criterion for marriage,14 as well as financial 
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ability, a muted, yet powerful motivation for marital choices. When couples agree to marry, 
the next step is iku aka n’uzo (literally meaning to knock on the door). This step requires the 
groom to register his interest in the bride with her father. The groom may come with his friends 
or brother(s) in this first stage with bottle(s) of wine for this first stage.15 In some cases, this 
visit is repeated by the groom and his relatives (father and other kinsmen) or the groom and an 
intermediary usually called onye aka ebe (literarily meaning eyewitness). This intermediary, 
who is usually a man, is chosen by the groom or his family because of his close relationship or 
association with the family of the bride and the groom. This second, and, if necessary, third 
visit, is often accompanied with bottle(s) of wine or kegs of palm wine and kola nut. When the 
visitors leave, the father of the bride would ask her to confirm her acceptance of the marriage 
proposal. If she confirms her acceptance, the second stage, called iju ese or igba nju 
(investigation), as it is termed in Akabo, Obiofia Nnewichi - a town in Anambra state - follows.  
This stage entails both families embarking on a process of investigation. The 
investigation is aimed at revealing the respective health and social standing of both families, 
such as caste (example osu, ume or diala), and consanguinity or affinal links (ie, connection 
by marriage, blood or common ancestor). This investigation is important because of the rule of 
exogamy and the need to verify the health backgrounds of the intending couple to prevent 
deadly or hereditary diseases such as epilepsy and mental problems.16 The father of both the 
bride-to-be and the groom go to the different villages of the other. They ask neighbours 
questions about the family - this is usually done without prior notice or indication to the other. 
They also do not directly expose their intention to the neighbours; it starts as an informal 
discussion. The reason is to elicit correct and genuine information. In some instances, they 
identify a prominent person, such as the king, elder or chief who knows much about the family. 
This is to filter through the pool of information that they have gathered. If the investigation 
provides a positive result, the process proceeds to the next stage. A negative result may be 
because of status, such as osu. In this case the marriage may be halted or terminated by the 
families. As mentioned in Chapter one, most parents ignore the osu or ume status, while others 
don’t. The couple may decide to cohabit or even marry without the permission of their parents, 
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16 See also DJ Smith ‘Promiscuous Girls, Good Wives, and Cheating Husbands: Gender Inequality, Transitions 
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especially with the widespread foundation for marriage such as romantic love, Christianity and 
other traits.  These Western traits differ from marriage criteria in the past, which were primarily 
social status such as being an osu. Now, these Western traits determine what is expected in and 
from a marital partner.17 This disobedience demonstrates the influence of agency on marriage 
negotiation. However, couples rarely disobey family instructions not to marry because they are 
sometimes coerced into conformity by their cultural and religious upbringing, which requires 
them to respect their parents and, by implication, tradition.18 Thus, there is dynamic tension at 
play, in which couples hold onto traditional practices even though they have imbibed Western 
values. In fact, Smith explained it more clearly when he said, ‘Africans are not simply 
abandoning traditional practices in favour of modern ones, but are creating their own systems 
of marriage and family organization that use resources of the past and the present, negotiating 
the tensions that emerge, and drawing on both traditional and modern moralities as they see 
fit’.19 This means there has been an aspect of continuity and change in Igbo traditional marriage 
system.  
The third stage is called the inara list, which literally means asking for the (marriage) 
list. This stage could be the last of the introductions by both families to the marriage. It entails 
a visit to the bride’s family by the groom and his kinsmen. Prior to the visit, the father of the 
bride would have made his daughter’s marriage proposal known to his kinsmen and they are 
expected to be present. The father of the bride or sometimes the eldest male in her family 
introduces other members of the family and their respective family positions. At this stage, 
both families would have accepted the marriage proposal in principle. The groom and his 
kinsmen will then demand a list of what they are to provide to complete the marriage and make 
the bride their wife. In some villages in Mbano and Mbaise, the groom’s family also produce 
a list of what they require from the bride’s family.20 The list contains items like cooked food 
and livestock, such as goats and chicken. However, the contents of this list are less than the 
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contents of the groom’s list. This is because the bride’s family will lose her labour, while the 
groom’s family will gain it. The list is compiled by the men and women groups of both 
communities.  The women and men groups entail all married men and women within the 
kinship group.   
The items on the marriage list given to the groom are sometimes influenced by the 
educational qualifications of the bride, whether she is pregnant, and the financial and cultural 
backgrounds of the couple. During my marriage for example, the list given to my husband’s 
family was influenced by the fact that I studied a professional course. During the negotiation 
of bridewealth, the groom and his kinsmen present all the items on their list, while the kinsmen 
of the bride do the same. 
The use of the possessive word ‘their’ in the foregoing discussion is deliberate. This is 
because, despite socio-economic changes, Igbo society still believes that marriage is not a 
contract between the couple alone, but an alliance between two families and their clans.21 This 
explains why the father of the bride hands his daughter over to the eldest man from the groom’s 
family, then the latter hands her over to the father of the groom, and then the father of the 
groom hands her over to the groom himself. This handover from the male figure in the bride’s 
family to the male figures in the family of the groom reveals the patriarchal system of Igbo 
society. Even if the father of either party is dead, their mothers cannot do the hand over, and 
must allow the next brother of her/their deceased husband(s) to do the honours. This deference 
to men does not advance the agency of women; rather it renders them invisible.  
The items on the marriage list are not fixed by the parents of the couples; rather, they 
are fixed by the Umunna, which in this sense means the kindred or lineage.22 Research 
participants were unanimous that the Umunna determine the marriage list. As one of them 
responded when asked to narrate the negotiation process of bridewealth in his town ‘the 
kinsmen determine all the items and later share it to the respective beneficiaries.’23 When asked 
whether parents can determine the items in the marriage list in his village, an informant 
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shrugged and responded: ‘No; it is the kindred. They fix the items and price for everybody.’24 
Although the kindred comprise of different groups such as the youth, associations of married 
women like the Umuada, and the Umunna, the latter group wields the most influence in 
bridewealth requirements. Participants were divided over the propriety of the Umunna to 
determine the marriage list when they do not partake in the training of the bride. While some 
believe it is unfair for the Umunna to be involved, others uncritically accept it as tradition. In 
any case, several reasons account for the Umunna’s involvement. A key informant summarised 
it this way:25  
The kinsmen must be involved unless you [bride’s family] are an outcast, or banished. 
Marriage is a thing of joy, and should be extended to people. These kinsmen will stand 
as a witness that he [groom’s father] has given out his daughter in marriage … Anybody 
that is in the [marriage] list will partake in it. When marriage is happening in another 
family, you will benefit also. It gives the bride’s family the right to partake in the 
celebration and sharing of other families’ bridewealth. The kindred are brothers and 
sisters [and their involvement in bridewealth] show that people witnessed the marriage 
of your daughter. 
 
The Umunna’s power to determine items on the marriage list reflects the agrarian origins of 
bridewealth payment. Given the communal production of wealth in those days, it made sense 
for the Umunna to determine the list. Today, it is unfair for the Umunna to continue determining 
the list when the individualistic nature of income and family life makes it impractical for them 
to contribute to the training of the bride. This unfairness is especially because the contents of 
the list are increasingly exorbitant. The contents of these lists, most of which go to the Umunna, 
range from items of adornment such as jewellery, clothes, shoes, bags, tobacco, and detergents, 
to food items such as tubers of yam, rice, stock fish, goats, fowls, and cows.26 These items must 
be provided before the marriage is recognised by the community. In most villages, the groom 
pays a sum ranging from N500 – N10 000 to obtain the list.27 While responding to a question 
on his experience with bridewealth payment, an informant stated: ‘In Mbaise [where I married 
from], my father-in-law was already dead. So, after the introduction before I was given the list, 
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I paid 10 000 naira; 5000 naira each for both the women and men’s list before it was given to 
me.’28 Affirming this statement, a parent stated: ‘He [groom] must pay also to get the list. The 
last time I checked it was 2000 naira for both the list of the Umunna and Umunwanyi (women 
group).’29 As seen in the first and second pages of appendix B, this payment is termed imepe 
akwukwo, which literally means opening the book. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain a 
satisfactory answer regarding the obligation on a groom to pay before he could obtain the 
marriage list, considering he must still provide the items on the list. Most research participants 
struggled to explain the rationale for marriage list payment; some gave responses, while others 
justified it purely on culture, which they claimed is ‘since time immemorial’ and ‘not likely to 
be changed overnight.’  
However, it is more likely the case that the practice of payment for the marriage list is 
a constructed custom that arose from the commercialisation of bridewealth payment. This 
practice reflects the influence of socio-economic changes on people’s ability to exercise agency 
over cultural constraints. It is instructive that many research participants did not question the 
origins of this practice. Only two of them speculated that it could have originated due to 
opportunism. The acceptance of payment for obtaining the marriage list thus reflects the 
complex dynamics of cultural construction and change. The handing over of this list initiates 
the negotiation process of bridewealth payment.  
 
5.3.2 Negotiation of bridewealth  
Bridewealth negotiation is often a long process that takes several hours to conclude. Its format 
differs from one locality to another. Accordingly, what I present in this thesis are general 
principles. The negotiation process is seen as a game to showcase the bargaining skills of the 
families, which entails agreement, disagreement, and final resolution.30 Indeed, it is a battle of 
will, wealth, and perseverance, which is not exclusive to South-East Nigeria.31 For example, 
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Koji affirmed in his study of the Turkana tribe of Northern Kenya that ‘the demander doesn’t 
merely state the demand in an ambivalent manner, abandoning it upon refusal, but rather 
becomes more persistent unless the demanded can skilfully evade the demand.’32  
Owing to traditional perceptions of bridewealth as a symbolic representation of the 
woman’s worth, families feel the need to bargain and arrive at an amount that seems 
respectable. However, many people have linked this bargaining, alongside its accompanying 
quarrels, as an indication of the potential of a marriage to be stable. As a key informant 
summarised it, ‘a marriage where there is no struggle or negotiation over what is to be paid 
usually does not last.’33 This belief that bridewealth bargaining promotes marriage stability has 
become customary in traditional marriage ceremonies. Its validity is yet to be proved and lies 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
On the day scheduled for the bridewealth to be negotiated, the two families assemble 
at the bride’s house. The marriage gifts as mentioned earlier are contained in the marriage list 
given to the groom’s family. There are different marriage gifts for the mother, umunwanyi 
(married women in the kindred or lineage), Umunna (represented by male heads of the clan or 
extended family), youths, first daughters of the clan or Umuada, and the bride’s father (whether 
dead or alive).34 The inclusion of dead people in the list of requirements is intriguing. The 
practice persists even though Christianity, which is the dominant religion in South-East 
Nigeria, forbids treating dead people as if they are alive. The practice is also intriguing because 
it inflates the items on the marriage list.35 As an informant stated: ‘I spent almost N35000 for 
another process called ime ife ekpere… a traditional rite for the dead father. It must be done 
before any other thing.’36 Another informant affirmed that he spent a huge sum of money 
buying a staff and a traditional piece of apparel called isiagu (lion head) for his deceased father-
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in-law. His in-laws believe buying these outfits cement the relationship between the dead and 
the living.37 Interestingly, the items bought for the dead are enjoyed by the living.  
The inclusion of dead people in marriage lists shows the strong influence of culture on 
agency despite the influence of socio-economic changes such as Christianity and education. 
On the interaction of socio-economic factors with culture, Bell argues that these factors affect 
culture by changing and replacing it with more contemporary values. However, Max Weber 
and DiMaggio argue that cultural values have an enduring and persistent feature.38  
As I observed, during bridewealth negotiation, male and female groups sit separately. 
The men sit on one side to deliberate on the contents of their list and the women do the same, 
along with other groups such as the youth. For a cultural region that claims to be enlightened 
by education and Christianity, this separate seating is intriguing, irrespective of whether it is 
an age-old tradition. Some research participants explained it as division of labour, one in which 
different groups work in different spheres for the upliftment of the community or family and 
then receive their reward from the marriage list. The representatives of the men’s side from the 
two families during the negotiation process are fathers of the potential couple, brothers of the 
couple, the Umunna, uncles of the couple and other selected members of the family. On the 
women’s side, participants are the mother of the groom (and bride), leaders of women’s 
associations, secretary/treasurer of associations, and women married in the village or clan. The 
bride more than the groom is rarely allowed to be present during the negotiation of bridewealth 
payment. She is represented on the women’s side of negotiations by her mother, if she is still 
alive. the bride’s involuntary absence on an issue of such significance demonstrates the 
constraining influence of culture on women’s exercise of agency.39 This influence is anchored 
in pervasive power relations and gendered social values, expectations, and roles.  
Interestingly, women are reluctant to use tools such as wealth, education, and religion 
to escape their culturally scripted roles. When I asked whether any woman attempted to 
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participate in her bridewealth negotiation, I was usually told that culture must be respected. 
The unwillingness of most women to question systems or norms that make or mar them affirms 
my argument that women often sustain or reinforce unfavourable customs.40 Women’s non-
exercise of agency in this regard may be contrasted with the position of men, who are now 
allowed to observe bridewealth negotiation in some communities.  
Grooms are increasingly present during their bridewealth negotiation. Where a groom 
is present, however, he rarely participates in bridewealth bargaining, despite funding the 
bridewealth payment and the items on the marriage list. He merely entrusts his interests to his 
father, kinsmen and the bridewealth mediator, known as onye aka ebe. Since he observes the 
negotiation, his kinsmen could easily consult him and obtain his permission when the demands 
from the bride’s side exceed his financial abilities or exceed the expectations of the groom. 
This consultation of the groom signals two things. First, it acknowledges that he funds the 
bridewealth. As noted in Chapter one of this thesis, this acknowledgement is primarily 
attributable to changes in family income settings. Whereas the agrarian, close-knit social 
setting of the past was communitarian, today’s mostly nuclear family setting is 
individualistic.41 Unlike in the past when families engaged in joint production of income, which 
enabled them to strongly influence spousal choices and bridewealth negotiations, individual 
income earning requires that grooms should be consulted.42 The increasing consultation of 
grooms reveals the influence of socio-economic factors in the emergence of structural change. 
On the one hand, tradition acts as a constraint on behaviour by making grooms mere observers 
of bridewealth negotiation; on the other hand, grooms’ position as breadwinners’ act as an 
enabling tool by making grooms indirect partakers in bridewealth negotiation.43 The 
constraining and enabling role of wealth or income shows the interconnected relationship 
between structure and agency in bridewealth negotiation. 
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Once the marriage gifts have been negotiated, fully provided, or agreement reached for 
their full provision, some close relatives of the couple (fathers, brothers of the couple, and 
uncles) proceed to negotiate the bridewealth itself – that is ego isi nwanyi. The quantum differs 
from village to village and from family to family. Unlike in the past when it was paid to the 
eldest male of the bride’s family, ego isi nwanyi is now given to the father of the bride.44 Its 
quantum is usually fixed by the father of the bride without influence from anyone.45 However, 
in some communities such as the Ikwo local government area of Enugu State and the Isu Onicha 
local government of Ebonyi State, the quantum is fixed by the community through their king 
or the Umunna, usually with the consent of the community.46 In rare cases, it is negotiated. 
Oftentimes, the father of the bride might ask the groom what he can afford to pay as ego isi 
nwanyi. Sometimes, also, he might accept a token sum from the groom, or return part of the 
sum paid by the groom.  
After the payment of bridewealth, the formal traditional marriage ceremony 
commences. At this stage, the bride is culturally recognised as the wife of the groom. It is 
worthy to note that bridewealth – in the sense of all the items on the marriage list – must not 
be paid at once or on the same day. In some instances, and depending on the agreement between 
the two families, some of the items on the list may be paid later. The most important thing is 
to have a marriage agreement. Failure to comply with an agreement renders the marriage void, 
irrespective of the value of the materials the groom offers as marriage gifts. As some research 
participants emphasised, if the man dies before paying the full bridewealth as agreed, his 
children will complete the payment when they reach maturity. This insistence on completing 
bridewealth payment shows its significance in Igbo traditional marriage. After the payment 
completion or agreement stage, the marriage gifts are shared amongst the kinsmen and other 
relatives of the bride on the spot or at some venue and time agreed on by the family. Before 
examining the sharing of marriage gifts and who its beneficiaries are, it is important to identify 
the key actors in the negotiation of bridewealth, their main roles, and the influence of patriarchy 
on individuals’ agency. 
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5.4 Actors in bridewealth negotiation and their roles 
Customary/traditional marriage is not a solitary affair. It involves many people in the 
negotiation and sharing of marriage gifts. As the preceding discussion shows, these individuals 
participate at different stages of bridewealth negotiation. To ascertain their roles, I discuss them 
under three categories, namely: invisible major actors, major actors, and minor actors. This 
division aims to provide a foundation for the reason why they partake in the sharing of the 
marriage gifts.  
 
5.4.1 Invisible major actors  
The two key actors in this group are mainly the bride and the groom. On the one hand, the 
groom provides the money and materials that are presented on the day of the negotiation. As 
earlier mentioned, he may be present during this process, but his views are presented by his 
father, elder brother, uncles or onye aka ebe – that is a marriage mediator or negotiator. 
Although he apparently plays a passive role in the negotiation, he exerts influence on the 
bargaining through his family and/or friends.  
On the other hand, the bride who, in local parlance, is the isi ahuru kwawa okpu (the 
focus of the ceremony), is totally passive and is rarely visible during the negotiation of marriage 
gifts and the bridewealth payment itself. As an informant explained her passivity, ‘it is no big 
deal, since my father is there.’47 This informant’s desire to participate in her bridewealth 
negotiation is held down by the structural force of tradition, which manifests in the form of 
respect for parents, respect for culture, and self-consciousness borne from socialisation. These 
patriarchal reasons may continue to limit the cultural autonomy and social agency of women, 
thereby rendering them incapable of challenging cultural barriers.   
 
5.4.2 Visible major actors 
Other than the intending couple, there are other major actors in bridewealth negotiation. They 
are the fathers of the bride and the groom, their respective mothers, uncles, brothers, leaders of 
the men and women’s associations, secretaries/treasurers of these associations, and the onye 
aka ebe.  
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The couple’s parents are actively involved if they are still alive. Sometimes they act as 
the chief negotiators at the men and women’s groups. While the groom’s parents present the 
gifts and money, the bride’s parents accept or refuse them.  
The leaders of associations ensure that the items on the list are complete or their cash 
equivalent paid. In fact, they could be said to be the main negotiators, since they often conduct 
the bargaining with the prospective in-laws in order not to make the parents of the bride appear 
opportunistic. They are required to ensure compliance with the rules of the community 
regarding the items on the list. Likewise, the secretaries and treasurers of associations keep 
notes of what was provided as marriage gifts and the monetary equivalent of these items.  
The marriage mediator, who is usually a man, intercedes between the two families to 
ensure that the negotiation runs smoothly. He is supposed to be a neutral person during the 
negotiation. The uncles and brothers of the couple only become major players when the father 
of the bride or groom is not present. Nevertheless, they are present during the negotiation even 
where the fathers of the couple are alive. In this case, their presence confirms their vested 
interest in the marriage gifts, as well as their role as consultants to the couple’s parents.   
 
5.4.3  Minor actors  
This group involves other members of the above-mentioned associations, and relatives of the 
couple invited by the couple’s parents to attend as mere witnesses. They are not entirely passive 
because some of them do participate in varying degrees in the negotiation of the bridewealth. 
Since the marriage list for women groups might contain food items, this group is responsible 
for cooking food for the guests.  
Apart from the bride and the groom, all the above actors benefit from the marriage gifts. 
As explained above, it can be deduced that the negotiation process of bridewealth fuels the 
continuation of patriarchy, since it favours the groom more than the bride.  
 
5.5 The influence of patriarchy on bridewealth payment 
The absence of the bride and, sometimes, even her mother during the negotiation and payment 
of bridewealth indicates that bridewealth negotiations operate in a patriarchal social 
environment. Generally, men are favoured in decision-making that affects both males and 
females in Igbo family life. Even when the father of the bride is dead, her mother cannot receive 




her bridewealth; rather a male relative receives it on behalf of the family.48 This practice might 
be changing in some countries,49; but this is not yet the case in the research area despite the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, which empowers women to inherit under customary law.50 Virtually 
all the research participants stated that the reason is because the child belongs to the father. 
When asked whether she was present during her bridewealth negotiation and payment, Cynthia 
replied as follows:51 
Interviewee: No. 
Interviewer: Why? 
Interviewee: According to our custom and tradition, I am not supposed to be there. 
Interviewer: Was your mother present? 
Interviewee: No. 
Interviewer: You didn’t feel you should be there since this is an issue that concerns you? 
Interviewee: My father and younger brother were there, so they represented me. It is no 
big deal. Besides, according to our custom, I am not supposed to be there even if I 
wanted to.  
 
Another bride responded as follows regarding her absence from her bridewealth 
negotiation:52 
 
Interviewer: I observed you were nowhere around the negotiation area. Why? 
Interviewee: Yes, I am not allowed to be there. Even my husband-to-be was not there. 
Interviewer: Yes, I noticed that also; but on some occasions, he was consulted. I saw 
him giving out money. When I asked him, he said they (his brothers) needed more 
money to add to what they have because your people demanded more than they prepared 
for. However, I didn’t see anyone consulting you despite this ceremony being more 
about you. Why is this so? 
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Interviewee: Erm, well as a woman, I am not allowed to be there. 
Interviewer: But why? 
Interviewee: It is our culture besides my mum was there. 
Interviewer: Yes, your mother was around during the negotiation of marriage gift at the 
women’s side but not during the payment of bridewealth. 
Interviewee: That’s why I said women are not allowed. 
Interviewer: You didn’t feel the desire to go there and know how much is being paid as 
your bridewealth? don’t you think your presence and opinion could have made a 
difference on the quantum of your bridewealth? 
Interviewee: It would have been good to be there since I know the financial capability 
of my husband-to-be; but culturally I am not allowed to be there. 
 
However, the information from a bride’s father53 and mother,54 while quite intriguing, 
confirmed the responses of the above brides regarding their uncritical acceptance of cultural 
passivity in bridewealth negotiation: 
Interviewer: Thank you sir. I observed your daughter was not present during the 
negotiation of both the marriage gifts and bridewealth. Why it so sir? 
Interviewee: Well my daughter, this has been our custom ever since I was born. 
Interviewer:  I understand it is a cultural thing, but don’t you think her presence would 
have made a difference especially in the excessive demands in the marriage list and the 
Umunna’s insistence on providing all the items on the list? 
Interviewee: My daughter, there is no need for her to be present. We don’t ask for too 
much in our family. In any case, nwanyi galara onu (a woman is expensive) both to 
train and to maintain. Why will an in-law think we will give him our daughter for free 
or for a lesser price? Some in-laws can be wicked at times. Will they give their daughters 
away like that? We don’t even ask for too much here.  
  
Regarding women’s ability to exert influence with their presence in bridewealth negotiation, a 
bride’s mother responded as follows:55 
Interviewer: Thank you ma. I will also like to know if the man is expected to provide all 
that is in the list for example, the women’s requirements. What happens if he doesn’t? 
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Interviewee: … Mind you, we are not selling our daughters, as mothers we want our 
right. You should give it to us. If you can’t because of the size of your pocket, then we 
can reduce the money. Like in my daughter’s case, I begged my fellow women to take 
whatever my in-law brings. I mean she is my 3rd daughter and the first to get married. 
I thought my family was cursed. I can’t stop her from getting married by asking for too 
much. I will not also stand and watch them do that to me. It means the supposed curse 
has been lifted. My fellow women dragged it but later, because my sister whom my 
daughter has been staying with was also there, she made sure that they didn’t extort 
money from the man by asking more than he can provide. 
Interviewer: Yes, I noticed your active role, but you were not at the negotiation of the 
bridewealth payment. Why? 
Interviewee: Yes, that is the role of the father. He fixes and collects the bridewealth. I 
am not supposed to be there.  
 
The dialogues with Cynthia and Chinasa show the constraining effect of structure on women’s 
use of agency to influence bridewealth negotiation. Specifically, it shows their unwillingness 
to exert agency due to cultural restraints. Their responses further show women’s passive 
attitude to the patriarchal gender dynamics of marriage under customary law in Igboland. 
However, Priscilla, a bride’s mother, had an intriguing perspective on women’s absence from 
bridewealth negotiation. According to her, since it is the responsibility of the bride’s father to 
determine the quantum of the ego isi nwanyi in her town, she discussed with her husband how 
much to accept from their son-in-law. In her view, her presence was not necessary because she 
already knew what would happen. To her, it was immaterial whether her husband reneged on 
this agreement. The noteworthy thing is that her opinion was sought and obtained. Although I 
did not ask married research participants to confirm prior agreements on ego isi nwanyi, it is 
logical for this consultation and prior agreement to be happening in many other families. Mrs 
Priscilla’s account shows that, although seemingly passive, women may be influential actors 
in bridewealth negotiation. Her account brings to the frontline feminist perspectives on the 
complementarity of gender roles.  
In this respect, Benya’s ethnographic study of women’s role in the Lonmin strike in 
South Africa is of great significance.56 Benya not only identified the legislative and cultural 
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restraints on women working underground as miners, she also highlighted their ‘traditional 
supportive roles; cooking for those at the mountain top and holding vigils, offering emotional 
and spiritual support to families’ which she said should not be left unnoticed.57 Furthermore, 
Peck affirmed this role by stating that what happens at work affects what happens in the 
household and vice-versa and that these two spaces cannot be viewed as separate. Their 
separation is artificial and porous and is as far as ‘they have their own structures of dominance 
along with their own distinctive rhythms and tendencies, but they are also related in the sense 
that each conditions and interacts with the other.’58 Thus, even though patriarchy influences 
bridewealth, women’s supportive roles in the family are capable of renegotiating cultural 
spaces, establishing new authority, and promoting women’s independence in one way or the 
other. 
 The completion of the negotiation and payment of bridewealth initiates the sharing of 
the marriage gifts, which though not strictly part of bridewealth negotiation, offers insights to 
the interaction of structure and agency. 
 
5.6 Sharing of marriage gifts 
The distribution of the marriage gifts brought by the groom’s family is communitarian. It 
clearly explains the Igbo adage that otu onye adighi azu nwa, meaning the nurturing of children 
is a collective responsibility and that nwa bu nwa oha, meaning a child belongs to everybody.59 
The beneficiaries include all the extended family members of the bride in their separate groups. 
Paradoxically, many of these beneficiaries do not contribute to the upbringing of the bride, thus 
begging the question why they should benefit from the sharing of marriage gifts. Also of 
importance is the fact that both the intending couple and their parents do not have a say in who 
should benefit from marriage gifts, despite the groom providing the funds for these marriage 
gifts.60 As mentioned earlier, recently the payment of bridewealth has become more 
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individualised, as the groom provides all the items on the marriage list or their cash equivalent. 
On other hand, neither the bride, for whom these items are provided, nor her parents who raised 
her, can determine bridewealth beneficiaries. While responding to the question of which 
group’s marriage list is the most expensive in his locality, a research informant narrated the 
situation in his village, which he said had recently undergone review. He stated:61  
In my place, the parents of the bride do not benefit from the items; rather it is the 
Umunna and the women’s list that is bigger. Presently we have changed the list such 
that the parents of the bride benefit more than the kinsmen. The reason is that in the 
former list, the parents who suffered to raise the child do not benefit more as expected.  
 
In support of this assertion, another informant stated: ‘in my place, the list for the 
women is the biggest … [because] they are the beneficiaries. They are mothers. It is their right 
as co-wives.’62 The below explanation demonstrates the strong influence that structure exerts 
on agency in the sharing of marriage gifts, as well as couples’ and their parents’ impressions 
and attitudes towards it. 
 
5.6.1 Why do they benefit? 
The question of why some people benefit in the sharing of the marriage gifts was often greeted 
with the response ‘it is our tradition.’ Traditionally, it is expected that the marriage gifts for the 
Umunna, Umuada, Umunwanyi and other general gifts should be given to these groups. None 
of the participants were able to give a satisfactory reason why some of these groups should 
benefit. Satisfactory reason here is measured on participants’ attitudes and impression about it. 
They were also unable to clearly justify the reason why all of the items on the list must be 
provided. However, the majority of my research participants (n=32) believe that the excessive 
demand of high bridewealth is caused by these groups benefitting from marriage gifts.63 Of this 
majority, some research participants (n=12) believe that this practice should be stopped. They 
acknowledged that it is a long-standing tradition, and voiced their desire to change this custom. 
For example, Priscilla in her suggestion about some groups of people benefitting from the 
marriage gifts, said: 
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Interviewee:  No [they should not benefit]. In my opinion, when a girl wants to get 
married, the parents can call on the kinsmen and community to come and celebrate with 
them. The parents can cook for them and they should accept it. Those items on the list 
are not necessary. Those items create financial difficulty for the groom most times. 
 
Another informant64 responded to whether the extended family should benefit thus: 
Yes and no. Yes, because it is the tradition, you can't stop because it is your daughter or 
son [who is celebrating their marriage]. No because they are the reason why it is high. 
We have list for father, mother, Umuada, Umunna, youth, step this and that. Marriage 
is a thing of joy and I would not stop people from celebrating with me, but they should 
take what I give them. People say it is gift, tell me if it is a gift why won’t they accept 
whatever is given to them wholeheartedly?  
 
Other research participants (n=20) believe it is a long-standing tradition that should be allowed 
to continue. For example, one informant responded to this question thus:  
They [extended family] are supposed to benefit from it. The thing is that during their daughter’s 
marriage, they [intending couple/parents] benefitted from it; they [couples’ parents] can’t 
become wise all of a sudden because it is their turn. It started from the past and can’t be stopped 
now.65  
 
Another informant stated:66  
Anybody that is in the list will partake in the sharing. When it is happening in another 
family, you will benefit also. It gives the person (parents of the bride) right to partake 
in another’s marriage celebration. They are brothers and sisters. It will also show that 
people are witness to the marriage of your daughter. 
 
This statement affirms the earlier argument that the Igbo traditional family structure is 
communitarian. However, it has the implication of holding unto communitarian beliefs, while 
evolving or adapting to an increasingly individualised social system.  
Furthermore, the minority views opposed to communal beneficiation from marriage 
gifts base their opposition on the need to protect women’s dignity. As Samuel, an informant 
summarised it: 
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They are not supposed to benefit from it. This is because women are not for sale. In my 
place, it is regarded and seen as igbankwu or inu mmanya nwanyi (literally means 
drinking the marriage wine of a woman), in other places it is seen as ikere ihe (sharing 
of marriage gifts). It is a thing of joy to give out the hand of your daughter in marriage 
in Igbo land, but then it should be left for the parents of the girl to invite their kinsmen 
to come and celebrate with them. It shouldn’t be done to overburden or extort money 
from the groom. They should eat whatever is given to them, [and] not make demands. 
 
The sharing of marriage gifts is significant for the interplay of structure with agency. The first 
significance is people’s reluctance to challenge culture, which is primarily caused by pressure 
by the custodians of customs to comply with tradition. Where the parents of the bride fail to 
provide the items on the marriage list or refuse to involve the kinsmen of the bride in the sharing 
of the marriage gifts, they could be sanctioned in various ways. One, they may be fined or 
banned from benefitting in the sharing of other families’ marriage gifts.67 The quantum of the 
fine differs from community to community. It could be in the form of cash or livestock. Two, 
their relatives could refuse to accompany them to mediate if a problem arises in their daughter’s 
marriage. As incredible as this may sound, no parent wants to be the first to disobey this 
tradition. Rather than fail to comply with marriage list requirements, they [parents] would 
provide the items themselves. The groom on the other hand will try his best to complete all 
marriage requirements. 
From the above responses, it is obvious that the persistence of communal sharing in 
marriage gifts relates to the social recognition that accompanies marriage. This recognition can 
be denied when the couple fail to comply with marriage requirements, specifically the sharing 
of the items on the marriage list. The pertinent question is why do couples not exercise their 
agency to determine the sharing of the marriage gifts they provide.  
 
5.6.2  And you have no say? 
Couples’ inability to determine who should benefit from the marriage gifts they provide lies at 
the heart of complaints regarding change in the meaning and significance of bridewealth. 
Although most of the prospective spouses interviewed for this study expressed displeasure over 
the excessive demands on marriage lists, they were unwilling to seriously challenge it, as 
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shown above in the responses of the participants. While some felt that it is against the custom 
and tradition of their place to insist on attending their bridewealth negotiation and determining 
the beneficiaries of marriage gifts, a clear majority were not really bothered about challenging 
it. As observed, it seems grooms are keener on challenging it than women. Despite their 
displeasure about excessive demands on marriage lists and their absence during bridewealth 
negotiation, some brides were more desirous of getting married and maintaining their self-
worth in the community. Their inability and unwillingness to challenge cultural demands 
contributes to the persistence of high bridewealth payment.  
 
5.7  Persistence of high bridewealth payment 
My fieldwork revealed that not all communities in South-East Nigeria demand high 
bridewealth. There are few areas, such as Isu in the Onicha local government of Ebonyi State 
and Idemili in Anambra State, where bridewealth demand is relatively low.68 Research 
participants disclosed that, amongst other reasons, low bridewealth demand in their 
communities can be ascribed to regulations laid down by their traditional rulers and agreed 
upon by the community.  
Findings from interviews show that there are other factors responsible for the demand 
of high bridewealth in South-East Nigeria, other than socio-economic changes such as 
unemployment, inflation, and urbanisation. These factors are also beginning to influence some 
of the areas that demand low bridewealth. One such factors is the issue of revenge. More than 
80 per cent of the research participants claimed that the attitude or the way in which the groom’s 
community treated the bride’s community during bridewealth negotiation and payment is a 
factor to be considered during negotiations. Accordingly, the bride’s relatives often insist on 
retaliating by insisting that all the items on the list be provided or increasing the items on the 
marriage list where it doesn’t compare to what was asked from them. For example, an 
informant said ‘I have noticed that the issue of high bridewealth is as a result of the way in 
which our kindred is treated for example when they go to marry from another village, that is 
how they will treat the other when they come to ours. This is irrespective of the family, so far, 
the knowledge of that treatment is known to everyone.’69 Affirming this, one research 
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informant said, ‘People now know that it is the way you treated others when they came to marry 
from your house, that is the way they will treat you when you come to their own house.’70 As 
already stated, marriage involves the family and the community. A lot of people accompany 
one family to marry a wife, there they get knowledge of the items on the marriage lists, how 
high or low it is and then they report back. As shocking as this may sound, most of the research 
participants support this idea.  
Another factor is inter-ethnic, inter-village and inter-state marriage. Some of my 
research participants claimed that the above factor influences the quantum of bridewealth 
payment during the negotiation process. The kinsmen of the bride demand and insist that all 
the items on the list be provided and even add more items to the list. My observations in the 
field showed that this is usually done during the negotiation process and bridewealth payment 
as a means to stop the man and his relatives from marrying their daughter.71 One of my 
participants responded to the question of the reason for demand of high bridewealth payment 
thus: ‘…But I discovered that if you were from their place they will remove some things for 
you, but for an outsider they add.’72 Another informant also responded in a similar way ‘There 
is list for an outsider and that of an insider.’73 Yet another said ‘Our list is not a blanket list, it 
depends on the family. We have different list for outsiders coming to marry from us and 
insiders (from our village). However, all these depend on the family you are marrying from.’74 
More elaborate was the response of one elder, who stated:75  
Well, we have list for outsiders coming to marry from us and a list for insider [that is a 
groom from their place]. We usually ask them what they demanded from us when we 
came to marry from their place [Conscious of what was demanded from them]. We keep 
record of all the things they demanded from us. We inform them that we will charge 
them exactly what they charged us so that when they come we don’t need to argue about 
it. Marriage is a continuous process [with young men and women meeting and insisting 
on marry whom they love, inter-ethnic, inter-state or inter-village will continue]. They 
must know that.  
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This factor is more pronounced when the bride is the first daughter to her parents and they 
don’t want her to marry far away from her tribe.76 Parents sometimes play a big role in this. 
One of the women leaders interviewed confirmed this when she said ‘…parents of the 
prospective spouses can beg the women or the men association as the case may be to reduce 
the items on the list.’77 They try to manipulate the marriage from low to high or beyond the 
reach of the man and insist that it be paid. Their expected reaction is for the man to abandon 
the marriage negotiation. A brother to a potential groom confirmed this expected reaction when 
he said ‘when they gave us the list, I studied it and said no. I called my brother (who was getting 
married) and told him to withdraw his intention and rather come back home to marry…the 
items on the list were too much for us. Am I starting a business for them (bride’s family).’78 
He went further to narrate that the marriage continued only because the foster parents of the 
bride were able to plead with the parents (bride’s) to accept whatever was offered. Though 
there are incidents of migration and love marriage, I observed that inter-ethnic marriage is still 
rare but not absent in South-East Nigeria. But there are more inter-state and inter-village 
marriages. None of my research participants married a non-Igbo wife. However, a male 
informant from Western Nigeria who is married to an Igbo woman, confirmed the difficulties 
and challenges he encountered during bridewealth negotiation as a stranger marrying an Igbo 
wife. He likened marrying from his wife’s community to buying a new car. According to him, 
you must be prepared before you get married from Mbano where my wife is, ‘… you must 
price the latest car and know the worth. If you can’t pay for the car, then forget about marrying 
from that place. … I had to do that comparison before going.’79  
Sometimes it is the kinsmen or relatives who activate this factor and the parents 
sometimes succumb to this influence. When one of the leaders of the women’s group was asked 
why they have such excessive and expensive things on their list and why they insist on it being 
provided, she replied thus: ‘Asa80 is the first to marry in this family, and she is being married 
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to a far place. She might never visit us for a very long time or her husband may never allow 
her to visit’.81 From her attitude during the negotiation of marriage gifts it could be implied 
that they want to get everything at once and not worry about their daughter’s willingness and 
ability to care for them in future or they want to frustrate the man so that he will abandon the 
marriage negotiation. This attitude could also be because of the next factor. 
Greed, which is hereafter referred to as opportunism, is another factor that contributes 
to the persistent demand of high bridewealth during negotiation process. I use the term 
opportunism because most items on marriage lists are non-essential materials or materials 
originally uncontemplated by tradition. Examples of items generally regarded as non-essential 
include luxury clothes, jewellery, and cigarettes. As a factor, opportunism comes into play 
usually when the father of the woman is dead and the fate of the woman with regards to 
negotiation and bridewealth payment is left in the hands of her uncles. One of my research 
participants stated: ‘greed is the cause [one of the factors of high bridewealth payment]. People 
also forget the future and look on the present. … If you [bride’s relatives] take all the things 
from them what happens then?’82 Another said: ‘Socio-economic changes have also spiked up 
things. Poverty is also part of the reason so is greed.’83 Yet another said: ‘The death of the 
father of the girl is one reason. When the father is dead the uncles may demand high bridewealth 
either to scare the man away or so that she doesn’t get married. Either way greed or wickedness 
is the reason.’84  Furthermore, Remy said: ‘Sometimes, the reason is greed on the part of the 
father. Sometimes, the kinsmen insist on the provision of all the items just to cause 
commotion.’85 This factor has some implication for marital stability, which most relatives do 
not think about. In one interview, one of my research participants,86 pointing out opportunism 
as one of the reasons for the demand of high bridewealth, narrated the experience of one of his 
friends, whose in-laws drained his pocket.  
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Do you know what he did? He vowed that none of his in-laws will visit him again. There 
is nothing the in-laws can do about it after all he has paid for her bridewealth. How can 
you say it is not too much when you place your entire burden/problem on one person 
and expect him to be happy? If you treat him well, he can do more than you asked of 
him in future.   
 
Another factor is the educational qualification of the bride.87 As I discovered in my 
surveys, the level of education of the woman plays a two-way role. One role is as structure and 
the other is as a bargaining tool. In the role of structure, educated brides command high 
bridewealth. Some of my key participants (n=10) said they have a different marriage list for 
different levels of academic qualification attained by the bride. They pointed to the fact that 
raising a girl-child is very expensive, especially since they will marry and leave the family. 
This factor plays a great role in the negotiation process, in that the parents, through the kinsmen, 
insist that they be compensated, and their effort appreciated by making sure that all that is on 
the list is provided in full. Here, one can argue that whatever is on the marriage list equates to 
the value and the worth of the bride from the perspectives of her relatives. One of the 
participants remarked:88 ‘… bridewealth for a PhD holder is higher than that of masters, 
bachelors, secondary school, and primary school certificates in that order.’ As an informant 
explained with an adage,89 ‘obere azu na akpata obere nku, nnukwu azu na akpata nnukwu 
nku’, which means that a valuable item (the bride) should be handled in a valuable manner (by 
the groom).  For example, Joseph boldly listed all the things he spends and is still spending on 
his daughter.90 He concluded: ‘You can’t compare the money used to train a lady in university 
to that of an apprentice. I will not allow my daughter to marry an uneducated or poor man. The 
money spent is too much. I also know that they are all women, but they are not the same …. 
raising an educated woman is very expensive because you must bear the loss of their service 
in the home such as cooking and washing.’ 
Many women I interviewed were inclined to using their educational status to determine 
their bridewealth. Cynthia and Chioma confirmed that, although their husbands were unhappy 
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with the items on their marriage list because they were numerous and expensive, they were not 
sympathetic to any reduction because ‘it is not up to what was expended’ on raising them.91 
Another factor is the financial and social status of the man. Some of my key participants 
(n=7) believe that the financial status of the groom influences how much his in-laws demand 
from him as bridewealth. His financial status also affects the way the bridewealth is negotiated. 
Thus, knowing the financial status of the groom, the bride’s kinsmen could present their 
demands during bridewealth negotiation in an unequivocal or persistent manner. A traditional 
ruler expressed disappointment over his experience during his son’s traditional marriage with 
the daughter of another traditional ruler in the same study area. According to him, his would-
be in-laws took advantage of his family’s position to manipulate the marriage lists.92 His wife 
was however, more disappointed than he was. She stated that the items on the list were hiked 
because of their status and vowed never to advise someone to marry from that town.93 Another 
informant said, ‘relatives of the bride demand high sum especially when the groom is 
wealthy.’94 Yet another said ‘You find out that some people especially the parents influence 
the kinsmen to add some items to the list and that is why it is more expensive. This they do 
when their in-law is wealthy. That is not good.’95 Yet another informant, Priscilla, stated: ‘They 
[parents] may request for more things and it will be added for them in the list. Most especially 
if the in-law is rich.’ Despite the claim of almost all research participants that their lists are 
fixed and that their daughters are not for sale, these factors contradict it since it can affect the 
marriage lists.  
  
5.8  Bargaining/agency tools 
According to Ensminger and Knight’s bargaining model, the payment of bridewealth has 
distributional effects, which favours the interests of those with strong negotiating power in 
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society.96 My fieldwork revealed that some prospective spouses and their parents use different 
forms of bargaining tools to influence and reinvent the cultural institution of bridewealth. I 
classify these tools as agency. These tools align with the symbolic interaction view, which 
emphasises that people are not passive beings or puppets, but could construct, produce and 
reconstruct their world (social structures) in a manner that gives meaning to their existence. 
Bargaining here is a mechanism, instrument, tool or leverage used in negotiations to swing an 
agreement in ones’ favour. In what follows, I present the bargaining tools that individuals 
employ in the negotiation and payment of bridewealth.  
 
5.8.1 Couples’ agency tools   
Here, ‘couples’ denote women and men who were preparing for their traditional marriage or 
had completed the traditional rites of marriage at the time they were interviewed. These couples 
are often faced with two choices. The first is to adhere to a common cultural script, which 
includes, but is not limited to providing, without objection, the items stipulated on the marriage 
list. This choice also implies being passive during the negotiation and sharing of the marriage 
gifts. The second choice is to (re)negotiate their role, while adhering to the accepted cultural 
script. After weighing the above two choices and its consequences, couples usually employ 
certain strategic tools to maximise their preferred outcome, which is usually to pay as little 
bridewealth as possible, gain social respectability, and marry a person of their choice. These 
tools are presented below in no specific order. 
 
a)  Cohabitation and pregnancy 
To understand cohabitation as a bargaining tool, it should be borne in mind that Igbo society is 
so patriarchal that men’s sexual conduct is not condemned in the same way as the conduct of 
women.97 High value is placed on women’s moral and sexual conduct. Despite this, many 
couples who are frustrated by high bridewealth demands resort to cohabitation. Most often, one 
of the consequences of cohabitation is pregnancy. With this tool, they elicited support from 
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their parents, who wanted to cover up the shame of premarital pregnancy.  Only one of the 
couples I interviewed admitted that they cohabited before bridewealth payment was paid. The 
male cohabitant, later husband, said:98  
The items on their [bride’s family] list too much. This is why people run away from 
marrying girls from that area or even live together with the girl without paying or 
completing all those rites. Actually, I was leaving with my wife and eventually got 
pregnant for me before I even went to pay her bridewealth. Her people didn’t know 
about it because she wasn’t that heavy. You know the shame of getting pregnant before 
marriage. That is the by the way.  They gave me the list and it took me long to gather 
all that they requested. When they noticed that she was pregnant they said I should come 
with whatever I have and do something on her head. You know people can’t stand the 
shame of having a daughter who got pregnant out of wedlock, so anything to cover that 
disgrace, they will do it. 
 
His wife confirmed his statement: ‘I got pregnant for my husband before everything was done. 
This somehow made them to reduce everything for my husband.’99 However, at least some 
participants (n= 20) consistently stated that cohabitation and pregnancy are increasing due to 
the demand of high bridewealth payment. For example, an informant Mpa Onyi stated: ‘in fact, 
the trend is to cohabit or elope with the man and get pregnant for him. That way the elders or 
parents will now beg them to come with whatever they have ... Whatever they [couples] say 
goes, so far as the shame of not paying bridewealth is removed from the family.’100  Yet another 
informant, Eucharia said, ‘couples … cohabit or live together without paying the bridewealth. 
Parents of the bride may require the prospective in-law to come and pay whatever they have if 
they discover that their daughter is pregnant. This is to cover the shame.’ And yet another said: 
‘These days young men and women who think that the demand of high bridewealth will hinder 
them from marrying each other, start cohabiting together without doing the traditional rites. 
The man may even impregnate the girl and you see the parents begging the man to bring 
whatever he has.’101 
This tool seems to succeed because it forces parents to actualise their children’s desire 
to complete bridewealth requirements and be recognised as husband and wife. This yielding by 
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parents performs two functions. The first is to avoid the shame that accompanies a marriage 
without bridewealth payment.102 The importance of chastity is evident in this statement by an 
informant: ‘However, if you have been living with the girl before making your intention known 
to her parents, you will provide a goat called ewu afia utali. This signifies the punishment to 
you sort of, for living with her before telling her family.’103 Although this is a punishment 
according to him, the emphasis is on the increasing recognition by his community that some 
people now cohabit before paying bridewealth. The second factor that informs parents’ shift in 
position is high fertility. Most scholarly works have linked the essence of marriage and family 
in Igboland to procreation in the pre-colonial and colonial era.104 It seems that procreation is 
still cherished in the post-colonial era. The shame of pre-marital pregnancy is ameliorated by 
the birth of the child, who is believed to play a vital role in replicating the kinship.105  
 
b)  Religion 
 
Religion has become a tool of change with respect to some cultural practices in Igboland.106 
Pentecostalism, more especially, has reconstructed many Christian experiences, thereby 
influencing people’s attitude to marriage. For example, Christians belonging to the Deeper Life 
Bible Church, Assemblies of God Church, and the Lord’s Chosen churches shun alcohol and 
an ostentatious lifestyle. Their beliefs influence some of the items on marriage lists. Some 
participants noted how their religious beliefs have helped them to curtail demand for high 
bridewealth. One of them stated that his community has two marriage lists: one for ‘believers,’ 
and the other for ‘traditionalists.’ Materials on the marriage list such as tobacco, cigarettes, and 
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alcoholic drinks have been removed from the believers’ lists.107 In some instances, the Umunna 
demand that the cash equivalent of the above listed items be given to them.108 However, 
‘believers’ may still use their faith to resist such demands. For example, Mpa Onyi disclosed 
that he refused to use his money to buy things he abhors. His wife affirmed that ‘believers’ do 
insist that cigarettes and alcoholic drinks should not be included on marriage lists. They also 
insist that they won’t spend their money on what they abhor.109 An informant stated: ‘the fact 
that some things on the list, we [Christians] don’t agree with it like alcohol, cigarette that can 
reduce it [bridewealth].’ Further to her question, I asked: what if kinsmen request that the cash 
equivalent of the items be given to them to purchase the items themselves? She responded: ‘I 
can’t spend my money on what I abhor, so no cash equivalent for them.’110 Other participants 
too raised religion as a bargaining tool. For example, Priscilla said, ‘He [groom] is expected to 
come with drinks depending on his religion though. These days Christianity has entered and 
changed some things on the marriage lists.’111 Nevertheless, as a bargaining tool, religion is 
sometimes limited by couples’ desire for social recognition, which compliance with 
bridewealth requirements confers. In the next section, I examine the bargaining tools used by 
parents to manipulate the structural constraint of cultural legitimacy.  
  
5.8.2 Bargaining tools used by parents  
The preceding sections have shown the difficulties experienced by couples and parents during 
bridewealth negotiation, payment, and sharing of marriage gifts. It also revealed that most 
parents are part of these constraints. Against this backdrop, it is important to point out that all 
the bargaining tools discussed above involve parents, because bridewealth payment occurs at 
the family level. After religion, education is the most prominent bargaining tools used by 
parents. The influence of western education on marriage and bridewealth payment is significant 
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because of the values, beliefs, and habits that accompany it.112 As a bargaining tool, education 
has a liberalising effect on people because the ideas imparted in schools sometimes contradict 
some traditional values. Some parents (n=10) now exhibit flexible attitudes towards 
bridewealth, which often support the original significance of bridewealth as a symbolic 
legitimator of marriage.  This flexible attitude of parents is evident in their statements. While 
some said their daughters are not commodities for sale, others stated that high bridewealth is 
unnecessary because no amount of money can make up for what they spent on their daughters’ 
upbringing, especially university expenses. Interestingly, however, this flexible attitude is also 
exhibited by affluent parents. It is arguable therefore that the distortion of bridewealth 
significance could be because of ignorance, economic wants, and opportunism, rather than 
cultural demands. In other words, in its present format in Igboland, bridewealth is culturally 
constructed. Since it is constructed, it can also be deconstructed with agency. 
In this regard, the most strategic agentic tool used by parents is reserved payment of 
bridewealth. Reserved payment may also assume the form of token bridewealth. Other than 
reserved payments, some parents (n=10) ask the groom to provide items on the marriage list 
for the Umunna, leaving their own items to be provided whenever the groom can afford it. On 
the day of bridewealth negotiation, parents could tell their kinsmen of their agreement with the 
groom and plead with them to respect it. The percentage of items on the marriage list that goes 
to parents differs from family to family. Including ego isi nwanyi itself, which is paid directly 
to the father, the percentage ranges from 20 to 35 in most communities.   
Generally, educated parents try to protect the interest of their children during 
bridewealth negotiations, since their children are not always present.113 Being familiar with the 
financial, religious, and educational worldviews of their children, they try to inculcate these 
views in their discussions with their kinsmen. Even though men are more successful in this 
endeavour than women, a female informant’s elaborate description of how her lawyer sister 
helped to reduce the items requested for her daughter’s traditional marriage rites shows that 
women could be more successful if they wish.114  
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It goes without saying that parents face difficulties in exercising agency against the 
demand for high bridewealth payment. These difficulties present themselves in the form of the 
kinsmen insisting on the groom’s provision of every item on the marriage list. It also presents 
itself in parents being denied their share of marriage gifts until all items on the list are provided. 
Nevertheless, acceptance of token bridewealth and waiver of items on marriage lists could 
eventually shift power relations away from the custodians of custom such as the Umunna and 
the Umuada to the parents. Notably, the primary reason for taking token bridewealth is to fulfil 
the cultural obligation for a traditional marriage ceremony. To parents who accept token 
bridewealth, their primary concern is for their daughter to be well cared for. For example, one 
parent stated that high bridewealth achieves nothing other than satisfying the financial needs 
of the recipients, since the stability of marriage and wellbeing of the bride cannot be determined 
by the quantum of bridewealth payment. This is because violence against women and divorce 
still occur with or without the payment of high bridewealth.115 The correlation of high 
bridewealth to marriage stability is not peculiar to Igbo society, as studies in Malawi, Ghana 
and South Africa have confirmed.116  
In the light of distortions in bridewealth’s meaning and significance, state and non-state 
laws were enacted to reduce demands for high bridewealth in South-East Nigeria. The question 
is whether these laws play influential roles in the bridewealth negotiation process. In what 
follows, I examine the role of law as an instrument of social control and a facilitator of human 
agency in bridewealth negotiation. 
 
5.9 Law as a negotiating tool? 
The negotiation and payment of bridewealth occurs at family level, which implies it lies outside 
the domain of the state. Despite this, law have been enacted to regulate this practice. As I have 
shown earlier, the most prominent of these laws is the Limitation of Dowry Law. I therefore 
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asked my research participants about their knowledge and attitude to state regulation of 
bridewealth and the general role of the state in reducing demands for high bridewealth. From 
their responses, I gained insights on the concept of law, especially in the context of marriage.  
As far as bridewealth is concerned, law exists on three levels: formal (state law), semi-
state (customary or traditional) law and non-state laws. A positivist idea of law as an organised 
set of rules for the structuring of human behaviour in society, which is enforced by state power, 
does not apply to certain cultural practices.117 When I asked research participants about state 
regulation of bridewealth through the Limitation of Dowry Law, they responded with disdain, 
derision, indignation, or ignorance. Some parents were especially irritated by the idea of state 
regulation of bridewealth. One parent summarised it this way: ‘I don’t see their business with 
it. … The government did not train our daughters for us and should not stop us from benefiting 
from whatever comes out of our training by reason of marriage. They stay up there to make 
their laws but can’t come down to implement it.’118 There is a disturbing feeling of alienation 
from state law in many of the responses from parents. One parent stated:119  
No, there should be no law for marriage. So, if I give out the hand of my daughter in 
marriage, you take me to court because I violated the law? The government is very far 
from us. There was once a law regulating the price of bridewealth, but nothing happened 
because it has become the custom of the people. You can’t tell people to change their 
culture overnight. 
  
Feelings of anger at state interventions in marriage are justified by statements like the below:120  
Government did not conceive or train a child. Why should they make such laws? 
Marriage is not a combat, whatever happens during bridewealth negotiation is relative 
to the Igbo adage that ogo mmadu wu nwanne ya (your in-law is your relative) ... High 
bridewealth is not a case for the government. … Government did not give free education, 
so they shouldn’t dictate how much is to be paid as bridewealth after I spend my money 
in this harsh economic condition raising my daughter. 
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These responses resonate with the attitude of elders narrated by Ogbu,121 as well as 
Malinowski’s proposal that law should be defined in terms of the functions it performs.122 
Bridewealth payment in Igboland demonstrates the resiliency of customary law, its ability to 
resist state law, and the fact that many societies, which seemingly lack a centralised body for 
the enforceability of law, nevertheless observe law. Similarly, John Griffiths criticised the 
notion of perceiving law from a legal positivist viewpoint.123 He argues that law is synonymous 
with social control, and social control is not the exclusive preserve of the state.124  
Kantorowicz’s argument that law should not be limited to ‘binding rules’ because not 
all laws are enforceable is helpful for understanding the role of formal law in bridewealth 
payment.125  As far as bridewealth payment is concerned, law should be defined as the norms 
that people regard as socially acceptable and beneficial to their daily needs. In this sense, 
bridewealth fits with Moore’s theory of ‘semi-autonomous social fields,’ whose boundaries are 
recognised ‘by a processual characteristic, the fact that [they] can generate rules and coerce or 
induce compliance to them.’126 The institution of bridewealth payment has shown itself to be 
autonomous and isolated from the regulation of the state. This is evident from the laws made 
to regulate it, and people’s defiant attitude to these laws. The custom of bridewealth payment 
has been able to generate rules such as marriage lists and its associated sharing formulas. It 
also induces compliance through its denial of social recognition for couples who fail to pay 
bridewealth. This denial of social recognition puts strong pressure on couples to comply, even 
when they have alternative choices, such as statutory law marriage or church marriage. 
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Given my observation on the compelling nature of culture, I will discuss the role of law 
in bridewealth negotiation under three contexts. These are: formal (state laws), semi-state and 
non-state laws.  
 
5.9.1 Formal or state law as a negotiating tool 
To what extent can the state intervene legislatively in the private lives of its citizens? Formal 
laws denote the laws recognised and enforced as state law. As I have stated repeatedly, the 
Limitation of Dowry Law is generally disregarded. Only 20 per cent of research participants 
displayed awareness of this law.  This 20 per cent is between the ages of 45-65 years. This is 
significant because it indicates that many young people are ignorant of the Dowry Law. Most 
of the young couples who complained about the distortion of bridewealth are unaware that the 
Dowry Law can work in their favour. Disregard for the Dowry Law also shows the dominant 
influence of customary law in personal matters. Furthermore, both participants who know of 
the Dowry Law and participants who are unaware of it questioned its effectiveness, especially 
since no one has been punished for contravening it. Here, the ineffectiveness of the Dowry Law 
relates, amongst other things, to the degree of emphasis placed on the courts to reject cases in 
which the bridewealth paid is higher than the amount prescribed in the legislation.127 The 
failure of the legislation also relates to its failure to recognise the unequal power relations in 
bridewealth payment, since its effect is to punish both the giver (groom and his relatives) and 
the receiver (bride’s family). The groom, and by extension the bride, violate this law – 
irrespective of whether they are aware of it – because of their desire for social recognition and 
because of their fear of destroying the family’s cultural status in the community.128   
Some participants have indicated that their willingness or otherwise to abide by the rules 
of the custom are constrained by the need not to lose respect in the face of the community. This 
was raised when participants were asked if they would consider giving out their daughters in 
marriage without the knowledge of the Umunna, whom they had admitted contribute to the 
demand of high bridewealth. One participant said: ‘Yes, he can [give out his daughter in 
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marriage without the Umunna] but it is not proper. In case of any problem the man will run to 
his kinsmen, so he is supposed to involve them. In fact, if he [father of the bride] has enough 
money, he can provide the items on the list for kinsmen whilst the in-laws refund later.’129 
Another said, ‘No, but if it was left to me I would say let them do that without the kinsmen. 
The items on the list of Umunna are the reason for the demand of high bridewealth.’130 Yet 
another said, ‘No unless you are an outcast, or have been banished. Marriage is a thing of joy 
and should be extended to people. These kinsmen will stand as a witness that he has given out 
his daughter in marriage to this family. It shows he is alone [if he gives her out without 
them].’131 The self-inherent flaws of the Dowry Law thus work against its effectiveness. 
Research participants’ reaction to it suggests that people will not hesitate to disregard state law 
whenever it affects their economic well-being, and so long as compliance is not enforced.  
Howard’s ‘full-belly’ thesis states that ‘a man’s belly must be full before he can indulge 
in the luxury of worrying about his political freedom.’132 What this means is that the efficacy 
of law is lost if basic needs, regarded also as human rights, are not met. The full-belly thesis 
has implication for the interaction of multiple legal systems. Since payment of bridewealth and 
its negotiation process is a traditional affair, almost all participants stated that it should be 
regulated traditionally. Thus, the call for internal regulation by participants signifies the need 
for a bottom-up approach to law involving local authorities such as the traditional leaders. The 
next two categories of law will enable us to view law in its pluralistic form. 
 
5.9.2 Semi-state law as a negotiating tool 
The role of state law in the regulation of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria is clearly 
questioned by my research participants. However, the role of semi-state law is not so clear. 
Semi-state laws are mainly regulations by traditional rulers, whose legitimacy is recognised by 
                                                 
 
129 Interview with Mr Remmy Nwachukwu, a 60-year old businessman on 12th April 2016. 
 
130 Interview with Mr Akwarandu Chukwudike, a 35-year old businessman on 28th April 2016. 
 
131 Interview with Pastor Samuel Onuoha a 58-year old married man on 22nd April 2016. 
 
132 R Howard ‘The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights - 
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa (1983) 5(4) Human Rights Quarterly 467-490 at 469; see also F Stewart ‘Basic 
Needs Strategies, Human Rights, and the Right to Development’ (1989) 11(3) Human Rights Quarterly 347-374 
at 347-350; J Donnelly ‘Recent Trends in UN Human Rights Activity: Description and Polemic’ (1981) 35(4) 
International Organization 633-655 at 634; P Streeten ‘Basic Needs and Human Rights’ (1980) 8(2) World 
Development 107-111 at 107-109. 
 




both the state and the concerned communities.133 As one research participants disclosed, in 
some communities in Ebonyi State, some traditional rulers made laws regulating the quantum 
of bridewealth. However, in Isu community, obedience to this regulation lasted only up to the 
traditional ruler’s death, after which people reverted to practices that pleased them. His 
successor did not bother to enforce the regulation. A traditional ruler revealed that they make 
laws only if there are complaints from the people.134 He admitted the difficulty of limiting 
bridewealth, given that it is not uniform and varies from family to family. Accordingly, its 
reduction can only be achieved by the Umunna. However, his wife added that ‘it is not about 
making the law; it is about obeying it. People do what they want since it is their children and 
they have the right to request any amount that pleases them. Families and elders of the 
community should look into [the issue].’135 In contra distinction with formal and semi-state 
laws, non-state laws or customs are clearly effective in bridewealth regulation, as I show in the 
next section. 
 
5.9.3 Non-state law as a negotiating tool 
To what extent are non-state laws valid? The answer to this question obviously depends on the 
person making the evaluation, since people subject to such laws have little doubt about its 
validity. As a normative category, non-state law is still contested by scholars.136 Ehrlich has 
termed the non-state norms that regulate people’s daily lives as ‘living law’.137 As he put it, 
living law is ‘the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been posited in legal 
propositions.’138 He went further to list the sources of this law as custom and usages, ‘all 
associations … both the one recognised, overlooked and disapproved by state law.’ 139 
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Advancing this further, Moore, in her semi-autonomous field theory, has noted principles, rules 
and procedures that proceed not from state or state-recognised authorities, but from semi-
autonomous fields such as kinship groups. In the context of bridewealth, prominent kinship 
groups would be the Umunna and the family, which regulate patterns of behaviour in a manner 
that induces compliance. Furthermore, neo-institutionalists such as O’Donell and North have 
argued that non-state laws have the power to shape behaviour.140 In the context of bridewealth 
payment, the power of non-state laws is evident in the ability of the Umunna to determine the 
marriage list in accordance with customs or traditions. It is also evident in the right of the 
bride’s father to determine the quantum of the ego ishi nwanyi.141 There is little doubt that 
customs or non-state laws are obeyed widely in communities.142 Although disobedience to 
these laws may not really lead to state-like sanctions, other forms of punishment, such as denial 
of rights and privileges in the community are just as effective as state sanctions.143 The 
activities of parents using bargaining tools are certainly more effective than state laws in 
reducing high bridewealth. Similarly, the power of the Umunna to regulate traditional marriage 
activities and maintain high bridewealth is more effective than state law. In all the categories 
of laws described above, the dynamics of power relations is evident in the denial of social 
recognition and exclusion of couples from participating in decision-making that affects them.  
 
5.10  Chapter findings  
My examination of the key actors in bridewealth negotiation, their roles, influences, and 
constraints, produced the following findings on how socioeconomic needs inform agency. 
Firstly, research participants, especially intending spouses, are generally unhappy about 
demands for high bridewealth payment. They complain that high bridewealth prevents couples 
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from marrying early, since they must work long and hard to raise the funds for bridewealth 
payment. They also complain that high bridewealth is forcing couples to cohabit, contrary to 
cultural values. However, despite their unhappiness over high bridewealth, couples and parents 
are constrained in their ability to enforce changes in its quantum. Although couples are inclined 
to challenge cultural institutions through financial coercion, cohabitation, education, and pre-
marital pregnancies, they are mindful of the social legitimacy conferred by bridewealth 
payment. Since their agency in this regard is limited by their need for social legitimacy, they 
are compelled to challenge high bridewealth payment through their parents and prospective in-
laws. Indeed, research participants disclosed that some parents prevail on the Umunna to reduce 
the items on the marriage list to ensure their children’s marriage is not derailed. 
Secondly, people’s exercise of agency is leading to clear shifts in attitudes towards 
bridewealth negotiation and payment. The most effective tool of agency in this regard is 
cohabitation and premarital pregnancy. Since Igbo society cherishes chastity, families rarely 
demand high bridewealth for pregnant brides. Accordingly, brides could use the threat of 
elopement, cohabitation and pregnancy to reduce high bridewealth, depending on the extent to 
which they are willing to endure the social ridicule resulting from their actions. Furthermore, 
some parents who belong to Christian denominations, such as the Lord’s Chosen and Deeper 
Life, exert influence on the marriage list by insisting on the removal of items such as alcohol, 
tobacco, and cigarettes. In some cases, they even object to the monetisation of these items, 
arguing that these contravene their religious values. Also, some parents resort to accepting a 
token sum as bridewealth from prospective sons-in-law as a means of limiting high 
bridewealth. Furthermore, they often waive from the marriage list some items which are due 
to them to reduce the financial burden on their in-laws. The acceptance of token sums, which 
is becoming widespread, is informed by common sense. It enables fathers to build a 
harmonious relationship with their sons-in laws, bearing in mind the overall emotional and 
economic benefits of such a relationship. The acceptance of token sums as bridewealth 
demonstrates the ability of structure and agency to reach a compromise or complement each 
other. Above all, it demonstrates how needs-driven agency deconstructs structure. Over time, 
the pruning of marriage lists and acceptance of token sums as bridewealth could reconstruct 
the meaning and significance of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria.  
Thirdly, the very limited role of state law in reducing demand for high bridewealth is 
significant. While most research participants believe that the state does not have a role to play 
in reducing high bridewealth because of its failure to provide socio-economic amenities, they 




emphasised the need for parents, elders, the Umunna, and traditional leaders to curb high 
bridewealth demands. Their opinions demonstrate people’s preference for a bottom-up 
approach to cultural issues. They also demonstrate that structure is constructed and sustained 
by the manner people employ their agency. In turn, the exercise of agency is informed by needs 
and interests, for example, the desire for the emotional satisfaction of marriage. Accordingly, 
legislation, an important aspect of structure, should be responsive to the ways people exercise 
agency. In other words, structure should follow agency because widespread practice accounts 
for shifts in attitudes and behaviours, which may then be recognised by legislation. As people’s 
disdain for the Limitation of Dowry Law demonstrated, ignoring the intricate link between 
structure and agency is unhealthy for the efficacy of the law.  
The remaining two chapters of this dissertation will highlight the significance of 
bridewealth negotiation for policy implementation and scholarly understandings of power 
relations within the structure and agency interplay.




Chapter Six: Significance of the structure-agency interplay 
 
6.1  Introduction  
The central question of how social order is created may never receive a definitive answer due 
to the diverse means of interpreting social phenomena. Nevertheless, structure presents itself 
in many forms, which give clues to the creation of social order. It manifests in law, culture, 
education, and religion. However, scholars dispute the extent to which structure may be 
regarded as the determinant of social behaviour. On the one hand, structure has been claimed 
to possess a constraining influence on behaviour.1 On the other hand, it has been argued to be 
shaped by agency, which manifests as human capabilities, reasoning, and behavioural choices. 
I argue that the structure-agency interplay should be seen from a needs-based perspective. A 
needs-based approach sees the interplay of agency and bridewealth practices primarily from 
the perspective of their cultural and economic motivations. Generally, it sees the interaction of 
structure and agency as a process of logical assessments, which are driven by socio-economic 
needs. Needs-based assessments often lead to dialogue, resistance, or acquiescence to structural 
demands by individuals. In this sense, a needs-based approach shares some features of the 
morphogenesis and bargaining model of rational choice theories. In the context of this study, 
it reveals interdependence between structure and agency, which is evident in the complex web 
linking the custodians of culture with agentic tools such as wealth, religion, and education.  
In examining the motivations and manifestations of agency in structural construction, 
the preceding chapter showed how individuals find ways to navigate cultural constraints and 
exploit gaps in state law through the bargaining tools at their disposal. In this chapter, I utilise 
a needs-based approach as an analytical tool for examining the structure-agency interaction in 
the negotiation process of bridewealth payment. The usefulness of this approach lies in the 
complementary or interdependent nature of the socioeconomic motives that drive bridewealth 
negotiation. Specifically, it views the interplay of culture and bridewealth practices from the 
perspective of their cultural, economic, religious, and legal motivations. Given that these socio-
economic motives are expressed by varying individuals acting within their social status and 
bargaining power, a needs-based approach to power relations is significant for policy 
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formulation and implementation.  In the words of Allot, ‘[i]t is the law-givers … who make the 
law; it is the law-keepers … who sustain it; and it is the law breakers … who change the law 
and make new law.’2 As evident in the failure of the Dowry Law, Allot’s statement reveals 
how people’s normative attitude to formal and informal laws helps in constructing and 
deconstructing structure. This chapter therefore argues that a needs-based approach to 
bridewealth negotiation is best suited to the structure-agency interaction. In what follows, I 
distil my theoretical framework from mainstream theories and situate it within the bridewealth 
negotiation process in South-East Nigeria.   
 
6.2        Structure and agency: diametric or complementary? 
The needs-based theoretical framework, which I use in this thesis, implies that structure and 
agency cannot be examined in isolation. In this sense, it resembles the complementarity view 
of structure-agency interaction.3 Emphasising only the influence of structure disregards the 
influence of agency on structural development. On the other hand, highlighting the importance 
of agency alone limits the influence of structural forces in shaping behaviour. For example, 
people’s need for the social legitimacy conferred by bridewealth payment is a strong influence 
on their behaviour. This influence breeds conformity to culture, thereby undermining the ability 
of couples to manipulate the structural institutions that regulate bridewealth payment. 
However, since marriage creates alliances between families, couples may still find ways to 
manipulate cultural constraints using tools such as economic coercion, co-habitation, and 
religion. These tools are products of needs assessments by prospective spouses and their 
families, which weigh the benefits and harms of particular courses of action. Couples’ ability 
to navigate cultural institutions show that the relationship between structure and agency is not 
diametric. I will illustrate the merit of a needs-based approach in the non-diametric relationship 
between structure and agency.  
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6.3  Needs-based approach and complementarity  
In explaining the structuration theory of social practices, Giddens presents structure as 
inseparable from agency.4 He argues that structure is a process that is both constraining and 
enabling. Structure’s processual characteristics entail an interaction of norms, interests, and 
power.5 In other words, behaviour is not determined by structural forces alone, since 
individuals’ actions are driven by their rational needs and interests.6 In the context of 
bridewealth payment, structure is ‘both the medium and outcome of practices’ that sustain the 
culture of bridewealth.7 As a medium and outcome, structure is influenced by needs 
assessments conducted by varying actors, who proceed to adopt the best course of action on a 
particular issue. In practice, the freedom to choose the best course of action is constrained or 
enabled by varying motives, some of which are not altruistic. Irrespective of motives, a needs 
assessment brings together structural forces and human willpower, thus demonstrating the 
duality of the structure-agency interaction. This duality is evident in bridewealth negotiation.  
When families demand high bridewealth payment using the banner of tradition, 
prospective spouses and their parents have the choice to resist or comply. By complying, they 
fail to exercise their agency, thereby contributing to the sustenance of structure. By resisting, 
they exercise their agency and defy tradition. In either of these scenarios, needs assessments 
are involved. This means that individuals, as knowledgeable agents, are not pawns of cultural 
forces, for they presumably possess the ability to negotiate and renegotiate practices suitable 
to their interests.8 For example, grooms used to be excluded from bridewealth negotiation. 
Their increasing participation in these negotiations demonstrates their vested interest in the 
negotiations as both providers of the bridewealth and subjects of the marriage discussion. Once 
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again, needs assessment is involved in grooms’ increasing participation in bridewealth 
negotiation. Similarly, prospective spouses are increasing their voices in the contents of 
marriage lists by seeking justifications for some marriage requirements. They even succeed in 
pruning the list, in some cases using persuasion, coercion, and threats of co-habitation, which 
has an attendant risk of pre-marital pregnancy. As a participant explained: ‘If we want each 
other but have no money to provide the items [on the marriage list], and we have begged the 
kinsmen to take what we have, what do you think we will do? We will leave them and their 
tradition; they will be the ones to beg us to come back.’9 This affirmation of agency shows that 
structure is not inflexible, since it can be questioned and manipulated by individuals with 
sufficient willpower and socio-economic abilities. Above all, it demonstrates the importance 
of approaching the structure-agency interaction from a needs-based perspective.  
The usefulness of a needs-based approach finds support in Giddens’ ontological 
framework for social behaviour.10 In sociology, ontology denotes the conceptual investigation 
of the nature of human action, social institutions, and interrelations between actions and 
institutions.11 Institutions and laws do not work ‘behind the backs of social actors’ because 
social actors not only have knowledge of their operations, they are also involved in their 
successes and failures.12 For example, research participants disclosed that some wealthy 
parents assist their prospective sons-in-law to satisfy the requirements in the marriage list. This 
assistance is usually by waiving items on the list, which are customarily due to the bride’s 
parents. But sometimes, this assistance also includes providing some of the items demanded 
by her Umunna. In this regard, an informant stated: ‘The parents … can even pay for some of 
the things [on the marriage list]. They can request that their in-law provide the things for the 
Umunna and not theirs. For example, my mother-in law did that to reduce the items [on the 
marriage list].’13 Parents’ contribution to the bridewealth of their daughters flows from their 
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desire for their daughters to marry, a desire that is obviously linked to a needs assessment of 
the social legitimacy conferred by marriage in South-East Nigeria.  
Having shown how structure is inseparable from agency in the bridewealth negotiation 
process, I proceed to demonstrate how a needs-based approach to the structure-agency 
interaction resonates with theories on structure-agency interaction and my field findings.  
 
6.4  Needs-based approach and temporality 
Since the inseparability of structure and agency fails to accommodate the primacy of time in 
social analysis, Archer proposed the notion of ‘analytical dualism’.14 She demonstrated how 
social change incorporates structured human relations, actions, and ideas over time.15 She 
argued that because structure precedes agency in the construction and reproduction of 
institutions, the two should be analysed separately to account for temporality in institutional 
construction.16 A needs-based approach avoids the need to account for time. Both structure and 
agency are shaped, informed, and altered by socio-economic needs, which transcend time. 
Indeed, social structures may come and go, but needs remain. The structure-agency interaction 
therefore requires a needs-based theoretical framework, since it easily accommodates 
temporality. In this sense of accommodating time, needs-based approach shares similarities 
with Buckley’s morphogenetic approach.17  
Borrowed from biology, and literarily meaning change in form, morphogenesis seeks 
to account for the changes and developments that occur in structure over time. The time element 
is important to needs assessment, since structure has neither pre-set form nor resilient features 
capable of resisting sustained pressure from human agency. An example of how a needs-based 
approach accommodates temporality is the history of bridewealth distortion. Research 
participants revealed how socio-economic changes induced mass penury and opportunism, 
which are the major influences on bridewealth distortion, as well as the drivers of needs 
assessments.  
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A needs-based approach is also useful for deconstructing social structures over time. 
For example, couples are increasingly using the cultural coercion of premarital pregnancy to 
combat high bridewealth demands. In the words of an informant: ‘Things are really changing 
now with urbanisation and movement of people. Women live with whoever has agreed to marry 
them. Some men go for introduction, take the [marriage] list and disappear. They continue to 
cohabit together … and [thereby] force the hand of culture.’18  
In sum, a needs-based approach shows how the behavioural changes produced by socio-
economic needs over time contribute to the emergence of new structures. This approach fits 
well with the dualist view of structure and agency interaction.19 In the context of bridewealth, 
dualism is useful for understanding how socio-economic needs drive the agency of prospective 
spouses to erode the traditions governing the marriage list. It also sheds light on the role of 
temporality in the construction and deconstruction of structure. For example, cultural 
enlightenment gained from education is helping couples to question the relevance of some 
marriage requirements to contemporary social conditions.20 These couples argue that some 
marriage practices hide under the banner of tradition, whereas the practices are really motivated 
by economic or psychological motives. Commenting on extravagant items on marriage lists, 
an informant, Mrs Azuka stated: ‘Sometimes the [marriage] list is used to punish the family or 
when they don’t like the man [groom] and want to frustrate him.’21  
In recognition of the importance of temporality, Archer argues that morphogenesis is 
characterised by a cycle comprising of three phases: cultural conditioning, socio-cultural 
interaction, and social elaboration.22 While I concede that these three phases are responsible 
for the emergence of social change, I argue that needs assessment is their common 
denominator.  
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6.4.1  Needs assessment and the three cycles of temporality 
In the negotiation process of bridewealth payment, socio-economic needs reveal the ways 
cultural factors succeed in constraining agency, eventually creating cultural conditioning. 
These cultural constraints consist primarily of the desire of prospective spouses to respect their 
elders and receive the social legitimacy conferred by bridewealth payment. In turn, the desire 
for social legitimacy is fuelled by acculturation, or what structuration theorists call memory 
traces.23 Memory traces are individuals’ knowledge of society, which they draw on for their 
performance of daily tasks. However, this ‘knowledgeability’ does not form in isolation of 
socio-economic needs. In the context of bridewealth payment, individuals’ knowledgeability 
refers to their beliefs about traditions, their motivations for obeying it,24 and above all, the 
socio-economic needs that drive their motivations. Knowledgeability helps to explain people’s 
flagrant disregard for the Dowry Law. People’s attitude to this law arguably demonstrates that 
a neglect of agents’ socio-economic needs results in disdain for state law.25 In a similar finding, 
Yarbrough’s detailed ethnographic study of rural Kwazulu-Natal reveals the socio-economic 
factors that underline the persistence of bridewealth payment.26 In describing why ‘ilobolo 
remains the primary legitimating’ mark of marriage and people’s disdain for state recognition, 
he hinted at a needs-based approach: ‘Without social action, there is no law. It follows from 
this that not only law’s existence but also its authority is produced through social action.’27 In 
the context of Yarbrough’s study, social action is impossible without needs assessment, which 
is driven by cultural, emotional, economic, legal, and even religious elements.  
Socio-cultural interaction, which is the second element in the cycles of temporality, 
also reflects needs assessment. Here, bridewealth payment reveals structure as both the medium 
of habitual action and the outcome of behavioural changes. The mutually dependent structure-
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agency interaction involved here cannot be isolated from socio-economic needs. As argued by 
Frohlich et al: ‘Structure is not possible without action because action reproduces structure. 
Action is not possible without structure because action begins with a given structure that was 
the result of prior actions.’28 This description of structure’s close link with agency reflects the 
informed, needs-driven actions of individuals involved in the negotiation process of 
bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria. In this sense, the divide presented by dualist 
scholars does not fit a needs-based approach, since it conflicts with the dynamism of 
bridewealth payment. Dualism implies that prospective spouses and their parents have little or 
no influence in shaping the contents of the marriage list. However, the needs-driven forms of 
agency employed by prospective spouses and their parents contradict dualism. Despite the 
insistence of elders, factors such as religious pressure (of both parents and prospective 
spouses), education pressure (of both parents and prospective spouses), and wealth pressure, 
play significant roles in bridewealth negotiation. As explained in preceding chapters, there is a 
generational shift in the onus to pay bridewealth from the family to the groom. This needs-
informed shift recognises that bridewealth payment has become more individualised than the 
joint effort it used to be in the agrarian past.29 Also, there is increased autonomy among women 
and men in their choice of marriage partners. By promoting the influence of structure in the 
construction of individuals’ marriage motivations, therefore, dualism downplays the role of 
socio-economic needs in shaping the ability of agency to (re)construct social institutions.30 The 
next section demonstrates how socio-economic needs compel individuals to construct the 
tradition of high bridewealth. 
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6.5  Bridewealth and structural construction  
The interplay of structure and agency in the negotiation process of bridewealth payment reveals 
the role of the clan in the emergence of structural change, notably high bridewealth. While this 
emergence may be constructive or deconstructive, it is driven by socio-economic needs. For 
example, parents are using the agency tools identified in chapter five to reinvent bridewealth’s 
symbolism. This reinvention, which is unconscious in many cases, consists of brides’ fathers 
accepting a token sum from their prospective sons-in-law as bridewealth. Token bridewealth 
acceptances reflect the desire of parents for their daughters to marry and acquire social 
legitimacy. It constitutes reinvention of culture, since most of the practices surrounding the 
marriage list are constructed. As I showed in chapter three, bridewealth used to be symbolic, 
while the items in the marriage list were not as commercialised as they are today. My research 
informants provide clear evidence that the contents of the marriage list are constructed by the 
kindred. This construction is driven by motivations such as opportunism, economic wants, 
dislike for the potential groom’s place of origin, and revenge against communities and families 
deemed to be unfriendly because of their high demand for bridewealth. Interestingly, these 
motivations owe more to the socio-economic needs of individuals (brides’ fathers) and the 
kindred (extended family) than to traditional demands. Thus, needs-driven human agency 
results in the structural construction of high bridewealth, thereby questioning the constraining 
influence structure is supposed to wield over agency. This peculiar role of agency in structural 
construction demonstrates the usefulness of a needs-based approach to the structure-agency 
interaction, since it accounts for variations in structural manifestation. In the words of an 
informant, ‘the [marriage] list depends on the kindred and not the village entirely. The village 
does not have a fixed amount as bridewealth.’31 Obviously, this statement implies that 
structure, in the context of bridewealth, does not manifest uniformly. Rather, structure should 
be treated on a case-by-case basis, for which a needs-based approach is best suited. For 
example, many research participants denied that high bridewealth is prevalent in South-East 
Nigeria. Rather, they stressed that the exorbitant demands of some communities in Mbano and 
Mbaise, Imo State, and Bende and Ngwa in Abia State, are responsible for the notorious 
reputation of South-East Nigeria for high bridewealth.  
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In a deconstructive sense, therefore, parents of prospective couples reshape the 
constructed tradition of high bridewealth by pruning or eliminating some requirements on the 
marriage list. They conduct this pruning based on their desire to ensure that their daughters 
marry, or to cement good relationships with their in-laws, or because of their religious beliefs. 
Whatever the motivation, needs assessment is involved, which is driven by socio-economic 
factors. For example, a faith-based deconstruction is emerging. It consists of refusing to 
provide cigarettes and alcohol on the marriage list because these items contradict the moral 
values of the groom. This trend illustrates Adam Smith’s famous remark about the symbiotic, 
and arguably, needs-based nature of structural construction: ‘Give me that which I want, and 
you shall have what you want’.32  
Furthermore, the influence of socio-economic needs in structural construction is 
evident in couples’ choice of marriage partners, parents’ religious influence on marriage lists, 
and the influence of the groom on the bridewealth negotiation due. Grooms’ influence on 
bridewealth negotiation is a logical product of the now individualised nature of bridewealth 
capital. Given the needs-driven manner agency (re)constructs structure in bridewealth 
payment, there should be a rethinking of the influence of agency on cultural institutions. This 
is because changes in the significance of bridewealth from symbolic to commercial reflect the 
socio-economic needs of individuals and families who added excessive items on the marriage 
list. This needs significance is manifest in the deconstructionist or re-inventive actions of 
individuals dissatisfied with rising rates of late marriage and cohabitation due to high 
bridewealth. As affirmed by some studies of the structure-agency interaction, there are hardly 
altered social standards that are not driven by behavioural needs.33  
Having shown the value of a needs-based approach to structural construction, I turn to 
the significance of this approach for state laws and policies on marriage in South-East Nigeria. 
 
6.6  Needs-based approach and legal pluralism 
A needs-based view of the structure-agency interaction sheds light on the interaction of laws, 
also referred to as legal pluralism. The dualist model of structure and agency interaction pays 
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insufficient attention to the reality of normative co-existence.34 Legal pluralism thrives on 
structure, which may be represented by the state. As Webber noted, legal pluralism insists that 
‘law is not simply what the state decrees, but is subject to, indeed is often constituted by 
normative claims that take shape within specific contexts of social interaction.’35 Here, state 
law may be regarded as structure, while agency may be regarded as an aspect of non-state law. 
The activities of individuals do not always conform to structural demands, since there is a 
multiplicity of laws from local to state levels, and people have understandings of law that are 
different from state law. Moreover, socio-economic needs strongly influence people’s 
application of, or adherence to law. For example, the Dowry Law, which sought to regulate 
bridewealth, is widely disregarded because of the economic benefits of high bridewealth 
payments. Indeed, some communities have bridewealth laws or regulations enacted by their 
traditional rulers; others have regulations for bridewealth payment made by age group leaders, 
while individuals and families sometimes produce their own regulations. These regulations 
make competing claims of authority on behaviour and often impose demands that conflict with 
the Dowry Law. Agents in the named social groups protect and wield power and influence over 
their bridewealth practices because of their varying socio-economic needs, obligations, and 
beliefs. The mere existence of varying bridewealth regulations, which are enforced in a 
peaceful manner, demonstrates the co-operative relationship between agency and cultural 
institutions. Although this co-operation is traceable to the legitimacy and control of the 
enforcing bodies over marriage and other cultural issues, socio-economic needs also play a 
role. Specifically, this role, as well as the actors who exercise agency, act in accordance with 
needs-based economic, religious, and cultural motives. However, a needs-based approach to 
structure-agency interaction in bridewealth payment is a complex matrix. 
 
6.6.1  Complexity of needs-based approach 
Despite the Dowry Law, regulations by traditional rulers, and proclamations by age groups, 
many families insist on determining the modus and quantum of bridewealth payment. Almost 
all the participants disclosed that regulation of bridewealth payment is not within the confines 
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of the government because it is a family issue. However, the socio-economic motivations for 
flouting the Dowry Law differ. The groom, for example, should be disposed to obeying the 
Dowry Law because it favours him financially. However, he is obliged to abide by the 
traditional requirements of his in-laws to marry their daughter.36 Moreover, he is heavily 
influenced by his affection for the bride – that is his desire to marry her. In making these needs 
assessments, he is also influenced by his personal laws and philosophy.37 These assessments 
thus present a complex web that make it difficult to predict the course of human agency in its 
interaction with structure. In the end, state law (structure) and community regulations (partly 
structure and agency) might succumb to the groom’s emotional and financial abilities.38 The 
word ‘might’ is deliberate because laws, customs, and rules are subject to needs assessment, 
negotiation, and change.39 While customary laws are known to adapt to socio-economic 
changes, state laws can also change in response to customary or religious laws.40 This needs-
driven mutual influence demonstrates that structure and agency are two sides of a coin with 
complex effects on each other.41 Etzioni affirmed the complexity of this interdependent 
relationship as follows: ‘a basic observation of sociology and psychology is that the individual 
and the community ‘penetrate’ one another and require one another, and that individuals are 
not able to function without deep links to others’.42 Having shown the significance of a needs-
based approach for legal pluralism, I turn to its manifestation in gender relations.  
 
6.7  Needs-based approach and gender relations 
The dualist perception of structure and agency paints structure as the author and moulder of 
behaviour, while agency is at its receiving end. In the context of bridewealth payment, dualism 
highlights the prominence of men as the determinants and benefactors of bridewealth 
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dividends. However, this prominence is superficial when viewed from a needs perspective. In 
other words, a needs-based approach highlights the complementary nature of marriage relations 
in South-East Nigeria.43 This complementarity is evident in women’s influence on bridewealth 
negotiations, contrary to traditional perceptions of their non-participation. There are several 
socio-economic needs behind this influence. Many research participants demonstrated how this 
influence is exerted directly and indirectly. 
 In direct influence, women finish their bridewealth negotiations earlier and demand for 
the men to conclude theirs. This pressure, the result of traditional desire to induct the bride into 
the marriage hall of fame, is usually exerted through ululations, songs, and dances. In cases 
where men’s negotiations are proving difficult, the wordings of these songs are adapted to 
reflect the fact that the bride is not being sold. Here, we see the desire for cultural legitimacy 
trumping the pecuniary benefits of high bridewealth. Women may also send delegates, usually 
the bride’s mother or an influential woman leader to ‘whisper’ in the ears of the negotiating 
men. Where culture permits them to observe the men’s proceedings, they radiate their 
displeasure with prolonged negotiations through intent, disapproving stares.   
In indirect influence, some brides secretly provide the money for their bridewealth or 
pressure their parents to provide it. This assistance is not readily acknowledged due to fears of 
cultural ridicule. However, many research participants acknowledged that cohabitation and 
premarital pregnancies are on the rise because of late marriages caused by high bridewealth. 
Providing or assisting in the provision of bridewealth is therefore aimed at avoiding the cultural 
disproval of being a single woman. Also, some brides are breadwinners in their families. If the 
movies emerging from Nollywood are to be believed, then brides’ provision of bridewealth is 
more common than acknowledged. Already, the practice of waiving the items due to the bride’s 
parents from the marriage list is widespread. These waivers are usually due to the indirect 
influence of brides on their parents, which stems from their need to marry. 
My argument of needs-based complementary gender relations in bridewealth payment 
has a correlation with the nature of marriage in Igboland. Notably, traditional marriage is a 
joyous event. As a research participant put it: ‘The joy of parents is to have their daughters out 
(married) when they are of age and not have them in the house because of high bride wealth.’44 
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This statement affirms the need for women and men to work harmoniously to ensure the 
success of marriage. In the context of bridewealth, needs-based complementary gender 
relations reveal the motivations behind patriarchal customs. In other words, what outsiders may 
perceive as patriarchal customs may actually be acceptable to women at the receiving end of 
the customs due to the socio-economic needs behind the customs. A needs-based approach 
therefore invites a reassessment of perceptions of gender relations and assumptions of women’s 
subordination. Such perceptions could contradict the empirical reality of interdependent gender 
relations in South-East Nigeria,45 including in bridewealth negotiation. As I proceed to show, 
the nature of gender relations, especially in a customary law setting, makes needs-based 
complementarity logical in bridewealth negotiation.46  
 
6.7.1  Nature of gender relations 
Gender relations possess processual and structural connotations.47 The roles attached to women 
and men are the consequences of social needs, including processes that affirm and further these 
needs.48 The needs-motivation of social roles arguably cut across gender. Socio-economic 
needs help to explain why a groom is required to satisfy both women and men’s items on the 
marriage list. If only men’s voices dominate bridewealth negotiation, there would be no need 
to satisfy the requirements of women.  
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Furthermore, individuals change the structural systems they live in when they are faced 
with socio-economic challenges.49 In the agrarian past, bridewealth was negotiated almost 
exclusively by men. In many communities today, not only are women increasing their voices 
in bridewealth negotiation, they are also advocating for limitations in amounts payable as 
bridewealth. In southern Nigeria, women’s annual ‘August Meeting’ is a popular platform 
through which they engage in this advocacy.50 Their advocacy demonstrates that gender 
relations are needs-based, are socially constructed, and could also be reconstructed by the 
ability of individuals to act in response to socio-economic needs.51 Construction and 
deconstruction of social practices show the interdependency of agency and structure, and also 
highlights the socio-economic needs that drive their relationship.  
Finally, ignoring the influence of socio-economic needs in the assumed power of 
structure to shape agency may hamper development policies relating to culture and customary 
norms.52 To shed light on this argument, I need to explore the implication of the structure-
agency interplay for policy formulation and implementation. 
 
6.8 Needs-based approach and policy implementation 
The previous chapter’s discussion of the negotiation process of bridewealth payment exposed 
the limited participation of the bride, for whom the bridewealth is paid. It also reveals the less 
limited participation of the groom, who largely provides the bridewealth capital. Moreover, the 
discussion reveals interesting mechanisms used by couples to make their voices heard. These 
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needs-based mechanisms shed light on the importance of considering agency-motivations in 
policy formulation and implementation.53 
The motivations behind couples’ mechanisms to participate in bridewealth negotiation 
are significant for overcoming challenges in law-related policy formulation.  My research 
participants were quick to dismiss the idea of government regulating the quantum of 
bridewealth payment. The reasons for this dismissal are interesting. For example, Chief 
Okenwa stated: ‘Government did not give free education, so they (state officials) shouldn’t 
dictate how much is to be paid as bridewealth.’54 Other participants’ attitude to government’s 
involvement in bridewealth regulation are even more revealing.  
First, people’s desire to protect bridewealth payment as a source of additional income 
is very strong. Second, there is considerable annoyance and/or disdain for government 
interference in a matter people consider private, especially since government is perceived to be 
generally indifferent to people’s welfare. Embedded in these reasons is a mistrust of 
government motives for meddling in cultural issues without adequate and periodic consultation 
with cultural actors. My informants believe that proper consultation on the part of government 
would give them opportunities to state their needs and preferences. For example, Mr 
Akwarandu stated that government might worsen bridewealth regulation by introducing 
cumbersome requirements such as registration and levies.55 Whether this statement is true or 
false will not be argued. The important thing is that a policy’s technical soundness is not an 
important criterion for it to be recognised and accepted by communities, especially rural 
communities.56 The key criterion is the policy’s reflection of people’s needs and aspirations. 
Notably, policies, projects, and laws that affect local communities are mostly made at the state 
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level (top-down) rather than grassroots level (bottom-up).57 Oftentimes, the communication 
and implementation processes of government projects are distorted. Writing about Indonesia, 
von Benda Beckman observed that the version of state regulations presented to local 
communities sometimes has little or nothing to do with the original policy.58 Indeed, state law, 
regarded as a ‘powerful magic charm’ to change the socio-economic conditions of people, 
sometimes fails to fit the lived realities of the people it seeks to help because it is made without 
their proper consultation and involvement.59   
Furthermore, power, economic, health, social, and political interest dynamics are 
usually affected whenever a policy is endorsed.60 Before endorsing a policy, communities 
weigh its potential benefits against its anticipated costs. Hence, it is vital to not only understand 
the motivations that underlie a policy’s endorsement, but also to involve the community in all 
aspects of its formulation and implementation.61 This understanding is particularly important 
for the efficacy and sustainability of policy implementation. A close look at the report of the 
Committee on Bridewealth in Nigeria’s then Eastern Region illustrates the importance of a 
needs-based approach in policy formulation. As shown in the preceding chapter, the Committee 
investigated the social effects of bridewealth payment to make recommendations for the 
removal of its hardships.62 The Committee found that:  
a) The term ‘bride price’ is derogatory and objectionable to many people. 
b) The socio-economic changes of colonial rule played a huge role in the 
transformation of traditional life. 
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c) Ex-service men returning from fighting for the British during the Second World 
War influenced the quantum of bridewealth because of their wealth and status. 
d) The educational qualification of a girl influences bridewealth payment. 
e) Inflated cost of living plays a role in increasing bridewealth. 
 
Although the Committee interviewed men and women to arrive to these findings, it failed to: 
1. Investigate the negotiation process of bridewealth payment. 
2. Address the link between this negotiation, culture, and inflated cost of living.  
3. Address the link between bridewealth, class divisions, and social cohesion. 
 
Ultimately, the Committee recommended a dowry law, which though adopted for the benefit 
of the people, failed to integrate their needs, preferences, and lived experiences. Its failure 
demonstrates that the human mind has an infinite capacity to resist the introduction of new 
phenomenon, especially laws and policy.63 A key aspect of this resistance is an unconscious 
rebellion against any policy that neglects the needs of the people it governs. A needs-based 
approach to development is therefore necessary for better understanding of the interaction of 
structure and agency.64  
 
6.9 Concluding remarks  
Structure is believed to exert a constraining influence on behaviour.  However, little scholarly 
effort is evident in how socio-economic needs compel structure itself to be constructed in 
cultural settings. Specifically, there is a void in how individuals, who are motivated by their 
economic, religious, educational, and normative needs, use agency to construct structure in 
traditional marriage relations. In this chapter therefore, I brought theory and practice together 
by advocating a needs-based approach to structure-agency interplay in the negotiation process 
of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria. I argued that socio-economic needs drive and 
determine structure-agency interaction. I further argued that a needs-based approach reveals 
the complementary nature of the structure-agency interaction. In so doing, I reject a dualist 
view of structure and agency in bridewealth negotiation. Importantly, I show the suitability of 
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a needs-based view of structure-agency interaction to complex customs such as bridewealth 
negotiation and payment.  
Although bridewealth has been a feature of traditional marriage from time immemorial, 
its persistence does not mean it is operating in the way it functioned in the past. Rather, its 
operation has adapted to fit the socio-economic needs of its adherents. These socio-economic 
needs also drive the construction and reconstruction of bridewealth payment. Although some 
young couples are willing to abandon the practice because it does not serve them well, the 
majority are desirous of continuing it because of the social legitimacy it confers. On their part, 
elders who include parents, pressurise their children to abide by it because of its cultural and 
financial benefits. This situation is not peculiar to South-East Nigeria.65 For example, 
Yarbrough explains the pressure to comply with bridewealth requirements as reflective of 
traditional ‘understanding of marriage as a union of two extended kinship lines’.66 Although 
many of my participants have numerous reasons why they think the nature of bridewealth 
payment has changed, only few of them were willing to endorse its abolition. Their 
unwillingness flows from the cultural-legitimacy stamp on marriage, which their decades of 
acculturation compel them to attach to bridewealth payment. Bridewealth negotiation thus 
demonstrates a complex interplay of structure-agency that demands a needs-based theoretical 
framework. Such a framework illumines understandings of cultural construction, gender 
relations, legal pluralism, and policy effectiveness. A needs-based approach has four 
significances for the structure-agency interplay in traditional cultural settings. 
Firstly, the process of structural deconstruction is long, difficult, and complex. 
Bridewealth payment is an ancient cultural practice, which draws its resilience from the 
legitimacy it confers on marriage.67 Any marriage without payment of bridewealth is rarely 
recognised as a legitimate marriage in South-East Nigeria.68 Paradoxically, the trend of high 
bridewealth payment was constructed by individuals, who were influenced by opportunism and 
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economic wants, among other reasons. This trend is now being deconstructed by token 
acceptance of bridewealth, pruning of exorbitant items on the marriage list, and restriction of 
items like alcohol and cigarettes, which offend religious beliefs. Despite playing a role in 
reducing the quantum of bridewealth, almost all Christian denominations encourage their 
members to pay bridewealth before coming for a church blessing. The influence of Christianity 
also manifests in the pruning of marriage lists. These constructions and deconstructions 
demonstrate the complexity of the structure-agency interplay. I have argued that a needs-based 
approach is best suited for understanding this complexity. 
Secondly, bridewealth payment and negotiation demonstrate a needs-driven 
complementary gender relation in South-East Nigeria. Women and men partake equally, 
although separately, in bridewealth negotiation. Both groups have their own requirements on 
the marriage list, which carry the same weight of fulfilment. By showing how women’s roles 
complement men’s roles, as well as how women influence bridewealth negotiation directly and 
indirectly, a needs-based approach questions assumption about patriarchal gender relations.  
Thirdly, widespread disdain for the Dowry Law, which seeks to limit bridewealth, 
demonstrates the usefulness of a needs-based approach for understanding the interaction of 
state law and customary law. The Nigerian Constitution provides for the right of people to 
develop and promote their cultures.69  In fact, the state has a responsibility to promote and 
protect culture, hence the adoption of the Dowry Law to regulate the quantum of bridewealth.70 
However, this law has practically no influence on normative behaviour, thus demonstrating the 
need for state policies to be sensitive to the dynamic of legal pluralism. I have argued that 
socio-economic needs underlie this sensitivity and is important for policy effectiveness, since 
policies are likely to fail if policy makers disregard the lived realities of people. Given that 
people’s lived realities inform the manner they use agency to alter structural institutions, top-
down approaches to policies could result in failure like the Dowry Law.71 
Lastly, the structure-agency interaction in bridewealth negotiations reflects continuities 
and discontinuities in social practices, which are best understood in the context of a needs-
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based approach. This is because these continuities and discontinuities are driven by the 
powerful influence of culture, on one hand, and socio-economic forces like unemployment, 
globalisation, religion, and education, on the other. Opponents of high bridewealth in South-
East Nigeria, which include most of my research participants, argue that it causes late marriage, 
cohabitation, and even objectification of women. These opinions reflect the influences of 
Western education, including the notion of human rights, Christianity, and acculturation. Many 
research informants pointed to bridewealth practices in other parts of Nigeria as evidence of 
best practices. However, most informants are generally unwilling to advocate the abolition of 
bridewealth payment. I have argued that their unwillingness to relinquish the cultural 
legitimacy conferred by bridewealth payment is a complex continuity that is best understood 
from a needs perspective. North hinted at the needs-driven nature of cultural continuities when 
he remarked that socio-economic constraints and interaction end up sustaining structure.72 
These constraints, he further noted, could manifest as societal sanction for social deviations, as 
well as its accompanying shame and stigma.73  
In conclusion, I argue that although cultural forces apparently undermine the ability of 
individuals to challenge bridewealth payment, socio-economic needs drive and sustain their 
cultural forces. Indeed, these needs enable individuals to influence bridewealth negotiation and 
payment. My argument is consistent with the perspectives of Archer, Giddens, and Buckley on 
structuration, complementarity, and morphogenesis. While Giddens argues that the activities 
of agents create structural conditions that make their lives easier or more difficult, Archer’s 
morphogenesis theory argues that agents can reinforce and resist the influence of structure. I 
argue that as far as bridewealth negotiation and payment is concerned, this structuration process 
is best understood from a needs-based perspective. A needs-based approach clearly uncovers 
the complex and interdependent relationship between structure and agency. This complexity is 
evident in the influence of couples in bridewealth negotiation, the ability of parents and in-laws 
to reduce items on the marriage list, the pruning of exorbitant items from marriage lists, and 
the exclusion of items that contravene religious beliefs.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
Over the past several decades, varying social problems have compelled scholars to debate the 
interaction of institutions with human behaviour – that is whether socialisation, especially 
cultural upbringing, determines the extent to which individuals act freely.1 Sociologists in the 
structural-functionalist-Marxist school of thought exalted structure as the main determinant of 
human behaviour because it possesses complex, self-maintaining attributes that limit the 
influence of agency.2 They further stress that individuals are the product of social influences 
around them, since they are socialised by various institutions such as the family, schools, 
media, and religious houses. Weber and other scholars in the symbolic 
interactionism/interpretive view of sociology reject the exaltation of structure over agency, 
arguing that customs and norms are not coercive enough to shape the behaviour of individuals 
in society.3 Their argument is founded on the freedom of individuals to resist social norms, 
influence norms, and thereby determine structure in a bottom-up manner. This debate has 
become a central issue in social theory and cuts across all spheres of life, such as class, politics, 
modes of production, employment opportunities, gender roles, succession, inheritance, and of 
course marriage. 
Recently, rather than partitioning the main determinant of structure and agency, the 
debate has shifted to understanding the relationship between the two. For example, Bourdieu 
used the principle of habitus to explain how the interplay of structure and agency shapes society 
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by producing self-sustaining behavioural habits.4 Accordingly, some scholars prefer a middle 
ground between structure and agency. Based on a complementarity theory, they argue that 
structure and agency influence and balance each other.5 I take a slightly different path by 
proposing a needs-based approach for understanding the structure-agency interaction in 
complex cultural settings. A needs-based approach posits that economic, cultural, religious, 
philosophical, legal, and other socioeconomic factors drive and determine structure-agency 
interplay, since they reveal better the motivations behind social behaviour. A needs-based 
approach is especially suited to bridewealth negotiation because it accounts for the 
complexities and paradoxes of power relations. For the reasons below, I sometimes 
interchanged the structure-agency interplay with power relations in the first five chapters of 
this dissertation. 
 
7.2  A complex social setting 
The social setting of bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria is very complex. Aside from 
the dearth of literature on bridewealth payment, bridewealth negotiation exemplifies a form of 
conflict between marriage customs and individuals’ ability to resist, shape, and recreate 
customs. Thus, prospective spouses’ choices of marriage partners and freedom to determine 
the quantum of bridewealth payment interplay with powerful cultural institutions. On the one 
hand, these cultural institutions are primarily customs and traditions, whose custodians and 
enforcers are elders, headmen, and traditional rulers. On the other hand, the agency of these 
same individuals influences the quantum of bridewealth payment negotiated through the 
agency of prospective spouses and their parents. This intricate relationship between structure 
and agency presents a complex analytical situation, which I deemed fit to represent with power 
relations. In turn, this power relations analytical tool is best understood from a needs 
perspective, since the individuals involved in bridewealth negotiation are all influenced by 
socio-economic elements. A needs-based framework is further justified by dissonance between 
contemporary cultural values and the social settings in which bridewealth customs developed.  
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7.2.1  Old socio-economic needs  
In the agrarian social settings in which bridewealth emerged, extended families practiced 
mostly subsistence agriculture in close-knit social units. They produced wealth jointly, raised 
bridewealth funds for their sons, and negotiated its quantum and disbursement through family 
heads, who were mostly elders. Notably, these societies practiced patrilocal residence, in which 
women moved to their husband’s family after the conclusion of marriage ceremonies. 
Significantly, patrilocal residence required children to be affiliated to their father’s lineage and 
clan. Bridewealth payment was rendered in recognition of the bride’s fecundity, and as pledge 
that her future children belong to her husband’s lineage. As a group-based initiative, 
bridewealth was also paid to compensate for the loss of the bride’s service to her clan, and to 
raise funds for her brothers to pay bridewealth for a bride to replace her agricultural and 
domestic services.6 It goes without saying that marriages were often arranged, with couples 
sometimes having no agency whatsoever in their spousal selection. In sum, bridewealth 
symbolised ‘an alliance between two families, rather than a contract between two individuals’.7 
This complex agrarian setting of bridewealth payment was obviously driven by group or 
communal needs. It explains why ‘marriage in traditional societies is not a personal affair 
between two individuals, but instead involves (a value-laden cultural bond between) two kin 
groups.’8 However, although the traditions of patrilocal residence and patrilineal lineage 
remain, two foundational elements of marriage and social life in South-East Nigeria have 
changed, thereby reinforcing the usefulness of a needs-based framework for analysing the 
agency of actors involved in bridewealth negotiation.  
 
7.2.2  New socio-economic needs  
The first element is the diminishing concept of the extended family, while the second is the 
disappearance of joint production of family wealth, from which bridewealth funds used to be 
raised. These two elements are being steadily eroded by urbanisation, unemployment, 
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acculturation, and individual income production, thereby creating a new system of socio-
economic needs. Despite their erosion, many bridewealth practices retain their ancient agrarian 
formats, thereby presenting three complex challenges for structure-agency interaction in 
contemporary Igbo society. In explaining these challenges below, I justify why I represent the 
complex relationship between structure and agency with needs-based power relations. 
First, bridewealth negotiation is still determined by clan members, especially elders. In 
many cases, neither the prospective spouses nor their parents can determine the quantum of 
bridewealth, who benefits from the items on the marriage list, and why the items should be 
distributed among certain clan members. This limited agency of prospective spouses in 
bridewealth quantum and distribution is retained irrespective of whether the concerned clan 
members helped in training the bride. Faced with this puzzle of applying agrarian marriage 
standards in an increasingly individualistic-minded society, prospective spouses and their 
parents have the option of resisting culture or sustaining it by compliance. The choices they 
eventually make are reached after needs assessment of potential gains and losses of particular 
courses of action.  
Second, high bridewealth, caused largely by the clan’s exorbitant demands on the 
marriage list, contributes to family interference in spousal choices.9 Sometimes, families prefer 
their daughters to marry men from wealthy families who can afford expensive bridewealth. 
Given socio-economic changes such as Western education, religion, and acculturation, young 
women and men possess the tools to exercise their agency on spousal choice.10 However, these 
tools are determined or at least influenced by socio-economic needs, of which cultural 
legitimacy and emotional affection are prominent.  
Third, prospective spouses are often excluded from the negotiation of their own 
bridewealth. They are restricted to indirect participation through their parents, aunts and uncles. 
This exclusion and passive participation is a carryover from ancient times when families 
negotiated marriage on behalf of couples. However, grooms have managed to become at least 
passive participants in bridewealth negotiation because they provide the bridewealth funds. 
They have the option of sustaining structure with their passivity or exercising their agency to 
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obtain an increased voice in bridewealth negotiations. Similarly, instead of acting through their 
parents, brides could exercise agency by demanding participation in their bridewealth 
negotiation and distribution. In making these participation choices, needs assessment 
influences the extent to which prospective spouses may exercise agency.  
Against this complex cultural backdrop, therefore, I utilised one central question to 
express my needs-based, power relations framework of structure-agency interaction: ‘In what 
ways do power relations play out in the negotiation process of bridewealth payment in South-
East Nigeria?’ I used four probes to answer this question comprehensively.  
The first probe investigated factors responsible for high bridewealth payment. The 
second examined the role of formal and informal law in the negotiation process of bridewealth 
payment. The third explored the ways individuals use agency to manipulate bridewealth 
negotiation. The fourth probed the significance of the structure-versus-agency interplay for 
development in Nigeria. 
 
7.3 Summary of the study 
The first chapter laid the groundwork of my study. It also identified the theories from which I 
develop my argument of a needs-based approach to structure-agency interaction. It explained 
how the struggle over the primacy of structure and agency obscures the benefits of the dialogue 
their relationship could produce. Most scholars argue that the relationship is diametric, while 
others argue that it is complementary. In contributing to this debate, I employed a needs-based 
approach, which draws from the bargaining model of rational choice theory and 
morphogenesis. With this framework, I justified my investigation of the relationship between 
structure and agency in bridewealth negotiation in South-East Nigeria, set out my objectives, 
and outlined my methodology.  
In chapter two, I unpacked the methods I used to investigate the relationship between 
structure and agency. By describing the sources and nature of my study’s data, I explained how 
I elicited answers to my research questions on the negotiation process of bridewealth payment. 
Using observation, semi-structured, and open-ended interviews, I sought data from potential 
spouses, traditional leaders, parents, elders, all of whom are key players in the bridewealth 
negotiation process. My questions centred on the origin and significance of bridewealth 
payment, the criteria for determining the items on the marriage list, and the consequences for 
the parents of prospective couples and the couples themselves of not providing all items on the 
list. Other questions include noticeable change(s) in the form of bridewealth, rationale and 




motivation for bridewealth payment, knowledge of the Limitation of Dowry Law, and the role 
of law in reducing high bridewealth payment. 
Chapter three provided a historical account of the concept, origin, and significance of 
bridewealth payment. This account aimed to set the stage for chapters four and six, which 
explore the role of law in bridewealth negotiation and the policy implications of the interplay 
of structure and agency. My analysis in this chapter established bridewealth payment as the 
keystone of a customary law marriage in South-East Nigeria. It showed how the agricultural 
settings of the precolonial era fitted bridewealth payment. These settings afforded women 
social spaces in which their human dignity was well appreciated. These spaces thrived in a 
village republican system, in which social groups played key supportive roles in the institution 
of marriage. In this setting, bridewealth had a symbolic value and signified the legitimation of 
marriage, appreciation of the bride’s fecundity, and compensation for the loss of her services 
to her family and lineage. In other words, the socio-economic needs that prompted bridewealth 
payment were perfectly suited to an agricultural setting. I found that by altering the agrarian 
basis of society, Nigeria’s colonial encounter played a huge role in the distortion of the meaning 
and significance of bridewealth in Igbo society. Some of the main factors that feature in 
bridewealth’s distortion include education, acculturation, economic wants, and monetisation of 
bridewealth, most of which could be attributed to economic policies.11 These factors created 
new socio-economic needs, thereby shifting the motivations for bridewealth payment. Over 
time, these factors also significantly influenced perceptions of the meaning and function of 
bridewealth payment. These perceptions became so distorted that people demand high sums of 
money as bridewealth despite legislation that prohibits it.  
Chapter four offers a historical overview of the Nigerian legal system in order to 
provide a context for women’s agency within the cultural institution of marriage. Since 
bridewealth is paid on behalf of women, I emphasised women’s voices within my argument of 
a needs-based approach to the interplay of structure and agency. I reveal how the socio-
economic changes brought by colonial rule affected people’s attitudes to bridewealth payment, 
thereby creating new needs-driven bridewealth practices. I also emphasise the relationship 
between the traditional legal framework of marriage and the legal regime imported by colonial 
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rule. My emphasis on how women exercised considerable agency in marriage relations rests 
on several reasons.  
Firstly, marriage is the foundation of social life in Igboland and is a well-respected and 
honoured institution. In this institution, women’s status is prominent because of their crucial 
role in procreation.  Secondly, the close-knit nature of precolonial Igbo society determined the 
extent to which socio-economic needs could determine women’s agency.  A notable feature of 
this society is its dual sex political system, in which gender relations were more complementary 
than hierarchical.  Positions, power, respect, and authority were earned based on individuals’ 
service to the community, as well as their moral integrity, wealth, age, and charisma. Colonial 
rule changed all these by making women nearly invisible in public life. Although women now 
have increased access to education and employment, this access has not translated to radical 
changes in their exercise of agency because it is balanced against women’s need for the cultural 
legitimacy conferred by bridewealth payment. 
Chapter five sheds light on the negotiation process of bridewealth payment. Here, I 
situate the interplay of structure and agency within a needs-based approach to power relations. 
The chapter makes two explorations. The first is how structure dominates agency because of 
the importance attached to the cultural institution of marriage. The second is how socio-
economic needs, especially economic coercion, plays a powerful role in people’s abilities to 
influence cultural institutions. I found that structure truly dominates agency, while economic 
coercion merely plays a limited role in people’s abilities to reconstruct or defy cultural 
institutions. Informed by other socio-economic factors such as education and religion, 
economic coercion is changing the ability of elders and associations to determine the 
distributional pattern of bridewealth payment. However, the constraints imposed on behaviour 
by people’s need for cultural legitimacy remain strong. These constraints are, notably, 
continuance of bridewealth tradition, prospective spouses’ inability to determine the quantum 
of bridewealth, and their involuntary absence during the negotiation process of bridewealth.  
Furthermore, I revealed the active actors in bridewealth negotiation, the needs that 
motivate their roles, and the influence of agency on these roles. I found that grooms’ parents 
and prospective spouses are, generally, unhappy about payment of high bridewealth. However, 
their need for cultural legitimacy, which is accompanied by communal pressure to conform to 
tradition, constrains their ability to take remedial action. But they are not entirely option-less. 
Driven by their children’s need to marry, for example, some parents’ resort to taking a token 
sum as bridewealth from their prospective sons-in-law. This strategy, which is becoming 




popular, is informed by common sense, for it enables fathers to build good relationships with 
their sons-in laws, bearing in mind the overall emotional and economic benefits of such good 
relationships. However, it has an insignificant effect on the items in the marriage list, which 
remain expensive and inflexible in many communities due to the greed and economic needs of 
the kindred. Again, although prospective spouses are inclined to challenge cultural institutions 
through cohabitation, education, and pre-marital pregnancies, they are mindful of the social 
legitimacy conferred by bridewealth payment. 
Thirdly, the inconsequential role of state law in reducing high bridewealth payments is 
significant for development programming. While research informants insisted that the state has 
no role to play in reducing high bridewealth due to its failure to provide affordable education 
and other socio-economic amenities, they emphasised the need for parents, elders, the Umunna, 
and traditional leaders to decide this matter themselves. This insistence demonstrates people’s 
preference for a needs-driven, bottom-up approach to cultural issues. It also demonstrates that 
structure is sustained by the ways people employ their agency. Accordingly, legislation, an 
important aspect of structure, should be sensitive to the socio-economic needs of people, 
because socio-economic needs are responsible for shifts in attitudes and behaviours, which 
construct or deconstruct structure. As people’s disdain for the Dowry Law demonstrates, 
ignoring the influence of socio-economic needs in the structure-agency interaction is unhealthy 
for adherence to law and supremacy of the law, which are key components of the rule of law. 
In chapter six, I distil my theoretical framework from mainstream theories and situate 
it within the bridewealth negotiation process in South-East Nigeria. In reconciling theories on 
structure and agency with my field findings on bridewealth negotiation, I argue that a needs-
based approach to the structure-agency interaction is best suited to bridewealth negotiation. I 
further argue that a needs-based approach to power relations in bridewealth negotiation reveal 
interdependency in structure and agency, which questions dualist theories on their relationship. 
On the one hand, a needs-based approach reveals that high bridewealth is constructed by the 
economic and personal motives of families and clans. On the other hand, it reveals an 
interdependence between structure and agency, which it locates in the complex web linking the 
custodians of culture with agentic tools such as wealth, religion, and education. An aspect of 
this complex web is the dissonance between bridewealth’s contemporary operation and its 
operation in the agrarian past. Although some prospective spouses indicate willingness to 
abandon bridewealth payment, they are mindful of the social legitimacy it confers. This social 
legitimacy is founded on the alliance which bridewealth creates between the spouses’ families, 




and which elders, including the spouses’ parents, exert pressure to maintain. This pressure 
demonstrates what Yarbrough calls ‘affinal understanding of marriage as a union of two 
extended kinship lines’.12 As agents, prospective spouses attempt to deconstruct high 
bridewealth using means such as elopement, co-habitation, and pre-marital pregnancy. They 
also influence bridewealth negotiation through their parents and in-laws’ abilities to reduce 
items on the marriage list and exclude items that contravene their moral beliefs. I conclude this 
chapter by explaining the value of a needs-based approach for understandings of legal 
pluralism, including its significance for development policies in Nigeria.  
 
7.4 Answers from the research question  
The first probe in my research question investigated the factors responsible for high 
bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria. Given the symbolic nature of bridewealth in 
precolonial times, contemporary bridewealth practices are constructed. The factors responsible 
for this construction are socio-economic needs. They are, primarily, opportunism, economic 
wants, and bias against prospective grooms and their families. These factors manifest in 
prospective in-laws’ desire to exploit the wealth of grooms and/or recoup expenses they 
incurred in training their daughters. Some parents and clans demand high bridewealth for brides 
trained in specialist professions such as medicine, geology, engineering, and law. Indeed, in 
several communities, there are separate marriage lists for professionally educated brides, which 
contain more expensive items than for less-educated brides. The factors that induce high 
bridewealth also manifest in clan reciprocity or bias against a groom from an unfriendly clan. 
An unfriendly clan is a historically enemy clan, or a clan that demanded high bridewealth from 
a member of the retaliating clan. High bridewealth also results from inter-racial marriages, 
since the prospective groom is assumed to be ignorant of bridewealth practices in the bride’s 
region. In turn, the factors responsible for high bridewealth payment are fuelled by the 
disruptive manner colonial rule displaced the socio-economic settings in which bridewealth 
payment originated.13 This displacement resulted in, among others, the monetisation and 
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commercialisation of bridewealth payment. Accordingly, a needs-based approach is useful for 
understanding the persistence of high bridewealth payment in South-East Nigeria. 
The second probe examined the role of law in the negotiation process of bridewealth 
payment. Data from research participants reveal that formal/state law plays little or no role in 
bridewealth negotiation. The Limitation of Dowry Law might as well be non-existent, since it 
has no deterrent effect whatsoever on the quantum of bridewealth. Many participants believe 
the Nigerian government has no right to regulate bridewealth when it fails to provide 
employment and socio-economic amenities such as education and healthcare. Similarly, there 
is a perception that the state does not involve communities in legislative decision-making. 
However, other forms of non-state law are prominent in bridewealth practices. These consist 
of customary norms and regulations observed by traditional rulers, parents, elders, and groups 
such as the Umuada and Umunna. There are also norms that emerged from general 
proclamations from traditional rulers and age grade leaders regarding the contents of marriage 
lists.14 The general observance of these norms supports the literature showing how structure is 
sustained by agency through widespread practice. Above all, their observance illustrates the 
influence of needs assessment in normative co-existence. 
The third probe explored the ways in which individuals use agency to manipulate the 
negotiation of bridewealth payment. The manipulation of bridewealth occurs in two ways. The 
first is the construction of bridewealth from symbolic legitimator of marriage to instrument of 
wealth accumulation by poor or opportunistic parents and clan members. The second is the 
deconstruction of bridewealth by prospective spouses and their parents. I found that many 
prospective spouses use economic coercion, cohabitation, and threat of pregnancy as 
bargaining tools to negotiate lower bridewealth payments. Economic coercion is most effective 
where the groom or bride is the major breadwinner of the family. In such cases, parents and 
clansmen try to retain a positive relationship with the prospective spouse by ensuring that the 
bridewealth negotiation runs smoothly. Sixty percent of research participants disclosed that co-
habitation and its attendant risk of pregnancy are effective in reducing high bridewealth and 
forcing the clan to relax some stringent requirements on marriage lists. As an informant stated, 
‘the girls of these days don’t care [for cultural legitimacy] so far as the man loves them.’15 For 
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their part, parents use religion as leverage to remove items like alcohol and cigarettes from the 
marriage list. Some strong-willed, educated parents who have embraced Western values also 
influence bridewealth negotiation by excising some exorbitant items on the marriage list.  
The fourth probe of my research question investigated the significance of the structure-
agency interaction for policy implementation in Nigeria. The widespread disdain for the Dowry 
Law demonstrates the ineffectiveness of a top-down approach to law. Conversely, it shows the 
need for needs-led, bottom-up change, as well as the need to consider socio-economic needs 
when formulating legislation. As von Benda Beckmann argued, development policies are 
geared towards change of behaviour.16 The success of a development policy is thus dependent 
not just on its technical soundness, but also on the processes leading up to its adoption, 
especially consultation between law makers and the people who the law seeks to regulate.  
From my research questions, therefore, the negotiation process of bridewealth payment 
demonstrates the value of approaching the relationship between structure and agency from a 
needs-based perspective.  
 
7.5 Closing remarks and recommendations 
The debate over the interaction of structure and agency will likely not abate in the foreseeable 
future. My research adds to the growing body of literature by showing how a needs-based 
approach avoids some conceptual difficulties such as temporality, structuration, and 
deconstruction. A needs-based view of bridewealth negotiation negates diametric perceptions 
of the structure-agency relationship in a manner that clarifies the interdependency of this 
relationship. In this sense, it resonates with Archer’s morphogenetic theory, which stresses the 
mutual relationship of structure and agency.  
Furthermore, although structure wields considerable influence over agency, this 
influence is not immutable because human behaviour can negate it. The behaviour of some 
actors in bridewealth negotiation demonstrate that structure is constructed and deconstructed 
through human behaviour. The mere fact that bridewealth payment became commercialised is 
evidence of how parents and clansmen constructed it into a cultural institution. Since 
bridewealth is constructed, it can also be deconstructed over time. For example, the acceptance 
of token sums as bridewealth could eventually reinvent its symbolic significance in South-East 
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Nigeria. The motivations behind this acceptance demonstrate the usefulness of a needs-based 
approach to the relationship between structure and agency. What are the implications of this 
complementarity for policy makers?  
The needs-based ways clansmen and parents constructed high bridewealth is significant 
for policy formulation and implementation. Both the distortions of bridewealth’s significance 
and attempts to reinvent its significance flow from socio-economic elements such as 
opportunism and desire for social legitimacy. In turn, these needs are actualised in agency – in 
other words in actions by community members. Where policies fail to take these needs into 
consideration through adequate consultation, such policies could fail. In this sense, the 
widespread disdain shown for the Dowry Law demonstrates the ineffectiveness of a top-down 
approach to policymaking.  
Finally, I reiterate that bridewealth payment does not occur in isolation of socio-
economic elements such as urbanisation, education, religion, and loss of livelihoods. Already, 
these elements are playing influential roles in how individuals exercise their agency in 
bridewealth payment. They demonstrate the usefulness of a needs-based approach in 
understanding how agency produces institutional change. This finding is not peculiar to South-
East Nigeria. Studies from Kenya and China reveal movement in the recipients of bridewealth 
from the bride’s parents and kinsmen to the bride herself, ‘effectively turning bridewealth into 
the wealth of the bride.’17 There seems no reason why such a movement cannot occur in South-
East Nigeria. To facilitate it, government could embark on research, consultations, and 
awareness campaigns, which could culminate in legislation empowering brides to receive their 
own bridewealth. From the opinions expressed by my research participants, such legislation 
will fare better than the Dowry Law, and could eventually help in reducing high bridewealth. 
My findings show that exorbitant items demanded by the Umunna, the Umuada, and other 
social groups, are primarily responsible for high bridewealth. However, the communal agrarian 
settings that necessitated clan members to benefit from bridewealth have been replaced by 
nuclear families living individualistic lifestyles. Many of my interviewees expressed 
displeasure over the distribution of their bridewealth materials among clan members who did 
not contribute anything to the training of brides. Accordingly, paying bridewealth to brides 
would give meaning to the term, ‘bridewealth.’ Such a needs-based shift in bridewealth 
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recipients will not affect the validity of a traditional marriage. In the words of an informant, 
‘the kinsmen can still attend the [marriage] ceremony.’ The socio-economic state of many Igbo 
communities indicates that prospective spouses possess the agency to produce a shift in 
bridewealth beneficiaries. Already, many brides are exerting agency against high bridewealth 
by threats of, and actual cohabitation.  
 
7.6 Going forward 
The interplay of structure and agency is significant for the roles of state law and customary law 
in post-colonial societies. This significance is due to the manner state law emerged. In Nigeria, 
for example, state law is an amalgam of transplanted English laws and local laws, which were 
themselves inspired by English law. During colonial rule, English law was considered superior 
to ‘native laws’ and ‘customs.18  Some of these native laws were abrogated, some were termed 
barbaric, while others were subjected to validity tests and stringent proof in courts before they 
could be recognised.19  Realising the need for members of the community to regulate their own 
affairs, colonial authorities appointed traditional rulers to act as liaisons between them and 
indigenous communities. Long after independence, Nigeria continues to use the colonial legal 
structure as its legal system. Regrettably, this legal system follows a top-down approach due 
to the manner colonial authorities imposed English law on indigenous communities. In this 
sense, a top-down approach neglects the manner customs with agrarian origins struggle to cope 
in modern conditions, thereby creating a dissonance between state law and people’s socio-
economic needs. Once again, this finding resonates with the legal situation in post-colonies.  
In their studies of the interaction of state law and non-state norms in Asia and Africa, 
scholars such as Woodman, Allot, Moore, Chanock, and von Benda-Beckmann,20 have 
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highlighted the differences between the law observed by indigenous communities and the 
perceptions of judges, legislators, and policy makers. These findings are of great significance 
for the structure-versus-agency discourse.21 Specifically, they illustrate the need for a needs-
based approach to the structure-agency interaction. As evident in the Dowry Law, state law is 
not as powerful as government officials would like to believe because of people’s socio-
economic needs. Future research on structure-agency relationship therefore needs to employ a 
needs-based approach to interrogate how state law interacts with the agency of individuals 
subject to non-state normative orders. Areas where such research could yield rich results for 
the structure-agency discourse include bridewealth refund, registration of customary law 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and even inheritance. 
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A.  Introduction/Consent/demographic information   
What is your language preference? Do you mind if this interview is audio-recorded? Recording 
your interview will help me not to miss your opinions and not to misquote you … If you agree, 
do you mind if I use your details in my PhD thesis? If you do not wish them to be included, I 
shall assign a pseudonym to you, and will thereafter call you by that name ...  
  
B.  Background of bridewealth negotiation process   
- Meaning and significance of bridewealth 
- Bridewealth and spousal choices  
- Steps preceding bridewealth payment  
 
C.  Changes in bridewealth practice and its effects 
- Nature of changes 
- Factors that influence changes  
- Resistance to changes  
- Negotiation process of changes  
- Role and influence of law  
 
D.  Negotiation process of bridewealth payment 
- Description of bridewealth negotiation  
- Role players during negotiation   
- Parents, potential spouses, kinsmen 
- Custodians of culture and tradition  
 
E.  Marriage gifts and power dynamics 
- Sharing of marriage gifts  
- Beneficiaries of bridewealth  
- Rationale for beneficiaries 
- Modes of sharing and changes 
- Deviations from sharing formula 
 




F.  Structure versus agency 
- Agentic tools in marriage lists 
- Reasons for agentic tools 
- Strategies for negotiating marriage lists 
 
G.  Law and society 
- Knowledge of bridewealth legislation 
- Compliance/resistance to legislation 
- Reasons for compliance/resistance 



















































































































































































































Occupation Highest level 











35 M Businessman Matric Married 
couple 
Imo 










75 M Businessman Matric Titled man/ 
Parent of a 
couple 
Imo  
6 Chief Okenwa 
(p) 
67 M Businessman Matric Titled man/ 
parent of a 
couple 
Anambra 
7 Chief Olakuso 
(p) 
58 M Businessman Grade 6 Titled man/ 










44 F Businesswoman Matric Married 
couple 
Imo  










36 M Businessman Matric Engaged 
couple 
Anambra 





37 M Teacher Postgraduate Married 
couple 
Imo  
15 Cynthia (P) 29 F Lawyer  Graduate  Engaged 
couple 
Abia  
16 Obi Okeke (P) 35 M Businessman Matric  Married 
couple 
Enugu  
17 Eucharia John 40 F Businesswoman Matric Married 
couple 
Ebonyi  
18 Gwam n’Ihu 
(P) 
40 M Businessman Grade 6 Married 
couple 
Anambra 
19 HRH Ogamba 75 M Teacher  Graduate  Traditional 
leader/ parent 
of a couple 
Imo  
20 HRH Ugoeze 
lolo 
73 F Teacher  Graduate  Traditional 
leader/ parent 




38 M Businessman Grade 6 Married 
couple 
Imo  






62 M Businessman Matric Titled man/ 
parent of a 
couple 
Imo  
23 IO Joshua (p) 62 M Businessman  - Titled man / 
parent of a 
couple 
Abia  
24 John Eze 65 M Businessman Grade 6 parent of a 
couple 
Abia  
25 John Okorie 48 M Businessman Matric Married 
couple 
Ebonyi  





55 M Businessman Matric  Married 
couple 
Imo  




29 Lolo Charity 
(p) 




30 Lolo Iyi (P) 55-60 F Businesswoman Matric Parent of a 
couple 
Imo  
31 Martins(p) 35 M Teacher  Graduate  Engaged 
couple 
Imo  
32 Chinedu (p) 37 M  Engineer Graduate Engaged 
couple 
Abia 
33 Mma Onyi (P) 31 F Businesswoman Matric Married 
couple 
Enugu  





26 F Student  Matric Married 
couple 
Enugu  
36 Mma junior 
(P) 





34 M Businesswoman Matric Engaged 
couple 
Enugu  










60 M Businessman Matric  Parent of a 
couple 
Imo  















60 M Farmer  - parent of a 
couple 
Imo  
45 Uzoma Okoye 32 F Businesswoman Matric 
 
Unmarried  Anambra  
46 Victoria 
Ekeka 
50 F Businesswoman Grade 6 parent of 
couple 
Imo  
47 Odinaka (p) 30 F Lawyer Graduate  Engaged 
couple  
Abia 
 
 
